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ABSTRACT

Policy considerations that affect immigrant ethnic minorities in the Netherlands are addressed by the articles in this volume. The articles cover the following topics: (1) the recent history of migration and general outline of government policy toward immigrant groups; (2) housing and the concentration or dispersal of ethnic group populations; (3) the education and employment of younger members of ethnic communities; (4) the contribution of research and the role of social work; and (5) the dilemmas the Netherlands face in attempting to formulate policy that will account for specific group characteristics and cultural backgrounds and still provide equal treatment for all residents. A final article presents the opinions of several ethnic group leaders about government policy as it is and as they think it should be. (Author/MJL)

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FOREWORD

This issue of 'Planning and Development in the Netherlands' has been devoted entirely to the position of immigrant minorities in the country. Over many centuries the Netherlands has built up a reputation of hospitality towards those who had to leave their own country because of their beliefs or as a result of political developments. The insertion of Huguenots, Jews and – in a more recent past – Indonesian Dutch, offers excellent examples of the proverbial Dutch tolerance being extended to new-comers. These people have not only become integrated into Dutch society – in some cases without completely giving up their own cultural heritage – they have also enriched Dutch cultural life and substantially contributed to the social and economic development of the country.

During the past fifteen years new waves of immigrants have entered the country, unprecendented in size as well as in heterogeneity. A common characteristic of all groups, however, was their modest educational background and hence their low socio-economic status. It was precisely for that reason that the Dutch asked many of them to come – initially on a temporary basis – to do the unattractive work that continued to exist, also in a welfare state. A welfare state that had been able to develop partly also a result of its colonial past. This was the reason why many felt a debt of honour towards the people of these former colonies who were also admitted in large numbers during that same period.

At this moment these newly arrived fellow-countrymen constitute about 4 per cent of the population of the Netherlands. This is relatively little in comparison with neighbouring countries, but given the high population density and the unbalanced distribution of the immigrants over the country, their arrival has led to considerable tension. The tradition of hospitality and tolerance is wearing thin, which is becoming especially clear in times of economic recession.

This is why both national and local government, after some initial hesitance, are now trying to develop an active immigrant policy which aims at mutual adaptation of immigrants and the original population by trying

to offer equal opportunities to members of all groups in what has become a multi-ethnic society.

It will be clear from this issue that those who are in charge of shaping minority policy in the Netherlands face several major dilemmas. Until a few years ago the question whether most immigrants would stay for ever or would return eventually was considered of crucial importance. Now that nearly everyone is convinced of the permanent character of the immigrants' presence new dilemmas have come up.One of these is the question to what extent government policy should take into account specific group characteristics and special claims that stem from the migrants' cultural background or to what extent all residents should be treated on an equal basis. Another dilemma relates to the possible effects of any form of preferential treatment of immigrants which might be seen as detrimental to the original population of comparable socio-economic status. This leads to the important question, of a much wider scope, as to when government policy may be considered succesful in cases where conflicting interests are involved so clearly. Will this be so when policy goals set by government and parliament have been achieved, or when the minority groups under consideration and their representatives are fully satisfied?

These policy dilemmas as well as quite a few others that may be derived from them, are treated more or less explicitly in all articles in this issue. They cover the major fields of policy development, such as: its recent history and general outlines, housing and the concentration/dispersal issue, the educational and employment situation of the so called second generation, the contribution of research and the role of social work. Finally, several minority group leaders give their opinion on government policy as it is and as they think it should be.

H.B. Entzinger.

THE CONTOURS OF A GENERAL MINORITIES POLICY

by M.J.A. Penninx

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the seventies there have been considerable developments in government policy with respect to immigrant groups in the Netherlands. Up to that time care and guidance of each ethnic group of post-war immigrants was in the hands of a different organisation, both within and outside of government, and for each group a different policy applied.
From 1979 there are signs of a significant change of course in government policy: in February 1979 the Minister of the Interior was named co-ordinating minister for minorities policy; within his ministry a weighty Division for the Co-ordination of Minorities Policy was instituted under the directorship of ex-MP and minorities expert Molleman. In March 1980 in its 'Preliminary Reaction to the Report on Ethnic Minorities of the Scientific Council for Government Policy' Government announced that it was taking very seriously the growing problem of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. In this preliminary reaction the main lines were sketched of a new general minorities policy which on essential points deviates sharply from policy which had been followed up to that time: Government proceeds from the assumption that members of minority groups will remain resident in the Netherlands for a long period, and recognises the importance of counteracting the structural lag and cultural isolation of these groups. Priority is given to intensification of policy in the areas of the labour market, housing and education, policy to combat discrimination, and revision of the legal status of members of minority groups. Considerable weight is attached to participation by minority groups in Dutch society and their ability to make themselves heard in the preparation of policy.
In anticipation of this, government already in the 1980 budget appropriated 125 million guilders for the intensification of minorities policy. This financial decision clearly anticipated the form and content of the new policy, and for this reason was somewhat disputed. Later the decision was taken to make the amount of 125 million guilders recurrent in the budgets of following years.

And finally at the end of April 1981 the Minorities Memorandum announced in the preliminary reaction made its appearance: a voluminous document in which the future general minorities policy is outlined and in which notice is given of measures to be taken. Intentionally it is called a *'draft* memorandum'; future minorities policy will only be determined after extensive participation by all the parties concerned.
In this article we will briefly sketch post-war policy, the backgrounds of the above-mentioned change of course in policy, as well as future policy and the organisational form this policy will take.

2. POST-WAR IMMIGRANT GROUPS AND GOVERNMENT POLICY WITH RESPECT TO IMMIGRANTS

Since 1945 the Netherlands has experienced various waves of immigration. We will examine each of these waves and give a short sketch of government policy with respect to each group.

2.1. Repatriates from the Dutch East Indies

As a result of the rapid movement towards independence of the former Dutch East Indies, there was a heavy stream of repatriates to the Netherlands, estimated at between 250.000 and 300.000 persons, in the period after the Second World War up to the beginning of the sixties. This stream was of a heterogeneous nature, a large part being made up of people of mixed Dutch and Indonesian origin, who on the grounds of their Dutch citizenship had the right to settle in the Netherlands. In general the people involved derived from the middle and upper classes of the administration and industry of the former colony, and were reasonably well educated. After a somewhat hesitant start, an active policy was set afoot and the necessary funds were made available for the reception and integration of these immigrants. Policy was aimed at adaptation and rapid assimilation in the labour process. Although the Ministry of Social Work dominated in the execution of policy, other departments also played a role, and policy was co-ordinated in a number of committees. Government could also count on significant contributions from the churches and from private organisations whose work was in turn co-ordinated under a central organisation. (See also Van Praag, 1973).
The conditions for a rapid assimilation of this category of immigrants were thus fairly favourable: the immigrants were reasonably well equipped for Dutch society; an active government policy supported by broad segments

of society, and favourable economic developments in the Netherlands at the time of their arrival.
Though possibly not all repatriates really feel assimilated in Dutch society, we may conclude that at the present moment there are no reasons for considering this category as a minority group which as such calls for systematic government attention.

2.2. The Moluccans.

Matters proceeded very differently with respect to the Moluccan ex-military of the Royal Netherlands East-Indies Army and their families who in 1951, under pressure of political developments in Indonesia, came to the Netherlands. Contrary to the will of the Dutch government these Moluccan servicemen had wrested a court order granting the right to come to the Netherlands. Both the Moluccans and the government regarded the sojourn in the country as temporary.
For a long time policy proceeded from the assumption of temporary residence: in anticipation of their repatriation to the Moluccan islands, the Moluccans were temporarily accommodated in a number of settlements. Originally policy was directed at counteracting assimilation in the labour market, and it was considered undesirable to disperse the group. Only after many years when it became obvious that repatriation to an independent Republic of the South-Moluccas was out of the question, and other possibilities for repatriation were rejected by the group, it was appreciated that the nature of the sojourn of these people was to be lengthy, and government turned its attention to realising a proper place for the Moluccans in Dutch society.
Till 1970 execution of this policy rested with the Commissariat for Amboinese Affairs (CAZ) of the Ministry of Social Work, later the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work (CRM). The CAZ had wide powers, and in practice it dealt with all policy concerning this group. Other departments were not or only very marginally concerned with this policy. The closing down of the CAZ in 1970 thus in fact also implied a strong reduction of policy, and the remaining duties were transferred to the Moluccans Division of the same ministry.
Only after the hijacking of trains by some young Moluccans in the mid-seventies policy with respect to the Moluccans was subjected to scrutiny, and a completely new vision was presented in the Report 'The Problem of the Moluccan Minority in the Netherlands' (1978). On the one hand this memorandum draws up a balance of more than 25 years of policy with

respect to the Moluccans, in which various mistakes are acknowledged, and on the other hand a policy is outlined which on a number of points may be viewed as a forerunner of the recently formulated minorities policy. (See section 4).

2.3. Mediterranean workers and their families

The arrival of large groups of workers from the Mediterranean area has particularly been the consequence of the rapid economic expansion in the Netherlands after 1950 and the manner in which the resulting shortage in the labour market was dealt with. The Dutch government viewed this migration as an instrument for solving temporary bottlenecks in the provision of labour. Originally migration was instigated by industry itself and government only served as a marginal control authority. From 1968 government busied itself increasingly with the regulation of this migration by introducing stricter rules for recruitment, entry and employment. Since the end of 1973 (the oil-crisis) the recruitment of foreign labour has come almost to a stand-still: only in very exceptional cases is new labour recruited. Since that time however there has been a considerable increase in immigration in the context of family reunions.

Policy with respect to Mediterranean workers and their families was always passive and ad hoc, since it was assumed that their sojourn was temporary and it was consequently considered that only limited facilities were required for their reception and guidance. The reason for migration was (temporary) work, and for this reason the Minister of Social Affairs played the largest role in this policy and was later co-ordinating minister for this policy. For a long time only the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work concerned itself with the social consequences of the sojourn of these immigrants in the country. Only in seventies, with the increasing number of family reunions, other departments were also confronted with the presence of Mediterranean workers and their families and the accompanying problems. Up to this time, however, there was no question of a co-ordinated active policy.

2.4. Migrants from Surinam

Until 1965 there was constant but limited migration between Surinam and the Netherlands, migration streams in which students occupied a prominent position. There was no special policy with respect to this group. Later, however, increasingly more people seeking work, originally deriving

mainly from the Creole population, joined the migratory movement to the Netherlands. This swelling migration stream reached its summit in 1973-1975, shortly before Surinam became an independent republic on 25th November 1975. After a relative stop in 1976-77 the migration stream again swelled considerably till 25th November 1980, when the 'agreement between the Netherlands and Surinam regarding sojourn and settlement by citizens of one country in the other country' expired.
Up to 1973 there was practically no question of any policy with respect to Surinamers in the Netherlands. The Ministry of CRM only subsidised a few special institutions which dealt with reception, guidance and providing of information for these Surinamese immigrants.
The heavy stream of immigrants in 1974 and 1975 had as a consequence that government activities were greatly intensified: a policy was drawn up which was to a large degree fashioned on measures taken with respect to repatriates from Indonesia. The policy structure included an interdepartmental co-ordinating body. A fairly large sum of money was made available for the purpose, and several departments under the guidance of the Minister of CRM as co-ordinating minister, were involved in this policy. Only in 1977 was this new policy laid down in a government memorandum: 'The Position of Migrants from Surinam in the Netherlands and Medium Term Policy' (Rijswijk, 1977).

2.5. Migrants from the Netherlands Antilles

Migration from the Netherlands Antilles received a fillip around 1965 as a consequence of recruitment of labour by Dutch industry and institutions. In the seventies migration stabilised around a net migration surplus of 2500 per annum.
From a policy point of view Antillean migrants received little specific attention. The Ministry of CRM was responsible for some action in the area of welfare. In recent years it has been possible for Antilleans to participate to a limited degree in facilities which had been made available for migrants from Surinam.

2.6. Refugees

The presence of groups of refugees in the Netherlands results from the principle that, independent of political sympathies with the refugees and of economic interests, the country invites political refugees on a humanitarian basis or that it grants refugees already in the country refugee status on request.

The groups of refugees who have been granted admission are of various origins: among the older refugees are Hungarians and Czecks, and in recent years the Netherlands extended invitations to refugees from Uganda, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Vietnam. In addition to this, among others, Portuguese, and Syrian Orthodox and Armenian Christians from Turkey were granted entry. With respect to refugees invited to the country (A-status refugees), government set afoot an intensive reception policy aimed at integration into Dutch society. Execution of this policy was concentrated mainly with the Ministry of CRM. For refugees who were granted entry (B-status refugees) there are hardly any extra facilities nor a reception policy.
The reception policy with respect to refugees to whom an invitation was extended rests with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while decisions concerning the granting of B-status to refugees who ask for asylum, rests with the Ministry of Justice.

2.7. Gypsies

Gypsies who traditionally and legally reside in the Netherlands have never been the subject of any specific policy; of old they came under the policy which applies to caravan dwellers in general. In 1977 however a few hundred gypsies who resided illegally in the Netherlands were registered and legalised. Since then a separate policy involving considerable resources and aiming at absorbing these gypsies into Dutch society on a sedentary basis, has been in operation.

2.8. Other immigrants

Apart from the above-mentioned groups who in the past have become subject of government policy, there were many others who came to the Netherlands after the Second World War. The number of EC-citizens for example has increased considerably, but apart from general policy in the framework of the EC, they are not subject of any national government policy. The number of citizens from non-European industrialised countries has also grown, as has the number of citizens from Third World countries. With respect to these groups no special policy exists either.
Finally, a striking phenomenon in the Netherlands is the considerable increase in the number of Chinese, especially after 1960. Their numbers are at present estimated at approximately 30.000. The majority of these people work in the catering business. Up to the present they do not form the subject of an explicit government policy.

Turkish wedding (Rotterdam)

8-a

CONCLUSION

In the period after the Second World War the Netherlands considered herself a densely populated or even over-populated nation. Immigration was not considered desirable and on many occasions government memoranda posed that the Netherlands should not be permitted to become an immigration country. In spite of this, since 1945 large groups of people have come to the Netherlands and remained. They came at various times, for varying reasons and in different migration waves. The migration streams which resulted from a more or less political background (repatriates from the former Dutch East-Indies, the Moluccans and Surinamese before 1975) came more or less unexpectedly. They could not be refused entry because this either was not politically expedient or would not have been acceptable. Migration streams with an economic background (workers from the Mediterranean area) came about at the express desire of and as a consequence of requirements in the Netherlands. The much greater migration stream consisting of the families of these workers was neither desired nor anticipated, but nonetheless it was not possible to staunch it. Generally speaking, it may be concluded that the immigration policy of the Dutch government has always been restrained, if not actively restrictive (with the exception of the Mediterranean workers in the early phase) though considerations of a humanitarian nature were not disregarded. As against this, however, government was constantly inclined to view the migration streams to the Netherlands as temporary.

This attitude to a large extent determined the goals set by government and the effort it expended for receiving and guiding and aiding these immigrant groups. Policy was to a large extent ad hoc and two-sided: a certain degree of integration in and adaptation to Dutch society was considered essential for as long as these immigrants should remain in the Netherlands. This adaptation or integration was however not seen in the perspective of a lengthy sojourn or even permanent residence in the Netherlands, and thus did not call for heavy stakes as regards policy and resources. Only with respect to the repatriates from Indonesia, after some vascillation, at an early stage government decided on a forcible policy aimed at rapid and complete assimilation. With respect to other groups change in policy has come only recently: with respect to the Surinamese immigrants after 1975; with respect to the Moluccans after 1977 and with respect to part of the gypsies also after 1977. As far as Mediterranean workers and Antilleans are concerned, only in 1980 did the 'Preliminary Reaction to the Report on

Ethnic Minorities of the Scientific Council for Government Policy' make a pronouncement regarding a fundamental change of policy.

3. GROWTH TOWARDS NEW POINTS OF DEPARTURE AND POLICY CONCEPTS

The question as to which factors played an important role in bringing about a new minorities policy can not be treated in full here. Nonetheless I would like to point to certain factors which, viewed in relation to each other, have in my opinion been of considerable importance. In this process the context within which discussion regarding minorities and minorities policy took place will be sketched briefly.

Increasing discrepancy between facts and policy

Especially in the decade 1970-1980 it became clear that government policy with respect to the various immigrant groups was far from adequate. The point of departure that the immigration of most groups was of a temporary nature increasingly proved mistaken. Partly as a consequence of the considerable amount of immigration in this decade (especially families of Mediterranean workers, Surinamers and Antilleans) and as a result of the stagnating economic development, it became increasingly clear that a restrained policy operated mainly from the Ministry of CRM, the welfare department, was far from being sufficient to guarantee the immigrants a reasonably acceptable place in Dutch society; the more so since the immigrants derived increasingly from lower socio-economic strata and were extremely ill equipped for rapid insertion into Dutch society.

In addition to this, the immigrants tended to congregate heavily in sectors of the four large cities in the West of the country and in a number of industrialised centres in other parts of the country. Even without immigration, these areas showed signs of congestion, one symptom of which was the shortage of dwellings. It soon became evident that various departments and their services were increasingly confronted with the presence of immigrants: the Ministry of Social Affairs was confronted with a very high and increasing degree of unemployment among members of the immigrant groups, and with difficulties in finding them work in view of the lack of education and experience of many of them. Municipal housing services were confronted with large numbers of immigrants seeking dwellings, on a scale for which their services, distribution system and supply were far from adequate. Schools received large numbers of children of immigrants, while they had no adequate answer to the problems arising as a consequence of this influx.

The confusing aspect of all this was that a different policy was pursued with respect to each immigrant group. Certain facilities were found to be available to certain groups but not to others, though the institutions concerned were becoming increasingly aware that the problem of integration in the Dutch society and of winning a place in that society showed the same characteristics for all minority groups. An important source of problems of integration was in fact found to be Dutch society as such, the selection mechanisms which operated in society and the inaccessibility of this society for these immigrants.

Action and research

Research and public opinion polls indicate that the climate in the Netherlands and the attitude of individual Dutch people to immigrants has become less favourable in the past decade, and that in a number of areas discrimination appears to be increasingly prevalent. On the other hand one should not lose sight of the fact that immigrants and minorities receive friendly overtures and assistance from many Dutchmen. It is noteworthy how great has been the influence of social action by either the local population or immigrants or combinations of both, on the development of policy in the interest of immigrants.

In the first place there are numerous volunteer groups who either on their own or in co-operation with the immigrant groups in question have set themselves up as defenders of the rights and interests of the immigrants, and often voice sharp criticism with respect to government policy. Perhaps of even greater importance is the fact that in the course of the years the Ministry of CRM has granted financial aid to private institutions for the reception and guidance of the various immigrant groups. It was precisely these welfare institutions dealing specifically with immigrants which, drawing on their experience, often brought abuses to light and criticised policy.

Of a completely different nature, but certainly no less consequential, were the acts of violence by certain groups of Moluccan youth; the forcible occupation of offices and hijacking of trains. Short term, these actions exerted a negative influence, but at the same time it is indisputable that they opened the eyes of many to a problem which up to that time had been ignored, and that they provided the impulse for a completely different policy.

The effectivity of the above-mentioned forms of protest is to a large extent dependent on the amount of attention they receive from the press and mass

media. In this respect the situation in the Netherlands, by comparison with surrounding countries, must be viewed as relatively favourable: immigrant groups and action groups fairly quickly find a willing ear in these media for voicing their grievances and criticism, and the interest shown in minority groups is relatively great.

Up to recently the role of research was only very limited: before 1975 only a few researchers devoted any attention to immigrant groups in the Netherlands, and within government only the Ministry of CRM played a role of any significance in initiating research. Nonetheless a number of scientific publications have performed an important function as catalyser. A first important work was the reader 'Immigrants in the Netherlands' (1973) edited by Verwey-Jonker, compiled on the commission of the Ministry of CRM. In particular the article by Van Praag in this volume provided various points of departure for a new policy. An article by Entzinger in 'Beleid en Maatschappij' (Policy and Society) dating from 1975 embroiders further on Van Praag's article in the light of new facts, after which others pursue this trend of thought. Van Amersfoort's doctoral dissertation (1974) occupies a special position: he makes a comparative description of the most important post-war immigrant groups and views this in the perspective of theoretical concepts such as minority group formation.

The most important impulse which government received from science to change its policy was the report 'Ethnic Minorities' (1979) of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR). The reason for the influence exerted by this report was not so much that the ideas it contained were completely new: they derive from and expand on the ideas of the authors mentioned above; but because this report makes a policy-oriented synthesis of the state of knowledge, and because this report was presented to government with the political weight of the WRR behind it. (For the content of the report see Planning and Development in the Netherlands 1979, No. 1).

The official and political climate

On the grounds of the experience that a welfare policy alone is inadequate to exert a (positive) influence on the position of immigrant groups, especially in the seventies the Ministry of CRM exerted considerable pressure on other departments to develop a policy of their own with respect to the various minority groups. These attempts at pressuring other authorities were far from being always successful, so that in fact the emphasis in policy

continued to rest on the welfare sector. It turned out that political decisions on a high level were necessary to achieve a fundamental break-through in the historically evolved division of tasks with respect to immigrants.
In 1977 and 1978 during and after the debates on the government memoranda on Surinamers and Moluccans, several MP's also voiced the opinion that general reform of minorities policy was needed. This coincided with the appearance of the WRR report. It would appear to me that one important aspect in arriving at a new policy is that the problem of minorities and minorities policy is not the subject of political controversy with strongly divided party opinions. Only one political party, the Netherlands People's Union (NVU) ever had explicit programme items in a negative sense regarding foreigners and minorities who reside in the Netherlands. This party has never had a representative in Parliament. By comparison with surrounding countries it is striking that up to now political parties are in general positive and careful in their treatment of the question of minorities and immigrants. Viewed politically there would seem to be a broad basis for a new minorities policy, which was as it were symbolised by the appointment as head of the Directorate for the Co-ordination of Minorities Policy of the minorities expert and ex-MP of the largest opposition party.

4. THE OUTLINES OF THE DRAFT MINORITIES MEMORANDUM

The preliminary reaction of government of 17th March 1980 to the WRR report 'Ethnic Minorities' already indicated the main lines of policy. It took more than a year before the co-ordinating minister for minorities policy on 28th April 1981 published details of that policy in the minorities memorandum. Apparently more time was needed than was originally foreseen to achieve a concrete form for the policy changes announced and to arrive at a consensus within the government apparatus now that all its various branches were involved with the question of minorities policy. Partly due to the fact that so many sectors of the government apparatus are involved, this memorandum is a sizeable document of 300 pages, more than 250 of which are devoted to considerations and measures in sub-areas for which various departments are responsible. Consequently this section cannot deal with more than a few main points of the report. In general I will stick to the sequence adhered to in the memorandum. First of all the memorandum gives a short analysis of the question of minorities in the Netherlands, after which the goals, conditions and organisational framework of the minorities policy are outlined. In the third part of the memorandum

policy measures are dealt with. These are grouped according to themes, which to a large extent coincide with the policy areas of the various departments which are involved in minorities policy.

Analysis (Part I)

Government considers the following groups as minority groups which fall under the minorities policy: 1. Mediterranean workers and their families; 2. people of Surinamese origin; 3. people of Antillean origin; 4. Moluccans; 5. Refugees; 6. Gypsies, and 7. caravan dwellers. The total number of people involved is approximately 500.000. Other groups, such as the Chinese, may be brought under this policy in future if there are indications for this. The inclusion of caravan dwellers in this list is remarkable: though these people are Dutch by origin, government argues that their social position in many respects resembles that of ethnic minorities: their (sub)culture, their social lag and isolation.

The analysis of the position and future of minorities in the Netherlands is in broad lines based on the views expressed in the Recommendations of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (see Planning and Development in the Netherlands, 1979, No. 1). It is expected that large sections of the minority groups now resident in the Netherlands will remain and that in the future their numbers will increase considerably mainly as a consequence of family reunions and births in the Netherlands.

This has far-reaching consequences for Dutch society and for policy. The groups involved are people with different cultural backgrounds, different life-styles and different norms and values. This could result in cultural confrontations, in which the immigrants will constitute the weak party. There is a large risk of cultural and thus also of social isolation of these minority groups, unless adaptation to and respect for each others culture are desired of and realised by both the immigrants and the host society.

This danger of social isolation and structural lag among minority groups by comparison with the autochthonous population is the greater on account of the fact that these minorities must seek to win a place in Dutch society from a very disadvantageous position: in times of stagnating economic development things automatically become more difficult for socio-economically weak groups. By comparison with socially weak groups among the original population, ethnic minority groups are in addition faced with other specific handicaps: they are unfamiliar with Dutch society and often with the language; as foreigners the legal position of many of them is weak; institutions which are of importance for all residents in the country are too

little accessible to minority groups; they are confronted with prejudice and discrimination.
The analysis stresses that for certain categories within the minority groups there are even extra impediments. In this context particular mention is made of women, the youth and old people.
Finally in the analytical section a short overview is given of the policy followed with respect to minority groups in the past. At the same time the ineffectivity of this policy is recognised and important points of departure for a new policy are implicitly formulated.
In the first place government acknowledges that it had misjudged the size and nature of migration. 'What was originally viewed as a temporary sojourn of a limited group of migrants proved to be a lengthy, if not permanent, residence of large groups'.
In the second place policy was strongly focused on the separate minority groups, and the emphasis was mainly on welfare policy. The host society and the aspects relating to development towards a multi-cultural society received only limited attention.
In the third place there was a lack of any clear co-ordination of policy which was carried out by separate departments for various minority groups.
In the fourth place the minority groups themselves in general had too little say in the formulation of policy.

Goals, conditions and the organisational framework of minorities policy (Part II).

'Minorities policy is aimed at creating a society in which the members of minority groups resident in the Netherlands, both individually and as groups, have an equal place and full opportunities for development.
This goal is further specified in three main themes:

a. Minorities policy is aimed at creating those conditions for minority groups which are essential for their emancipation and their ability to participate in society. Promotion of mutual adaptation and acceptance of all population groups by each other is essential. Emancipation is viewed in a wide sense: not only as a process of hightening self-esteem and self-awareness of the minority groups and of the individual members of these groups. Emancipation is also aimed at influencing the surrounding society in such a way that it will continue to afford these minority groups scope for development.

b. Minorities policy is aimed at reducing social and economic lag of members of minority groups.
c. Minorities policy is aimed at preventing discrimination, and at combating it where it does occur, as well as at improving the legal position of members of minority groups in as far as this is necessary.'

It is clear, and government wants to emphasize this, that in seeking to achieve this goal the minorities question is a responsibility of society as a whole and that policy is actively directed at society.
Furthermore various considerations which may be seen as conditions and points of departure for policy are associated with this goal:
In the first place *policy should be intensified.* Government announced that recently extra finances have been made available, but at the same time poses that in the future the departments themselves must provide the necessary extra funds by means of revising their expenditure.
In the second place government poses that the area of minorities policy which is aimed at eradicating lag *should preferably be couched within a general policy framework*. That is to say that policy aimed at eradicating lag of all socio-economically weak groups in the labour market, in housing, in education, etc., should devote specific attention to minority groups.
The third point of departure is that an intensified minorities policy must go hand in hand with a *restrictive* immigration policy. The reason for this is that government is of the opinion that a liberal policy of admission would undermine the chances of a successful minorities policy (and the ability to command the necessary resources).
Three points of departure are stressed as regards the organisational framework for the execution of policy:
In the first place *there must be proper co-ordination of policy*, under the auspices of the Minister for the Interior, between the various departments which are responsible for policy in the various areas.
In the second place the *lower levels of government* (provinces and especially municipalities) are ascribed an important role in the execution of policy. The co-ordinating minister must stimulate and lend assistance to these lower levels of government and co-ordinate their activities with national policy. An Executive Costs Regulation for municipalities has recently come into effect. According to this regulation the municipalities receive a contribution from government for special executive costs relating to setting afoot and executing a local minorities policy.
In the third place government considers it of great importance that organisations of *minority groups* should have a say in policy. A Bill regulating

participation by minorities is announced. Point of departure is that each minority group will have its own participatory body at a national level. At a local level too participation is encouraged, especially by stipulating when providing the municipalities with funds in the framework of the Executive Costs Regulation that participation be realized. Reference is made to promises already made in the preliminary reaction by government to the WRR report that when necessary and possible policy decisions by government regarding minorities policy will be made public in draft form to permit of participation before definite decisions are taken. Where the recommendations of participatory bodies are not followed reasons will have to be given.

Policy measures (Part III).

This part of the report discusses ten aspects of minorities policy and announces numerous policy measures and intentions. This summary can only briefly refer to a few.

1. *Immigration and admission policy*
   It is again stated here that a restrictive admission policy will be followed. International obligations will however be honoured. In fact only few measures are announced. On the Belgian frontier control will be intensified and the question is under consideration whether a visa should be made compulsory for certain nationalities. One measure which is mentioned is that the lowering of the majority age in the Netherlands from 21 to 18 will be effective in the context of the right of family reunion.

2. *General policy aspects*
   In this section various themes are dealt with. The most important of these are:
   - Government strives to improve the *legal position* of members of minority groups who are not Dutch nationals. Government follows the advice of the WRR that when an immigrant is admitted to the country it should be made clear what is the nature and duration of the stay. For people who have been resident for more than 10 years a few structural improvements are under consideration: it will become practically impossible to evict these people from the country.
   - Government endeavours to arrive at a more effective policy with respect to prosecution in cases of *racial discrimination*. A number of

changes in the law are already being prepared and the possibility is being studied of setting up an institute for the lodging of complaints.
- Government aims at increasing the *influence of minorities* in society. A bill is being prepared which will grant foreigners the vote at a municipal level. Other possibilities for participation in the administration will also be stimulated. Furthermore government lends its support to strengthening minorities organisations.
- It is announced that *language interpretation centres* will be organised along other lines so that they will be more widely accessible and be financed by government.

3. *Labour market policy*

The conclusion is drawn that the position of both working and non-working members of minority groups in the labour market is weak. Unemployment among minority groups is very high: while the rate of unemployment among the Dutch was 7% at the end of December 1980, the unemployment rate for Mediterranean workers and for all other foreigners was twice as high; among Surinamers, Antilleans and Moluccans the unemployment percentage fluctuated at about three-fold this percentage. Among refugees, gypsies and caravan dwellers unemployment is even much higher.

The measures which have been announced or are under consideration concentrate almost exclusively on lowering this high rate of unemployment and on furthering access to the labour market. Since a too low level of education among minority groups is viewed as the most important reason for the inaccessibility of the labour market, particular emphasis is placed on the creation of new measures to ease the situation in this area:
- More possibilities will be created for the unemployed among minority groups to take courses of elementary education as well as to obtain vocational skills and orientation in the labour market. This will increase their chances of obtaining a job and they will also become more eligible for vocational training.
- Existing courses of vocational training will be made more easily accessible to members of minority groups, and the regulation governing grants for courses which highten the chance of making an entry into the labour market will be expanded with respect to minority groups.

In addition to this, government has various measures in view which

aim at making it more attractive to employers to hire immigrants (wage cost subsidies), at furthering the mobility of workers (removal costs regulations), and at intensifying and expanding the role played by Regional Labour Offices.

4. *Housing policy*

In this area too government proceeds from a 'demonstrable lag' among minority groups by comparison with the original population. Policy in this area is however emphatically non-specific: it has been found that there are great similarities between the housing problems of socio-economically weak members of the original population and of immigrants. When pursuing such a general policy account must however be taken of some specific characteristics of minority groups. A second important point of departure is that policy is neither aimed at dispersal nor at concentration of minority groups. The analysis focuses on three bottle-necks: the supply of dwellings, quality of housing and level of rents, and the distribution of dwellings.

Measures are aimed at resolving these bottle-necks:

- Government considers realizing an extra housing programme. These extra dwellings would not be earmarked specifically for minority groups; but in the programme as a whole account would be taken of the specific needs of minority groups, such as relatively large cheap dwellings for large families from minority groups.
- Government aims to improve the quality of housing and the ability of minority groups to pay for this housing by adapting individual rent subsidies to specific characteristics of these groups and by creating new facilities for the improvement of dwellings.
- In co-operation with municipalities and housing corporations government hopes to stimulate a more just distribution of dwelling space for minorities.

No concrete measures to this end are mentioned.

5. *Education policy*

Already in March 1980 a detailed draft policy plan of the Ministry of Education and Science made its appearance. After discussion and opportunities for participation, the Minister presented his definite policy plan for education for minority groups simultaneously with the draft minorities memorandum. A summary of the educational plans is given in the draft minorities memorandum.

Educational policy with respect to minorities focuses on four aspects:

- *Problems of adjustment* when entering Dutch schools. The point of departure is that in as far as is necessary facilities must be made available for dealing with problems of adjustment among children from minority groups. Existing arrangements are expanded and extra staff and resources will be approved.
- For a number of groups tuition in *their own mother tongue and culture* will be possible in the total educational packet. This must however be incorporated in harmonious manner. A Bill will be introduced to govern this type of education.
- *The reduction of educational lag* among children from minority groups will continue to be an important goal. By means of re-schooling and additional schooling of teachers and expansion of school guidance services, teachers should be equipped to provide these children with the necessary attention which they require.
- By means of 'intercultural education' in the schools an *acculturation process* should be set afoot: children should get to know each other's cultures better and as a consequence better learn to accept and appreciate each other. This calls for the revision of learning resources and the training of teachers. Various measures are being taken to this end.

6. *Welfare policy*

In this area there were always considerable facilities available. Much of the old policy was however strongly directed at minority groups; that is to say specific instruments aimed exclusively at minority groups outside of the general welfare facilities. In this extensive part of the memorandum, old functions are preserved, but a few new elements are added. In the new policy emphasis is on putting general welfare facilities to use for minority groups, and on decentralisation of the execution of a large part of this policy from the ministry of CRM to municipalities.

This new policy is aimed at four aspects:

- the making accessible to minority groups of general institutions for social services, socio-cultural work, recreation, sports etc.
- the furthering of participation by minority groups in society, also at an administrative level;
- equipping minority groups for Dutch society by means of language and orientation courses and general education;
- making available facilities which promote the preservation and development of the culture of the various minority groups.

7. *Health care*
Policy in this area focuses on making health care accessible to minority groups. Attention is focused on a few specific problems such as drug addiction and psycho-social and psycho-somatic problems.

8. *Police and justice*
It has been found that law and police are increasingly involved with minority groups. Measures which are announced are mainly in the area of re-schooling and additional schooling for officials in these services in order to improve their ability to cope and to provide the necessary aid.

9. *Return migration*
The memorandum poses that return migration to the country of origin should be a free individual choice. Government does not want to make its assumption that a large part of the minority groups now present in the country will settle here, a self-fulfilling prophecy. It desires to simplify return migration for those who have concrete plans for returning to their own countries. Return migration facilities will be made available and a study made of the question.

Conclusions

By comparison with the situation up to a short time ago, the draft minorities memorandum must be seen as a big step forward. The question of immigration and minority groups is gone into explicitly and analysed, starting points for policy are chosen realistically, and ideas for a future approach are developed.
In the second place the fact that the memorandum faces up to some of the main problems of minority groups, such as work, housing and education, and that the basic principles for policy strategies have been formulated would appear to me to be of great importance. It must however be added that the policies announced sometimes concentrate on a few arresting problems. For instance in the area of labour the position of employed persons and those who (would like to) work independently is hardly discussed.
And, last but not least, the question arises whether all the proposals and measures under consideration which have been listed in the memorandum

can be realised. The memorandum does go into the question of finances in one section, but it only discusses what resources are at present available (in total approximately 600 million guilders for items which are explicitly intended for minority groups). The question as to where resources for measures which have been decided upon and *new* measures under consideration must come from is clearly answered: by the revision of resources within the various departments. This implies a heavy mortgage on future minorities policy. The definite minorities memorandum, which will appear after participatory discussion early in 1982, will have to provide clarity on this point.

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Moslem-feast (Bijlmermeer, Amsterdam)

DISPERSION AND DISPERSAL POLICY

by C.S. van Praag

1. TERMINOLOGY

In this article the terms dispersion and concentration are used alternately to define a state of spatial distribution of immigrants. The difference lies merely in the direction in which the phenomenon is measured. Both terms are used in their static sense and, unless otherwise stated, not for spatial concentration or deconcentration processes. Finally, the terms are used in a neutral sense, unlike such terms as ghetto and ghetto-formation, which denote an unfavourable phenomenon or process. The term segregation will also crop up in the course of this article. This term is often associated with the existence of social barriers between different population groups, a phenomenon which relates to ghetto-formation and is generally given a negative evaluation. Here, however, segregation stands for the measure in which two population groups live spatially mixed or segregated, independent of the causes or the implications thereof. Hence, it is a neutral term, denoting the spatial distribution of population groups with respect to each other. It then usually determines the concentration of minority with respect to majority.

In the Netherlands the term ethnic minorities is usually reserved for migrants from the Mediterranean countries, Surinamers, Antilleans, Moluccans, and refugees of different nationalities. Indo-Europeans and aliens of West-European and Anglo-Saxon origin are generally not counted as minority groups. For practical reasons this article deals principally with Mediterranean migrants, Surinamers and Antilleans. Other groups are of less significance numerically. The Moluccans exhibit very specific dispersion characteristics, which would certainly warrant a detailed discussion. It is precisely on account of this idiosyncratic character of the Moluccan settlement and the many pages an adequate treatment would take that this group has been left out of consideration.

The term immigrants is frequently used in this article as identical to ethnic

minority groups, though some of the members of these groups have not actually immigrated but were born in this country.

2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION

Dispersion and concentration can be considered at different levels. There is national dispersion and local dispersion at district – neighbourhood – street – block and apartmenthouse level. In the present article the focus is mainly on the dispersion of immigrants over districts of large cities. On this level a reasonable quantity of material is available while at the same time this type of data is most indicative of the social position of the immigrants. Differentiation according to socio-economic status takes place at this level, and any processes of ghetto-formation can best be observed here.

In much of the literature, more especially the American literature, the measure of dispersion at this level is seen as an indicator for integration or assimilation of immigrant groups and, considering the manner in which the majority of European migrants have become part of the American community, there is much to be said for this approach. Spatial dispersion of immigrants then indeed appears to be associated with other indicators for integration or assimilation, such as occupational distribution, knowledge of the language of the host community, participation in this community, mixed marriages, which all in turn are also associated with length of stay and generation[1].

These relationships are also observed for a younger immigration country like Australia[2].

But the model is not universal. On the one hand there are voluntarily chosen forms of segregation, which are in no way associated with poor participation in the host community or with prosperity deficiencies. In the Netherlands, for example, the residents from other E.C. countries are sometimes to be found living in concentrations which are not much less dense than those of people originating from the Mediterranean recruitment countries[3]. The striking, for that matter policy-induced, degree of segregation exhibited by the Moluccans does not conform to the American dispersion model either. On the other hand there are institutional forms of segregation, which are not associated with length of stay, knowledge of the language or even with the prosperity of the minority group either. The segregation of blacks in American cities represents this type of concentration, directly imposed by actions on the part of the majority.

The forms of concentration mentioned here are distinguished by various authors. Boal for instance uses the terms 'colonies' (temporary concen-

trations associated with the migration phase), enclaves (voluntarily chosen forms of segregation) and ghettos (imposed forms of concentration)[4]. Van Amersfoort uses a similar classification[5].

The distinctions made would appear to be merely of a typological nature. Concentrations are sometimes based both on internal cohesion of the migrant group, with a tendency towards voluntary segregation, and on pressure exerted by the majority. Status and acculturation variables invariably have some influence both on the degree of internal cohesion and on the degree of segregation, which the majority wishes or is able to impose.

The ethnic concentrations, which now appear to occur in the Netherlands, are probably the most resemblant to the 'colonies' of Boal, the background being the migration situation and the status factor. There is little evidence of an elitist or some other voluntarily chosen form of segregation. It is on the other hand true that ghetto-like elements can be observed in the concentrations. Certainly in the recent past there have been – not altogether unsuccessful – attempts on the part of the majority, both individuals and organizations, to keep members of minority groups out of certain districts[6].

As against this there is a certain pressure exerted by the authorities to break through these barriers, as well and some penetration by minority groups into newer districts commenced long before the saturation point of the concentration districts was reached. Tipping-point phenomena, i.e. the fairly rapid shift of a district on account of the original population deliberately abandoning the district, have not yet clearly come to light either. The immigration in the Netherlands, however, is of recent date and not yet completed. Family reunion is still causing the number of migrants to rise substantially. It is impossible at the present time to draw definitive conclusions. For example, it is not yet clear how long the social status factor resulting in the concentration of immigrants in certain, low-rated districts will continue to be of influence. The formation of a largely ethnic social rear may not be excluded. The perspectives as regards employment, as are now beginning to show up in outline, are not altogether reassuring. Quite apart from this it must be considered that in the Netherlands, and this is true for the whole of Western Europe, actual labour migration has practically come to an end and that those who settled last are not, as was the case with the European immigrants in America, pushed up by an even less adapted group of newcomers.

3. DISPERSION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL.

Before going into the dispersion within the cities any further some remarks on national dispersion are in place. Despite the empty cells it is evident from Table 1 that in the period 1975-1980 a certain degree of dispersion took place of Surinamers and Antilleans from the four major cities, namely Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. This could have been the result of a deliberately conducted dispersal policy for these groups. This policy, however, was discontinued for the greater part in 1979 and because the immigration of Surinamers and Antilleans has continued since that time it is by no means certain that their deconcentration throughout the country will continue. There has never been a dispersal policy for Mediterranean groups. Hence, their share in the population of the four largest cities rose steadily in the period mentioned.

Table 1 Distribution of immigrants according to size of municipality in per cent. of the national total per group 1975-1980

	Early 1975			Early 1977			Early 1980		
	Med.	Sur/ Ant	Tot. Pop.	Med.	Sur/ Ant	Tot. Pop.	Med.	Sur/ Ant/	Tot. Pop.
4 large cities	35,8	58	15,6	38,1	51	14,9	39,1	50	14,1
other mun. > 100.000 inh.			12,3	14,5		12,8			12,7
mun. <100.000 inh.			72,1	47,4		72,3			73,2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Municipal and CBS-figures.

Table 2 Percentage of immigrants in total population of the four large cities 1975-1980*

	Early 1975			Early 1977			Early 1980		
	Med.	Sur/ Ant	Total	Med.	Sur/ Ant	Total	Med.	Sur/ Ant	Total
Amsterdam	2.8	3.4	6.2	3.9	4.4	8.3	5.6	5.4	11.0
Rotterdam	3.7	2.1	5.8	4.7	2.7	7.4	6.3	3.8	10.1
The Hague	1.8	2.9	4.7	2.4	4.3	6.7	3.4	5.4	8.8
Utrecht	3.5	1.5	5.0	4.2	1.8	6.0	5.7	2.3	8.0

* Surinamers and Antilleans, including descendants born here, and persons of Surinam nationality.

Quite apart from the extent to which the relative dispersion of the immigrants throughout the country is developing, it is in any case true to say that their share in the population of the large cities is increasing appreciably, because suburbanization has a selective effect on the original Dutch population (see Table 2).

4. THE DEGREE OF CONCENTRATION WITHIN THE LARGE CITIES

The degree of concentration of minorities in certain parts of the city is usually expressed in the so-called segregation index, which represents the distance D in the accompanying graph.



D is the maximum vertical distance between the cumulative frequency distribution c of the minority population over units (usually districts) of a city, these units being arranged according to the size of the minority share in the total population, and the straight line s, which represents a minority population dispersed in absolute proportionality with the majority (each district has an equally high percentage of minority groups). The index can also be defined as the percentage of the minority population that would have to move in order to produce a minority dispersion equal to that of the remaining population (c then coincides with s)[7].

Segregation indices were calculated for the four large cities at the level of the census districts applied by the Central Bureau for Statistics. With a few

exceptions this was not done for smaller municipalities, because there these districts are usually too few in number and too heterogeneous as regards social status to impart any significance to the procedure. Moreover, it is often so that the essential information is lacking. The values found for the larger municipalities (see Table 3) are far below the figures obtained for blacks in American cities, where the segregation index may exceed 80[8].
Yet, a segregation index of 50, as applies on the average to the Mediterranean migrants, means that half of these groups would have to move from the concentration districts in order to obtain a dispersion proportional to the remainder of the population. To give another example: the segregation index of 50,9 found for the Mediterranean migrants in Rotterdam relates to a situation in which half of these migrants live in an area that contains only 16 per cent of the total population; three quarters of the Mediterraneans live in an area with only 29 per cent of the total population.

Table 3 Segregation indices for the Mediterranean and West-Indian Populations in the four largest and a number of other municipalities early in 1980

	Mediterranean migrants	Surinamers Antilleans
Amsterdam		
Amsterdam	33.9	30.0
Rotterdam	51.0	46.7
The Hague	58.8	55.5
Utrecht	45.9	37.1
Tilburg (1979)	27.6	
Almelo (1979)	about 55	
Delfzijl* (1979)	57.7	

* Turks only

The values which the index assumes for various cities and for various population groups are rather divergent. In Amsterdam the immigrants are less concentrated than in the other large cities. The Mediterranean population is more strongly segregated everywhere than is the West-Indian population.

The index is generally higher, if it is calculated for agglomerations rather than municipalities. If calculated for smaller areas (sub-districts), it is likewise higher[9]. It is evident from the segregation indices that the immigrants are relatively strongly concentrated in specific districts, but this does not give any indication as to how strong these concentrations are when

measured with respect to the total district population, nor where the concentrations are located. The following maps present both kinds of information for Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. The number of Netherlands town districts where the percentage of immigrants (Mediterranean + Surinamers + Antillean) exceeds 30 is still limited. At the beginning of 1980 this was the case in 10 of the nearly 300 districts of the four large cities (districts with a very small population are not taken separately, but are joined with others).



Utrecht, 1980: Percentage of immigrants on the total population of districts. Bureau for Statistics of Utrecht



Rotterdam, 1980: Percentage of immigrants on the total population of districts.

S.C.P.-cahier, nr. 22



The Hague, 1980: Percentage of immigrants on the total population of districts.



Amsterdam, 1980: Percentage of immigrants on the total population of districts.

S.C.P.-cahier nr. 22

Moluccan living-camp Lunetten

Districts with similar concentrations are also to be found in some medium-size municipalities, e.g. in the industrial towns of Twente.
Districts showing high percentages of Mediterranean migrants often also have high percentages of Surinamers/Antilleans. For Rotterdam and The Hague the correlation coefficients between the percentages of Mediterranean migrants and Surinamers/Antilleans amounted to about 0.80. For Amsterdam this correlation coefficient was only 0.40 and for Utrecht 0.31.

5. DISPERSAL POLICY

5.1. General

Policy can bring about changes in the spatial distribution of certain groups. In the Netherlands a discussion has been going on in recent years as to the direction such influencing should take. The discussion takes place in reports issued by government authorities (more especially municipal authorities), the housebuilding associations and organizations engaged in welfare work among ethnic minorities.

The controversy of the dispersal policy relates to promotion of the dispersal process by the government. Spontaneous dispersion taking place is hardly a point of discussion. There are few people who would want to counteract this kind of dispersion. The developments observed thus far, however, do not give the impression that spontaneous dispersion will automatically occur at any significant rate and that any government action in this respect would be irrelevant.
Apart from the recent migration as such (the migrant status), the factors determining current segregation also include socio-economic deprivation and institutional barriers, while the prospects for a fast, vertical mobility would not seem to be particularly favourable. As mentioned before, there are no flows of new immigrants who could take over the lowest positions from those previously settled.
The developments observed in the concentration of the Mediterranean migrants on the one hand and the West-Indian migrants on the other, of which the latter proved to be much more clearly subject to a deconcentration process, give reason to believe that the policy had a great influence on the degree of dispersion achieved.

The term dispersal policy is used in the Netherlands for kinds of policy which differ quite considerably as regards aim, means and scale. Those

responsible for conducting the policy and others interested in the subject will, when speaking of dispersal policy, have in mind a policy aiming to reduce or stabilize the number of immigrants in districts or neighbourhoods where the percentage of immigrants among the total population exceeds or threatens to exceed a given limit. Such a policy usually does not envisage an overall picture of the desired dispersion of immigrants, but merely wishes to avoid exceptional circumstances, which are regarded as problematical (ghettos or ghetto-formation).
But there are also other kinds of policy, which are sometimes referred to as dispersal policies. Above district level there is a national dispersal policy for Surinamers and Antilleans and at one time a policy was conducted in Amsterdam below district level, in which provision was made for a given dispersion of immigrants over the dwellings in a single building[10]. These are rather divergent kinds of policy as regards content and implications, although they certainly exhibit points of agreement.
Another complication is that intention and effect of a policy need not necessarily be identical. For example, a policy can aim to provide housing of a given quality for immigrants without the object of achieving dispersion. Authorities who want to give immigrants equal chances on the housing market consciously or unconsciously strive for a situation which, compared with the present one, provides a higher degree of dispersion. The previously mentioned national settlement policy for Surinamers and Antilleans also results in a reduction of concentrations in certain districts without this being an explicit aim. The municipality of Amsterdam, which in specific years was opposed to high concentrations of immigrants in certain districts, actually welcomed the national dispersal policy as an important support for its own local dispersal policy[11].

An urban dispersal – or more accurately perhaps an anti-concentration – policy, aiming to avoid or to cause to disappear excessively high concentrations, can make itself felt by various means. The national dispersal policy, which promoted settlement of Surinamers and Antilleans outside the large cities, can from the point of view of these cities be regarded as a volume control, which has brought down the percentage of immigrants in all the districts of the city (and probably even more so in the concentration districts than in other districts). Other means to influence, dispersion are pressure (in positive or negative form) exerted on newcomers to choose or to avoid settlement in specific districts and pressure exerted on immigrants already settled in concentration districts to move to other districts (dispersal policy). In practice, urban dispersal policy relates to the guided

settlement of newcomers and resettlement of the population already settled, insofar the latter register themselves as housing candidates. It is to this kind of policy that the discussion chiefly relates.

5.2. Arguments in favour of a dispersal policy

The idea that concentrations of immigrants would be harmful to the groups themselves and to society as a whole frequently crops up in American literature, which is greatly preoccupied with the ghetto phenomenon[12]. In these sources segregation is regarded as an impediment to the participation of minorities in the host community, more especially where segregation goes hand in hand with deprivation. In Peach's reader various articles are devoted to the statistical relationship between segregation and different indicators of integration, including occupational participation[13].

The relationship is more than just statistical. It is argued that segregation would impede participation in the surrounding community via isolation and revelation of social demarcation lines and furthermore via the growth of own minority institutions and facilities. Through this mechanism concentrations also contain a deprivatory and a self-perpetuating character. Schools especially are mentioned in this context. The fact that concentrations of minorities are generally also accompanied by inferior housing conditions is likewise mentioned as a disadvantage, although this defect is not inherent in concentration as such. Naturally, these conditions do provide an argument in favour of dispersion.

In a number of British reports of about ten years ago a plea was entered in favour of a dispersal policy on previously mentioned grounds, another argument put forward here being the avoidance of conflicts between immigrants and the original population[14]. The existence of such a policy would furthermore constitute a reassurance for the original population of districts in which concentrations of immigrants are in the process of formation.

In the Netherlands arguments in favour of a dispersal policy were put forward in two Amsterdam reports of October 1974 and of August 1978. The following quotations throw some light on the municipal viewpoint then adopted: (In more recent reports, the municipality of Amsterdam appeared to have changed its standpoint). 'We take the view that concentration should be avoided as far as possible. The dispersal policy will have to relate to the whole of the city's territory. In close consultation with

inhabitants, houseowners and possibly organizations engaged in social welfare, including those responsible for the specific social welfare on behalf of Surinamers, close attention will be given to existing concentrations, more especially in the Bijlmermeer district. Since Amsterdam can hardly be deemed capable of housing the flow of migrants, we regarded a national dispersal policy as a first requirement'[15].
In the Report of August 1978 it says: 'It should be possible to avoid friction by counteracting great concentrations and by furnishing proper information to and providing guidance for the groups of housing candidates concerned. . .'. 'On the other hand the dispersion of aliens throughout the city is promoted with a view to achieving integration in the Amsterdam community'[16].
The dispersion principle was supported by the Amsterdam Federation of Housing Associations [17], but in practice the effects were not in keeping with the official aim[18].

In the municipality of Rotterdam the idea of distribution is already quite old. In 1972 the municipal council approved an amendment in the housing-accommodation regulations, whereby the granting of a residence permit in a given district could be made to depend on the composition of the population already established there. The purpose of this was to close certain concentration districts to any further settlement of immigrants. The Decree was annulled by the Council of State in 1974, because it was considered to be completely alien to efficient distribution of housing accommodation as referred to in the Housing Accommodation Act and thus discriminatory[19]. In the later 'Nota Migranten in Rotterdam' (Report on Migrants in Rotterdam) (undated, probably 1978) it is pointed out rather disappointedly that through this annulment an instrument for realizing a balanced composition of the district population had been eliminated. But: 'Rotterdam will continue to stimulate the settlement of migrants in districts with low concentration'[20]. The means to achieve this are less direct, namely 'to enable immigrants to quality for dwellings of housebuilding associations and private landlords via binding regional threshold lists, more especially outside the urban-renewal areas' and 'to enlist the services of the housebuilding associations with a view to offering migrants the possibility of renting a dwelling in a newly built district'[21]. Contrary to the views currently held on the subject in Amsterdam, urban renewal is also regarded as a dispersal instrument here. Within the scope of urban renewal demolition and new-construction are in an indirect way valuable instruments on behalf of a positive dispersal policy. At the present

time the cheapest housing in Rotterdam is concentrated in the urban-renewal areas. As a rule the housing there is not much wanted by Dutch families, but it is particularly popular among migrants. Improving the quality of these dwellings and pulling down the most delapidated housing will result in a reduced concentration of cheap housing in the urban-renewal areas. This development is expected to result in greater dispersion of migrants. Efforts are being made to ensure that more than half of the existing housing stock in the areas concerned will have been renewed by the year 1986[22].

In another Rotterdam report of November 1979 dispersion is still regarded as the best solution, but with greater reserve and then in the form of 'clustered deconcentration'. 'To be quite honest we must admit that to our mind neither concentration nor dispersion would seem to be the answer. In all modesty and with great hesitation we see as the only, least harmful solution a form of controlled housing of minority groups in small concentrations throughout the city, thus 'clustered deconcentration'. Could we really earmark streets or parts of streets as places for aliens to settle? Would that not be in conflict with the idea of freedom of settlement? Would this not straight away raise a cry of discrimination? Would the objections raised to concentration not also occur, perhaps to a lesser extent, in the case of clustered deconcentration? We are inclined to believe that they would not. The urban dynamics are characterized by people being able to meet freely, which means to say that people can approach one another in full confidence. This requires a feeling of self-confidence, confidence in the own culture and in the own identity. If migrants can experience these values among themselves, they will enter our western community with greater self-assurance, with greater willingness and with less fear. This attitude, together with the small scale of clustered deconcentration, will also smoothen contacts between immigrants and the local population'[23].

The municipality of Utrecht would also appear to be in favour of dispersion. Concentrations of aliens are seen as a problem, which can be solved by means of allocation of housing. The municipality would also have to be prepared to buy dwellings from aliens in the concentration districts and subsequently to offer them rented housing in other districts (in the same way as is happening in some other municipalities a lot of housing in delapidated districts in Utrecht is being bought by aliens, because the waiting time for rented housing is very long). Both measures are referred to in the report itself as 'positive discrimination'[24].

In a national government report, which in turn is a reaction to a report by the Scientific Council for Government Policy no reference is made to the

dispersion-concentration dilemma at all. It is mentioned, however, in a letter from the State Secretary for Housing of 20th May, 1980, in which a form of clustered deconcentration on a voluntary basis is recommended. 'In this sensitive matter I apply, pending further discussions on the subject, a number of points of departure:

- The policy can exclusively be conducted if voluntarily supported by those concerned.
- Large concentrations in bad housing conditions must be avoided. To this end a link-up must be sought with the integral approach to the urban renewal problem. Smaller concentrations in proper housing conditions can, however, precisely have a favourable effect in preventing the social isolation of ethnic minorities as much as possible. This is especially true in the case of women originating from certain Mediterranean areas. When speaking of 'Large concentrations', this must be understood to refer to areas on the scale of town districts. When (parts of) streets or groups of dwellings are concerned, this relates to 'small' concentrations.
- In a policy aiming to eliminate large concentrations it is necessary to promise the people concerned good housing, employment and a sound social climate elsewhere. An integral approach is desirable to achieve this'[25].

This does not yet fully sum up all those in favour of dispersal. A preference for a dispersal policy is often to be observed in a – possibly somewhat arbitrary – selection of material from smaller municipalities. This is the case for instance with the municipalities of Hengelo, Arnhem, Vlaardingen, Zwolle and Delfzijl, and less explicitly also with Eindhoven. Publications of the municipalities of Tilburg, Almelo and Helmond do not present a definite opinion on this point[26].

5.3. Arguments against dispersal policy

At a time such as the present, when such notions as 'own identity' and 'multi-cultural society' are frequently used, the objections associated with a dispersal policy stand out more clearly. Recent British insights (Britain has previous experience with dispersal policy) are used to support the views put forward.

These objections are first and foremost of a fundamental nature. A dispersal policy directed specifically to immigrants and making a distinction

according to ethnic background in the allocation of housing are alleged to be discriminatory and illegal. In a few cases government authorities themselves have actually arrived at this conclusion, as may be seen the action taken by the Council of State with respect to the policy envisaged in Rotterdam. A similar dispersal policy, which had already materialized in Birmingham, was terminated by the municipality in 1975, because it was considered to be in conflict with the Race Relations Act[27].

The idea frequently underlying the dispersal policy is that immigrants present a problem that might be solved by spreading it out over a greater area, thus by dispersal. In actual fact this view would in itself be discriminatory.
Furthermore, the compulsion inherent in a dispersal policy is deemed to be inadmissible. Stimulating the supply of housing in certain districts would invariably be accompanied by a restriction of such supply in other districts. This would result in a reduced freedom of choice and a lengthening of the waiting times for the immigrants. In this connection reference is repeatedly made to the closure of certain 'threatened' districts in Amsterdam in the mid seventies[28]. The question is for that matter whether this policy deserves the name of dispersal policy, since it was not the districts with the highest percentages of immigrants that were closed, but rather the adjoining districts. It actually slowed down the dispersal process.

Those opposed to dispersal policy further argue that dispersion need not necessarily lead to integration. The results of research on this relationship contain numerous contradictions. If there would be any question of causality at all, it would rather be in the opposite direction[29]. Conflicts between the original inhabitants and immigrants in concentration districts are said to be mainly determined by the inferior housing and living conditions to which both groups are exposed and not so much by the concentration itself. Better relations between the two groups might be promoted by a general policy aiming to eliminate deprivation[30].

A last important argument is not merely directed against dispersion, but it is also in favour of concentration. Concentrations are said to fulfil an important function in the reception of migrants, acting as a safeguard against mental isolation, furnishing a support for own facilities and for the own cultural pattern, and serving as a bulwark against agression on the part of the majority[31].

The majority of these arguments are also to be found in a more recent Amsterdam report entitled 'Rehousing Policy on behalf of Amsterdammers not born in the Netherlands' (1979).
Amsterdam has obviously turned away from the idea of dispersal. The conclusion of the report tends to lean towards a preference for already formed concentrations:
'In conclusion it would be truw to say that it cannot be proved that dispersion leads to integration. Concentrations in older districts are in the first place an expression of the socio-economic situation in which ethnic minorities find themselves, as is also true for the Dutch low-income groups. It is there that the point of attack for the integration policy should lie. Another argument against a dispersal policy to prevent concentrations is that it is also possible to point to positive aspects of concentrations. Moreover, it is by no means certain that the people concerned want to be dispersed. The latter links up straight away with another aspect of the entire discussion on the subject of whether to disperse or not, namely the practical feasibility of the dispersal policy. By such a policy must be understood especially the allocation of housing in districts and housing complexes where few ethnic minorities live to members of such groups who have risen to the top of the waiting-list. A policy of this kind is subject to numerous restrictions, viz.:

- Like any other housing candidate foreign workers and Surinamers can state a preference for a specific neighbourhood. Allowance must be made for this preference.
- In the districts concerned few dwellings become available and the demand for them is great on the part of urgent cases in the urban renewal scheme. These have priority, as a result of which few dwellings remain. Diminishing this priority can lead to stagnation in urban renewal projects.
- Surinamers cannot be identified as such in the records of the municipal rehousing department. They have Netherlands nationality.
- Selective allocation of dwellings in districts where there are few Surinamers and foreign workers automatically amounts to selective non-presentation of dwellings in districts where concentrations actually occur. This leads to (partly) closed districts, a situation which the Municipal Council has expressly rejected.
- Such a selective policy will undoubtedly lead to a lengthening of the waiting time for Surinamers and foreign workers, because fewer dwellings are potentially available for the same number of housing can-

didates. When making allowance for number of rooms, rent, floor and the like, the chances of success will then, of course, be reduced.
- Moreover, it is indefensible, in principle, to offer or not to offer someone a dwelling on account of colour or ethnic background.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing is that according to present insights it is no longer desirable to conduct a dispersal policy. In addition, it is, in principle, incorrect and incapable of implementation in practice'[32].

The final version of an Amsterdam Report on immigrant workers and their families in Amsterdam (1979) is no longer in favour of an active dispersal policy either. It expects more of the willingness of different national groups to co-operate at the neighbourhood level and in this connection for community organization[33].

The position occupied in the discussion by the municipality of The Hague is somewhat ambiguous. A Memorandum on the housing of migrants (March 1980) rejects, in principle, special housing facilities for migrants as well as compulsory dispersion. The impression is that the views held in Amsterdam are supported. On the other hand it is pointed out in the Hague Memorandum with some regret that the dispersal policy for Surinamers and Antilleans with the aid of the 5 per cent scheme relating to priority housing runs the risk of being eliminated and consequently efforts are being made to find a possibility of continuing the scheme within the municipality of The Hague[34].

5.4. Weighing the arguments

The discussion on the desirability of an urban dispersal policy in the Netherlands has thus been represented, but not settled. None of those concerned applaud the formation of heavy concentrations of ethnic minorities in deprived urban areas, thus of ghettos.
Opinions differ, however, on the probable effects of a dispersal policy as a solution.

The discussion largely takes place in the sphere of ethics. It is endeavoured though to find support in results of scientific research and in the assumed own preference of the minorities for a given residential environment. It would appear to be difficult to derive decisive arguments from this.

For example, it is impossible to say on scientific grounds whether a dispersal policy promotes the 'integration' of immigrants. Too many specific migration variables are involved and there are too many current interpretations of 'integration'.
The preferences of immigrants are not entirely devoid of ambiguity either, although they do provide a little more guidance. Opponents of the dispersal policy go so far as to argue that dispersion with the agreement of the immigrants is completely non-existent[35]. A British survey concerning the preferences of immigrants in registration for Council Houses shows this group prefers the inner city area[36].
As against this there are also indications which show that the majority of immigrants are inclined to exchange existing concentrations for environments inhabited more by non-immigrants. This was evidenced, for example, in a survey conducted in the Bijlmermeer (Amsterdam), in Hengelo, in Utrecht and in Rotterdam[37]. Furthermore, it is argued that the dispersed immigrants are certainly not less satisfied with their residential situation than those living in concentrated groups[38]. The report 'Segregatie in Rotterdam' (Segregation in Rotterdam) (1980) reveals that greater weight is attached to the quality of the housing accomodation and the housing cost than to contacts with fellow countrymen, the facilities in the district or the degree of discrimination experience. The greater the concentration, the more the subject of housing stands out as a problem[39]. The most direct research results were furnished by Lee, who compared West-Indian migrants in three London districts. In all three districts only a minority (just over 20 per cent) attached any value to the presence of other West-Indian migrants in the residential district. In the district where the West-Indians were the least concentrated this figure was only 7.7 per cent[40].

The question that arises is, of course, whether this kind of preferences, quite apart from the direction in which they go, should be respected by the authorities. This would after all be in conflict with the principle of non-discrimination, which is so vigorously upheld by many opponents of the dispersal policy. Preferences of non-immigrants for a 'white' district may after all not be met either!
If it were a question of strictly individual neighbourhood preferences in a situation of ample supply all along the line, the policy could, of course, accept individual wishes as a basis for the allocation of housing. This is clearly not the case. It is in all probability a matter of collective preferences, which – and there is no doubt about this – are aimed at scarce housing

situations. Thus, the policy is subject to restraint exerted by a choice. Given the of old existing and now once more increasing government interference with the distribution of housing accommodation, it would hardly be feasible to leave such distribution to the mechanisms of the free market, while moreover developments thus far have demonstrated that the immigrants would be the victims of this situation. They have already become the victims of the restrictions which have been imposed on government interference on the housing market in practice.

As is implied in their arguments, the opponents of the dispersal policy as well promote in practice a degree of dispersion greater than that now being applied. Hence, the controversy is not concerned with the desirability of a policy resulting in dispersion, but with the degree to which dispersion must deliberately be aimed at by the government and with the principle of a discriminatory treatment of population groups to be applied to this end. This is essentially an ethical problem.
The opponents of the dispersal policy take a certain responsibility upon themselves if they take the view that concentrations of minority populations in deprived districts, which are inclined to continue to grow as a result of further immigration, should be left untouched. The danger of ghetto-formation, when the least attractive parts of the city become the permanent domain – moreover the exclusive domain – of minority-groups, is certainly quite real. If these opponents are of opinion that dispersion is not an admissible and/or adequate means, they have the moral duty to present another solution.

Such an alternative is indeed put forward by the majority of the opponents of a dispersal policy. The ingredients of the solution offered are almost invariably:

- raising the standard of living for both immigrants and non-immigrants;
- the promotion of better housing conditions and facilities in old town districts, from which again both profit;
  In this respect the term urban renewal often crops up;
- the combating of discrimination, e.g. by means of legislation; greater government influence on housing distribution is sometimes also advocated;
- Improving the social skills of the immigrants through dissemination of information and welfare work.

No rightminded person could raise objections to these recommendations. The danger in them is, however, that they can easily be used for justification of a policy, which allows the existing situation to continue in main outline and leave the spontaneous developments to take their course. The proposed solution consists of a number of formalities, all of which already are part of the existing policy. There is very little guarantee indeed that such proposals will produce an important result in the short term.
Immersion of majority-minority problems in the general problem of social inequality is unjustified, unless there is a prospect of this social inequality being eliminated in the foreseeable future. Propagation of a theoretical approach of this kind on behalf of a concrete, rather clearly delineated, social problem, which has only recently arisen, makes a utopian or even escapist impression. Several publications quoted in this article advocate this kind of solution.
This reproach does not apply to the same extent to urban renewal as a solution to the more specific problem of decay. Although urban renewal does not constitute a short-term solution either, it can certainly amount to an operation having direct and far-reaching consequences in the part of the city reached at a given time. It is very much an open question, however, whether urban renewal will have the effect its protagonists expect of it. Much urban renewal and certainly the expensive, spontaneously occurring urban renewal in relatively attractive, picturesque districts, but equally the controlled renovation made possible through government subsidies, produces more expensive housing, which on account of its attractive nature has a selective effect on the non-immigrant population. Quite apart from this, they are at the top of the list anyway, because most of them have lived longer in the district than anybody else. In this way urban renewal is probably the most effective, compulsory manner of dispersion, but the process takes place at a very slow pace.

The general social inequality approach also comes down to a reductionistic point of view. The conflicts between different population groups are said to be based on deprivation applying to all of them and on the competition for scarce commodities. They would disappear after arrears and scarcity have been eliminated.

Even if such an aim could indeed be realized, which – as argued before – is an assumption of a rather academic nature, it is still a question whether this kind of conflict would then be a thing of the past. Wherever different racial ethnic or racial groups live together in the same community, in-

tolerance is a widespread, almost universal phenomenon. This is true for both dispersed and concentrated settlement of minorities, but the antagonism is undoubtedly the strongest in the case of large and moreover growing concentrations. This factor of spatial distribution as an independent contribution to the relationship between groups, is insufficiently recognized by the opponents of dispersal policy.

In addition, opponents of the dispersal policy apply another form of reduction in the sense that they reduce the reaction of the original population in old city districts to the presence of immigrants to misconceptions in respect of the other group. There is no doubt that such misconceptions exist in old districts, as everywhere else for that matter. A real nuisance factor as distinguished from nuisance existing only in the minds of those concerned, is obscured or reduced to negligible proportions in this approach. If a district becomes non-Dutch for one third within the span of ten years, this constitutes a real environmental change for the original inhabitants, with which not everyone is able to cope.
The original inhabitants are essentially affected also through the claims minority groups lay to the facilities of the district. A school where more than half of the pupils are minority group members no longer offers the same type of education. This is the neglected other side of the 'carrying capacity' argument. Real nuisance can be reduced by deconcentration. The summated effect of the presence of the immigrants is hereby reduced. The effect is also distributed over the entire non-immigrant population. There is every reason for crushing discrimination wherever it occurs and to demand tolerance. There is no reason for forcing such a programme only on the population of old city districts.

A part of the nuisance perceived for that matter originates from the not unrealistic expectation that ultimately the district will be completely dominated by immigrants, in other words that a tipping-point will occur. Timely deconcentration could be psychologically effective in a situation of this kind.

5.5. Conclusions

The solution advocated here is not that of compulsory dispersal. A dispersal policy can be confined to the removal of obstacles, which immigrants experience in settling and the furnishing of a greater freedom of choice in such settlement. For a large part such a policy would run parallel with the measures the opponents of dispersal have in mind. This also

applies to promotion of local harmony in districts where different population groups live together in one and the same community, which will continue to be essential under any circumstances. Making the better Housing-Act dwellings more accessible to immigrants in itself implies a greater dispersion in the future. This could be achieved by the government exercising greater influence over housing distribution, an idea which is sometimes also advocated by the opponents of a dispersal policy[41].
In addition, however, a certain stimulation of the dispersal process might be desirable in the form of positive pressure, i.e. the use of positive means to divert the flow of immigrants away from the concentration districts. An impulse in this direction is already available in the form of a model and consists in offering extra housing quotas outside the concentration areas to immigrants. This kind of policy was applied in the fifties for housing repatriates from Indonesia (the so-called 5 per cent scheme) and with considerable success[42]. Similar provisions were once more introduced on behalf of the sudden, greatly expanding migration from Surinam in 1975. This scheme implies that for the immigrants who wish to make use of it initial accommodation is available in the form of contract boarding houses, from which subsequently a transfer is sought to a normal dwelling. To this end a quota of 5 per cent of the new-construction Housing-Act dwellings is reserved for the migrants.

For the Surinamers and the Antilleans this 5 per cent quota was found outside the four large cities, but definitely in municipalities of more than 25.000 inhabitants, this in order to avoid isolated settlements in small municipalities. The Scheme also applied to migrants already settled in the large cities and in this way also affected existing concentrations. The Authority responsible for implementation of the policy again in analogy to the former repatriates policy made provision – for a certain amount of social welfare measures on behalf of the migrants and promoted contacts with fellow countrymen in the place of settlement.

According to the figures of the Bureau mentioned, 5300 Surinamers and Antillean families, i.e. 33,000 persons, made use of the 5 per cent between 1975 and 1980. This is quite a considerable percentage of the total number of Surinamers and Antilleans in the Netherlands. These 33,000 persons include 10,000 who were dispersed at a later stage after initial settlement in one of the large cities. In The Hague alone 3,670 persons were assisted in this way in finding housing accommodation elsewhere (figures up to March 1980).

The 5 per cent scheme still exists, but in actual fact no longer has any great influence on the Surinamese settlement pattern. The reason for this is that the scheme only applies to Surinamers of Netherlands nationality, while practically all recent migrants from Surinam have Surinam nationality. Furthermore, other groups, such as refugees and Moluccans, have been given priority under the scheme. In 1980 the turnover of the scheme as far as the Surinamers were concerned was already insignificant.

Elimination of government interference will not be met with approval everywhere. In effect, a Government Committee concerned with housing problems of migrant workers recommended not so very long ago that the possibility of an extension of the 5 per cent scheme to all immigrants should be examined. In its recommendations the Committee continues:
'When setting priorities in regard to allocation of housing accommodation the municipalities should make due allowance for the special needs that can result from lengthy separation of the immigrant worker from his family.'
'If in certain municipalities relative arrears have occurred with respect to the immigrant workers working or living there compared with other housing candidates, such municipalities should make appropriate provisions to make up these arrears, e.g. by affording a certain amount of privilege. The possibilities of meeting the housing needs among the immigrant workers and their families by making the so-called 5 per cent scheme also apply to them should be closely investigated.
The municipalities should publish periodically how the housing accommodation becoming available is distributed among the different categories of housing candidates, including especially the immigrant workers and their families. The greater need for relatively larger dwellings among the immigrant workers than among the original population (on account of differences in family composition) should be investigated and quantified. This would enable more effective allowance to be made for such needs in future construction, while furthermore optimal use could then be made of the possibilities of joining Housing-Act dwellings to provide larger accommodation in new-construction or improvement projects[43]'.

The principle of privileging certain groups of immigrants, which is advocated here with due caution and which, apart from the 5 per cent scheme, could also be adopted in a municipal allocation policy adapted to the needs of these groups, is of a highly controversial nature. To those who condemn

any form of distinction made in regard to housing accommodation between immigrants and non-immigrants, and who often oppose the mere registration of such a distinction, positive discrimination is also a form of discrimination and thus unacceptable. To others positive discrimination of immigrants is unacceptable, because in this way non-immigrants are placed at a disadvantage, more especially those who as regards the commodity to be distributed are in the same position as the immigrants.
An objection that can be raised to the first argument is that rejection of discrimination need not be accompanied by its negation as a social fact. Colour and ethnic origin may be formally irrelevant criteria in the distribution of housing accommodation, but in actual fact a distinction is made at the expense of the minority. There is reason to doubt the power of the government to suppress this phenomenon in all sections of society. Hence, positive discrimination could be regarded as an active and just compensation for the effects of negative discrimination.

The second argument against positive discrimination – that of putting non-immigrants in a similar situation at a disadvantage – might give rise to the following remarks:
In the first place only few members of the original population find themselves in the same situation as the immigrants. In connection with housing accommodation the immigrants are usually distinguished on the strength of such essential criteria as settlement conditions and size of family. The families concerned are often of long standing, its members having been separated as a result of migration reunion depending on the availability of a dwelling.
On account of the usually large households involved they are dependent, according to Dutch standards, on a particularly scarce category of housing, which makes their waiting times extra long. The housing shortage that has now arisen can no longer be regarded as a simple distribution problem. The arrival of the immigrants has not only increased the existing demand for housing, but it has also created an entirely new demand, to which an answer will have to be found not just in the distribution of housing, but also in construction.
In recent government reports reference is made to the need to adjust the housing stock to the newly created demand. The State Secretary for Housing and Physical Planning has in mind 'a scheme for families of eight or more persons, irrespective of their ethnic origin'[44].
Considering that, if not even now, certainly in the near future the majority of these families in the large cities will be immigrant families, the addition

concerning their ethnic origin is a mere formality. We are not concerned here with a colour-blind housing distribution, but with a change of policy specifically adjusted to the needs of the ethnic minority.
The fact that the special needs of immigrants might warrant special provisions does not alter the circumstance that numerous members of the original population consider themselves harmed by the arrival of the migrants. The housing market has become tighter, precisely in those areas where the housing shortages are greatest and exhibit the fastest growth. Waiting times have become longer for all those in search of accommodation.

The ultimate justification of positive discrimination, however, lies beyond the individual profit that would fall to immigrants. The opening up of an extra allocation circuit for immigrants reduces the need for competition in the housing market in old town districts and perhaps can prevent the occurrence of tipping-points and the formation of real ghettos, thus at the same time improving the possibilities of urban renewal.

In this paper the principle of positive discrimination in favour of immigrants was defended. The form which this positive discrimination should assume is merely indicated by a few suggestions. When extending the 5 per cent schema, it will be necessary to make important decisions. It is not altogether clear to what groups the scheme would have to be extended. Various groups can be distinguished, whose claims are of a varying nature and priority. There are families waiting for reunion, migrants already housed with their families, but then often in inferior housing, housing candidates of the second and even the third generation (Moluccans) and future settlers (refugees, new Surinamese and Antillean migrants). The validity of the scheme must be specified according to period of time and geographical location. These problems relating to the scope and the setting of priorities are only mentioned here, without specific solutions being suggested.

Apart from the reservation of housing quotas there are also possibilities in the allocation policy, which relates to the existing stock. In various municipalities people are dissatisfied with the prevailing allocation system and an effort is being made to introduce a points-system to enable the claims of the registered housing candidates to be properly appraised. The inclusion of family phase and of the need for family reunion in a system of

this kind partly determines the position of minorities on the housing market and consequently also their spatial dispersion.

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8 K.E. Taeuber and A. Taeuber: 'The negro as an immigrant group' in Peach, as cited under reference 1, p. 125.
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9 For Amsterdam, The Hague and Utrecht the segregation indices for the agglomeration were between one tenth and one fifth higher than for the municipality (figures of 1976). For Rotterdam on the other hand the index for the agglomeration was actually lower, probably because such municipalities as Schiedam and Vlaardingen with fairly high percentages of immigrants were added as units to the municipality of Rotterdam, as if they were districts of this city. The intramunicipal concentrations of Schiedam and Vlaardingen were thus covered up.
For Rotterdam the segregation index for immigrants was not only calculated at the level of the census districts of the Central Bureau for Statistics, but also at the level of a finer division (about twice as many districts). This caused the index to rise by just over 2 points (figures of 1976), both for the Mediterranean migrants and for the Surinamers/Antilleans.

[10] Overleggroep Pensions (Consultative Group Boarding-Houses) (eds.): 'Niet hier, maar daar' (Not here, but there) the history of the intramunicipal dispersal policy in Amsterdam', Amsterdam, August 1979. The Consultative Group Boarding-Houses is composed of a number of welfare organizations for Surinamers and immigrant workers. The report was drawn up from official documents, newspaper articles and contributions from different authors. It is further briefly cited as 'Overleggroep Pensions'.

[11] Overleggroep Pensions op cit., p. 73, 74.

[12] A.M. Hawley: as cited in Peach (see reference 1), pp. 11, 112.
M.M. Gordon: 'Assimilation in American Life', Oxford University Press 1964, p. 71.
J.M.M. van Amersfoort, op cit. pp. 67, 68.

[13] See reference 1.
See also: P.F. Cressey: 'Population succession in Chicago: 1898-1930' in American Journal of Sociology, vol. 44, No. 1, 1938, p. 67.

[14] Overleggroep Pensions, op.cit. p. 98.
T.R. Lee: 'Race and Residence, the concentration and dispersal of immigrants in London', Clarendon Press Oxford, 1977, p. 98.

[15] Cited from Overleggroep Pensions, op.cit., p. 73.

[16] -do-, p. 74.

[17] -do-, pp. 63 and 66.

[18] -do-, pp. 16-42.

[19] -do-, pp. 115, 116.

[20] 'Nota Migranten in Rotterdam' (Report on Migrants in Rotterdam), probably published in 1978 as a municipal report, p. 22.

[21] -do-, pp. 23, 24.

[22] -do-, p. 23.

[23] 'Leegloop en toeloop' (Depopulation and Settlement), report of Municipal Executive Committee on population movements in Rotterdam, November 1979, p. 31.

[24] Overleggroep Pensions, op.cit., pp. 119, 120.

[25] Letter from the State Secretary of Housing and Physical Planning of 20th May, 1980, Second Chamber, Session 1979-1980, 16208, No. 3, p. 3.

[26] 'Buitenlandse werknemers in Hengelo' (Immigrant workers in Hengelo), Evaluation Report Municipality of Hengelo (O), 1980, p. 45 ff.
'Informatie van buitenlandse werknemers' (Information on immigrant workers) in connection with a discussion between the Municipal Executive Committee and organizations of immigrant workers at Tilburg on Thrusday, 24th September'.
'Op weg naar een gemeentelijk beleid inzake culturele minderheden' (Towards a municipal policy on behalf of cultural minorities), Municipality of Almelo, March 1980.
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'Discussienota migranten' (Memorandum of Discussion on Migrants), Municipality of Vlaardingen, October 1979.
'Buitenlandse werknemers in Zwolle' (Immigrant workers in Zwolle), Foundation 'Het Refter', June 1979.
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28 -do-, pp. 15, 16, 26 ff.

29 Lee, op.cit., pp. 71, 72.
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30 Overleggroep Pensions, op.cit., pp. 30, 46.
Lee, op.cit., pp. 97, 163.

31 Lee, op.cit., p. 47.
Boal, op.cit., pp. 46, 47.
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32 'Nota huisvestingsbeleid niet in Nederland geboren Amsterdammers' (Report on Housing Policy on behalf of Amsterdammers not born in the Netherlands), op.cit., op. 716, 717.

33 'Raamnota: de buitenlandse werknemers en hun gezinnen in Amsterdam' (General Report: immigrant workers and their families in Amsterdam), Municipal Gazette, 1979, Appendix G, p. 42.

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36 Hazel Flett: 'Dispersal Policies in Council Housing: arguments and evidence', in Journal of the Commission for Racial Equality, Vol. VII, No. 2, Summer 1979.

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38 Lee, op.cit., pp. 147, 149.
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39 G. Mik et al., op.cit., p. 103.

40 Lee, op.cit., pp. 147, 149.

41 Overleggroep Pensions, op.cit., p. 109.

42 Van Amersfoort, op.cit., p. 97.
C.S. van Praag: 'Het overheidsbeleid inzake allochtone groepen' (Government policy in respect of immigrant groups), in H. Verwey-Jonker (ed.): 'Allochtonen in Nederland' (Immigrants in the Netherlands), Government Publishing Office, The Hague, 1973, pp. 30, 31, 41.

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(57

Surinamers (Bijlmermeer, Amsterdam)

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THE 'SECOND GENERATION' OF IMMIGRANTS IN EDUCATION AND ON THE LABOUR MARKET.

*by M.H. de Vries**

1. INTRODUCTION

It must be admitted that the term 'second generation' has become a familiar expression in common usage, but in actual fact it is incorrect. It suggests an exactness which is in no way confirmed in reality. The 'second generation' is usually understood to refer to youngsters originating from the Mediterranean countries, Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles or the Moluccas. Strictly speaking, some of these youngsters belong to the first generation, namely those who migrated along with their parents or who came to the Netherlands on their own initiative. This first generation is to be found among the Mediterranean migrants, Surinamers and Antilleans. Among the Moluccans there is already a third generation: children born from parents who were themselves born in the Netherlands.
It would be more correct, therefore, not to speak of the 'second generation', but more generally of 'young members of ethnic communities'. The latter designation has the advantage that it applies to the whole of the group, irrespective of place of birth. Just as in the case of the term 'second generation', an argument against the term 'young members of ethnic communities' is that it suggests a homogeneity, which simply is not there. There is no denying that these youngsters sometimes exhibit marked differences – not merely insofar as they belong to different ethnic groups, but also if, for example, they belong to the same group and have been in the Netherlands for a different length of time. The problems of a 14-year old Moroccan born in the Netherlands differ considerably from those of a fellow countryman of the same age, who has only been here for a few weeks.

* This article is based on a recent study by the same author, entitled: 'Waar komen zij terecht? De positie van jeugdige allochtonen in het onderwijs en op de arbeidsmarkt' (Where will they end up? The position of immigrant youngsters in education and on the labour market), The Hague (Government Publishing Office), 1981, the study having been compiled on behalf of the Advisory Commission On Minorities Research (ACOM), who submitted it to the Netherlands Government in the form of a recommendation.

Despite the disadvantage mentioned I would adhere to the term 'young members of ethnic communities', but I shall neutralize the attendant disadvantage as much as possible by differentiating according to ethnic origin and length of stay in the Netherlands.

Gradually, a clear qualitative and quantitative change has occurred in the composition of the groups of youngsters in the Netherlands. At first the situation mainly concerned children and young people born in the country of origin, who spent a part of their youth there and at a given time emigrated to the Netherlands. This process is still going on: in the next ten years it is expected that some tens of thousands of young people from the Mediterranean countries – mainly Turks and Moroccans – will come to the Netherlands, whereupon the flow will probably cease. The majority of them will have arrived prior to 1987[1]. In addition, the number of children born in the Netherlands annually will rise, and consequently the young Turkish and Moroccan population will to a growing extent consist of children born and bred in the Netherlands, as well as of young people who have already lived here for some length of time. This development has already become noticeable, especially in the youngest age group: as at 1-1-1978 about 85% of the Turkish and Moroccan children under eight years of age were born here[2].

In 1990 the situation will be such that practically all Turkish and Moroccan children attending elementary school will have been born in the Netherlands, while the majority of children attending secondary school will either have been born here or will have lived here for a number of years. This means that by that time hardly any typical 'initial reception problems' will occur at the schools any longer. Compared to 1977 the number of Turkish and Moroccan school children will be four times as great[3].

The developments which will occur among the Surinamers and the Antilleans will probably not be much different qualitatively. It is impossible to say at the present time what course they will take quantitatively. Even now the whole of the population of Moluccan children and young people already exclusively consists of persons born in the Netherlands on account of the one-time migration which occurred in the early fifties.

In the present article I would confine myself to the fields of education and labour market. This might appear to be somewhat one-sided, but I have two reasons for doing this. The first reason is that hitherto a large part of the literature on immigrant younsters has been characterized by a socio-psychological approach to the problems. Life between two cultures, identity crises and problematical behaviour resulting therefrom, such as use of drugs, criminality and running away from home, are often the main issues

in this literature. Although problems of this kind indeed occur and most probably in an even greater measure than among young people of Dutch origin, these publications are generally hardly supported empirically, since relevant research is scarce. Moreover, such problems are only encountered among a minority of young allochthons. Treating educational and labour-market problems as principal issues has the advantage that they relate to practically the whole of the group. Insofar as they are of school-going age all the members of the group will come in touch with education and a large number of them will enter the labour market. A second reason for confining myself to education and labour market is that they are fairly fundamental fields, which for a large part determine the position of these young people in society.

2. EDUCATION

2.1. General

In the Netherlands educational circles were fairly suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with pupils of non-Dutch origin.
After all it had not been foreseen that the majority of Mediterranean workers would remain here and have their wives and children come over. Nor had it been foreseen that Surinamers would settle in the Netherlands in such great numbers. The substantial flow of Mediterranean and Surinamese pupils to Netherlands schools got under way in the course of the seventies[5]. Compared with these children, the number of Moluccan pupils was small and moreover their presence was not new.
According to the most recent statistics or estimates the situation is as follows:

	Mediterranean (total)	Turks and Moroccans	Surinamese and Antilleans	Moluccans
Infant and elementary schools	abt 40,000[6]	abt 30,000[6]	abt 18,000[7]	abt 3,000[7]
Secondary schools	abt 9,500[8]	abt 6,100[8]	abt 15,000	abt 3,000[9]

Unfortunately, no data are available concerning the ultimate school-leaving qualification of pupils of non-Dutch origin.

About 3.5 per cent of the total number of pupils receiving elementary school education is not of Netherlands nationality[10].
This percentage is unknown in respect of these ethnic groups who do posses Netherlands nationality (all Antilleans, most Surinamers and many Moluccans). The degree of concentration of these pupils varies from one school to another. The highest concentrations are to be found in schools in the large cities. In 1978 40 per cent or more of the pupils attending 119 infant and elementary schools were of foreign nationality (the most prevalent concentration being between 40 and 50 per cent). But the number of schools with a lower percentage of foreign pupils is many times greater[11].

2.2. Policy

The education policy conducted hitherto in respect of ethnically non-Dutch pupils might be characterized as a policy directed to pupils who have recently come to the Netherlands, who do not speak Dutch and whose own language and identity must be preserved to some extent. This policy is then confined to primary school education. It appears that different standards apply with respect to secondary education.
This implies that there is actually no question of a policy for pupils who have already been in the Netherlands for some time. Nor is this the case for pupils who have recently arrived in the Netherlands and who actually have a good command of the Dutch language (such as some of the Surinamese and Antillean pupils).
All these aspects are successively elaborated below.

2.2.1. The policy for pupils who have recently arrived and do not speak Dutch.

The main issues in this policy have been right from the start the language problem and identity. Since recently, i.e. since the draft policy plan of the Minister of Education was published in April 1980, the socio-economic background of the pupils has also received the necessary attention.
The 'language problem' is conceived in such a way that extra attention can be given to and is considered desirable for both the Dutch language and lessons in the own language of the child. It would seem that the government is unaware of likely conflicts between these two aims, e.g. that the one may be met at the expense of the other.
The pupils usually receive the extra lessons in the Dutch language a few hours per week from a specially appointed teacher. The non-Dutch-

speaking pupil is then taken from the classroom and receives these lessons together with other pupils in the same situation. The teachers who have been given this task certainly have no easy job: no proper teaching material is available, they have to improvise a great deal, they are badly prepared for their task (at the teacher colleges the tuition in teaching Dutch as a second language is still in its infancy), they often have no proper classroom available, there is no curriculum, etc.

The tuition in the own language, usually referred to as 'tuition in the own language and culture', is given by a foreign teacher. Especially for Turkish and Moroccan pupils the lessons are generally given during school hours. The foreign teacher is employed by the school and the lessons he gives come under the responsibility of the proper Netherlands authority. This involves the necessary difficulties, since strict supervision of these lessons is difficult to realize. Insofar as the lessons are given during school hours the pupil is again taken from the own classroom. The national standard for the time that must be spent on these lessons is from 3 to 5 hours per week, but this is no hard-and-fast rule. The parents of the pupils are free to make their children take part in these lessons or not. A remarkable thing is that the majority of the Turkish and Spanish pupils attend these lessons (in both cases about 80%), while the percentage of Moroccans taking part is only about 35[13].

The exact cause of this remarkable difference is unknown. It is possible that, apart from the preference displayed by the parents, the shortage of teachers in this case also plays a part.

It is interesting to see what changes have taken place with the Netherlands government as regards the legitimation of this 'own language and culture' tuition. Until recently this was done especially in connection with the possible return of the pupil to the country of origin. It was gradually realized, however, that such return was unlikely for the majority of these pupils and this is certainly so in the short term. Since the publication of the previously mentioned draft policy plan this legitimation has, therefore, disappeared from the scene, albeit that it is still evident off-stage. The Ministry is still prepared to start four 'return migration courses', but for the rest the return migration motive has disappeared from the own language and culture tuition[14].

The arguments in favour of this tuition are now twofold. On the one hand it is expected to produce a balanced development of the pupil's identity, a possibility of narrowing the gap between school and home and to assist the pupil in developing a positive self-concept. On the other hand a function is allocated to this tuition in the 'initial reception': as long as the pupils have

not yet sufficiently mastered the Dutch language in order to be able to follow the lessons given in this language successfully, tuition in the own language can serve to avoid or to reduce learning arrears. There are different models for these two aims, which will be discussed in more detail further on.

It is not known whether the aims envisaged are achieved with this tuition. There is certainly some reason for being sceptical about this, especially as far as the first aim is concerned, which relates to the balanced development of the pupil's identity. The problem lies especially in the fact that the concept 'identity' can hardly be defined.

The term 'preservation of the own culture' does not take us much further, because what culture and what elements of this culture are actually involved?

As mentioned in the introduction, we are being confronted in growing measure with pupils born and bred in the Netherlands and whose culture is gradually growing to be different from the current culture in the country of origin. Would these pupils recognize much of their 'identity' in teachers who have recently arrived in the Netherlands[15], originating from a country, which they only know from the stories told by their parents and possibly from a holiday trip to that country? The view expounded by the Ministry to the effect that this tuition 'guarantees a certain continuity in the development process' moreover creates the suggestion that we are concerned here with a kind of sliding scale, beginning with the own culture and ending with the Netherlands culture. It is very much an open question, however, whether this is actually possible. 'The' Netherlands culture and some immigrant cultures might well contain conflicting elements. Exemples of this are the desirability of Islamic girls taking part in education or in gymnastics lessons and views on how authoritarian a teacher should be in giving tuition.

Last but not least, it is furthermore rather remarkable to find that the lessons in the 'own language and culture' are sometimes given in a language, which is not the language spoken by the pupil at home. This is the case for instance with a lot of Moroccan children: from 50 to 80 per cent of the Moroccans in the Netherlands speak a Berber language[16], while tuition is given in the classic and Moroccan Arabic. It is true that this also occurs in Morocco itself, but it is certainly strange how one could derive arguments from this Moroccan reality in the Netherlands situation to support such aims as 'reception in the own language', 'reducing the culture shock' and the like[17]. What happens in practice is that in this way these children are confronted with two new languages instead of one.

The attention given to the socio-economic environment to which the pupil of non-Dutch origin belongs is new. In itself such attention is certainly called for, since it has been found that with Dutch pupils the environment is of great influence on their school achievements. It would seem, however, that this attention is intended to anticipate a situation in which the policy on behalf of pupils who belong to ethnic communities could be fitted into a more general policy, which aims to eliminate, via education, any arrears with which both Dutch and non-Dutch pupils are confronted. Such anticipation might well be premature, however, since it is not at all unlikely that members of various ethnic communities differ on a number of essential points, even if they belong to one and the same socio-economic class. The measures proposed in the draft policy plan to eliminate arrears, which were caused by the environment to which the pupils of non-Dutch origin belongs, are the appointment of 'school contact teachers' at schools having large concentrations of these pupils and involving their parents in a growing measure in the school life of the children, for instance by stimulating them to sit on parent committees in larger numbers. It is not yet clear how all this will work out in practice. A condition for immigrant parents to take part in parent committees is, for example, that they speak Dutch reasonably well, but the measures announced in the draft policy plan on behalf of adult education (literacy courses, Dutch language courses and the like) bear no proportion to the actual needs.
So much for the *contents* of the policy as it is now conducted, together with some remarks in respect thereof. We shall now deal with the *form* which the reception of recently arrived pupils takes.

Roughly speaking, there are two 'models' for this. The first, most current 'model' is the one in which the pupil is placed in an 'ordinary' class at a Netherlands school immediately on arrival, i.e. together with Dutch and possibly also other non-Dutch pupils. The pupil follows the lessons right from the start, at least he is physically present. In addition, the pupil usually follows extra Dutch language lessons and possibly also lessons in the own language and culture. In American literature, this kind of 'reception' is referred to as the 'sink-or-swim' method.
A second possible method of reception is that according to specific reception models. Here the pupil is placed in a special concentration class, in which he stays for one or two years and subsequently passes on to an ordinary class. In this concentration class he is taught in his own language for about one third of the time, although this varies from one school to another. Lessons in gymnastics and manual skills are usually attended

together with Netherlands pupils[18]. According to a very rough estimate fewer than a thousand pupils receive tuition in accordance with the latter method, which figure moreover includes pupils who have been in the Netherlands for some length of time and already speak Dutch. These specific reception classes exsist – as far as known – only for Turkish and Moroccan children. Thus, the first 'model' is by far the most commonly applied model. This is the case irrespective of the starting position of the pupil. Incidental circumstances rather than the situation of the pupil on arrival at school in the Netherlands would seem to determine in what way he will receive tuition. The two models have not been evaluated[19] and thus it is not known which of the models is the most suitable for the pupils concerned. This is a serious problem, since 'initial reception' is a matter of now or never. In a few years time the influx of Turkish and Moroccan children of elementary school age will have ceased, as was argued in the introduction.

In sharp contrast with elementary education, hardly any attention is given to the own language and culture of the pupils receiving secondary education. Here the object is to familiarize the pupils with the Dutch language as quickly as possible, in order that they can pass on to regular education. To this end International Linkage Classes were introduced. In these classes the pupils are taught the Dutch language and are also taught other subjects. For a lot of pupils this kind of teaching does not seem to produce the result envisaged. At first the linkage period was initially one year and is now two years, but even this is often insufficient, since attempts to achieve integration in ordinary secondary education are not successful. For a lot of pupils this education is in effect final education and not, as was the intention, linkage education. The heterogeneity of the pupils is exceptionally great: there are illiterate pupils, who never went to school in their country of origin and also pupils who in their country of origin received a complete elementary school education and some years of secondary education[20]

A striking point is that the idea of 'reception education' – the own language being partly used as the language of tuition – as is sometimes done at the elementary school, does not appear to be evident with the Netherlands government where secondary education is concerned. In actual fact there are more arguments in favour of introducing such a model in secondary education than in elementary education. Secondary education after all involves pupils whose school career has only a few more years to go. It is important, therefore, that their acquisition of knowledge should not be brought to a halt[21].

2.2.2. The policy on behalf of pupils who have already been in the Netherlands for a considerable length of time and on behalf of recent arrivals who speak Dutch.

In actual fact there is very little one can say on this point: this policy is simply non-existent.
A remarkable thing is that the tuition in the own language and culture does not exist for Surinamers and Antillean children, although not all these children have a proper command of the Dutch language. In Surinam tuition is given in the Dutch language, but many of these children speak Creole, Hindi or some other language at home. Furthermore, the Surinam variant of the Dutch language deviates rather considerably from the standard Dutch on a number of points. In the event of inadequate Dutch language proficiency Surinamese and Antillean children sometimes enter into consideration for extra Dutch language lessons. For Moluccan pupils there is actually a possibility of receiving tuition in the own language and culture (since 1979), despite the fact that all these children were born and bred in the Netherlands!
Precious little is known about the education problems of pupils of non-Dutch origin who have spent most or the whole of their life in the Netherlands. Hardly any research has been performed in this field[22]. The reason why the need to investigate these problems is so great is that in the near future we shall almost exclusively be confronted with pupils born and bred in the Netherlands. It is not known, for example, what command of the Dutch language children have who have grown up here, but speak another language at home. This would have to be investigated, however, if there is to be any question of an anticipatory policy.

3. LABOUR MARKET

3.1. General

The position of ethnic communities on the labour market cannot, of course, be divorced from the overall labour market situation, which is bad. We are concerned with diminishing employment and it is likely that this development will continue in the coming years. The working population will continue to exhibit a drastic growth up to 1990. The result of these two developments is growing unemployment in the medium-long term.
Precious little is known about the specific situation of ethnic communities on the labour market, more especially as regards the position of those who

hold jobs in work. In this respect we can only go by the result of (scarce) part research and impressions. More is known about the position of the unemployed, since accurate records are kept by the Regional Employment Exchanges, which come under the Ministry of Social Affairs. The employment exchanges do not merely record the number of unemployed registered, but also their age, sex, education, occupational category, nationality and ethnic origin. (The latter indeed takes place for Surinamers and Antilleans having Netherlands nationality, but not for Netherlands Moluccans).

Seeing that so many crucial data on those in work are lacking, it is difficult to interpret the available data on the unemployed. It is impossible, for example, to calculate the size of the working population within each of the ethnic communities, thus making it difficult to compare the various groups with each other and with the Dutch.

A question which often arises is whether ethnic communities more severely affected by the growing unemployment. On the strength of estimates of working populations the conclusion may be drawn, with some reserve, that this is indeed the case and that the Moluccans are the most strongly affected, followed by Surinamers and Antilleans and finally by the immigrant workers from the Mediterranean countries[23].

The data available on young members of ethnic communities are subject to the same restrictions as those relating to the groups as a whole, i.e. we more know more about the unemployed than about those in work. The simple question: What kind of work do these young people do? cannot be answered and we can only speculate on the subject. But the material available on the unemployed among them does indeed give rise to some remarks, as will be seen below.

3.2. Those in work

More is known about the position of the Mediterranean migrants on the employment market than about that of all the other groups. In this case also the available data are nevertheless inadequate to enable conclusions to be drawn on the position of the young people[24].

Mediterranean workers were recruited to carry out unskilled labour. About 75% of them work in industry and about 25% in the services sector[25]. This usually concerns functions involving a lot of inconveniences (dirty, noisy work, shift work and the like).

To be able to arrive at conclusions on the employment position of young people from the Mediterranean countries it is advisable to split up this group into:

1) those who were above statutory school-going age when they arrived in the Netherlands;
2) those who received part of their school education in the Netherlands, and
3) those who were born and bred in the Netherlands or at least received the greater part of their school education here.

This distinction is usually not made in the literature, such as a result of the assumed homogenity among young members of ethnic communities. The employment position of the first group will probably not be much different from that of their parents. As regards the third group it is not the parents, but the young people of Dutch origin (which may be compared to them as regards age, sex, education and the like) who constitute a relevant category for comparison. In the Netherlands, however, this third group is at present not yet very large.
As a whole the group of Surinamers and Antilleans occupies an intermediate position between the Mediterranean migrants and the Dutch[26]. Unlike the Mediterranean migrants they are not concentrated in a limited number of sectors of the labour market and exhibit a greater dispersion as regards occupational level, although – when compared with Dutch workers – they are underrepresented at the higher levels[27]. But here again it is for the time being still impossible to draw any further conclusions from this as regards the position of the young people[28].
Least is known about the Moluccans. Seeing that it is the only group of which all younger members were born and bred in the Netherlands, they would be the most suitable group for comparison with Dutch youngsters.

In order to gain more insight into the position of young members of ethnic communities on the labour market and how it relates to that of the Dutch young people of the same age it is in the first place essential to know, of course, what kind of work they do and what qualifications they have. It would also be necessary to know in how far the fact that they are of non-Dutch origin plays a part in the selection applied by employers and employment agencies. As will be evident from the following section, all that is available is some scarce research data and some assumptions, but this is by no means adequate. Further, more should be known about the level of the aspirations of the young people themselves. It is fairly generally considered that, especially among the young people of the Mediterranean origin, this level is low compared with that of other groups. There may be different causes for this: the poor level of education; the occupational

orientation, which may be still largely determined by the occupational structure in the country of origin; the pressure exerted by their parents to accept any kind of work for the benefit of the family income, etc.
It is to be expected, however, that according as these young people stay in the Netherlands longer, they will acquire the occupational orientation of Dutch young people of the same age and will also impose higher demands with respect to the quality of working conditions. This situation is illustrated by the experience of an employment officer with a Regional Employment Agency in a large city. According to him Turkish and Moroccan boys are inclined to accept any kind of work if they come to the employment exchange accompanied by their father. If they come alone, they certainly make their demands.

3.3. The unemployed

On the strength of a computer run furnishing data on young unemployed from the Ministry of Social Affairs we can gain a better insight into this subject[29]. As regards these data it should be noted that they relate solely to those registered with the employment exchanges as unemployed. Not included are:

1) those who are indeed unemployed and registered with Regional Employment Exchanges, but who are not eligible for employment (these are for instance people following a course of training, people of whom it is considered that they are not eligible for employment through their own fault, e.g. as a result of the use of drugs and the like) and
2) people who are indeed unemployed and lookign for work, but who are not registered with Regional Employment Exchanges. It is not exactly known how large these two groups are.

It may be seen from the first table that among the young unemployed of non-Dutch origin the level of education is highest with the Moluccans and lowest with Turks and Moroccans. Surinamers and Antilleans occupy a position somewhere in between. This information is in itself not surprising, since all the young Moluccans, as the only ethnic community have at least received education in The Netherlands throughout the entire period in which they were of statutory school-going age. At education levels 3 and higher they are underrepresented compared with (non-immigrant) Dutch. On the other hand these differences in level of education is indeed surprising if coupled to the chance of unemployment. With the Dutch the percentage of unemployment among those with a low standard of edu-

Table 1 Unemployed aged 15 to 24, according to nationality/ethnic origin, sex and standard of education.



Source: Ministry of Social Affairs

[1] *Standard of education*

1 = no, incomplete or completed elementary school education and incomplete secondary school education
2 = lower secondary education
3 = higher secondary education
5 = higher professional education
6 = university bachelor's degree
7 = doctoral degree



Source: Ministry of Social Affairs (For total numbers in absolute figures see Table 1)

Table 2 Unemployed aged 15 to 24, according to nationality/ethnic origin, sex and duration of registration

Data of all groups, except Moluccans, as at 24-6-1980.
Data of Moluccans as at end of December 1979.

cation is generally higher than among those with a high standard. With the ethnic communities the opposite would seem to be the case: the higher the standard of education, the greater the chance of unemployment. Moluccans, having the highest standard of education, probably also have the highest percentage of unemployment. People of Mediterranean origin, who have the lowest standard of education, are probably the least often unemployd.

The previously mentioned, largely still low level of aspirations of many Turkish and Moroccan young people and their willingness to accept any kind of work probably have something to do with this.

Points that stand out in figure 2 are the relatively very short periods of unemployment of Turkish and Moroccan men and the very long periods of unemployment of Moluccans. Turkish and Moroccan young men exhibit the shortest periods of unemployment of all the groups of young people, including the Dutch: just over 60 per cent of them is unemployed for a period of three months or less. An equally striking point is that Turkish and Moroccan young women are unemployed so much longer than the males of the same nationality and age group. About 40 per cent of the young women is unemployed for up to 3 months, while just under half exhibit a period of unemployment of from 3 to 12 months (as against approx. 6060 and 35 per cent respectively for the males). None of the groups shows such a marked difference in periods of unemployment between the sexes. There is still no explanation for this.

The situation of unemployed young Moluccans is far from favourable if the duration of their unemployment is anything to go by: no fewer than roughly 40 per cent are without work for a year or longer.

Although the unemployment percentages of the various ethnic groups differ, they are in all cases estimated to be higher than the unemployment percentages among the Dutch. The latter figure is about 5 per cent for the total working population and about 9 per cent for the unskilled working population. For the people of Mediterranean origin the unemployment percentage, which is supposed to be the lowest of all ethnic groups, is estimated at 11.

A likely cause of the higher percentage among people of non-Dutch origin in general could be a certain reserve on the part of employers to take them on. This reserve can vary from 'fear of anything foreign' to hard and systematic discrimination. This reserve is promoted in the present period, in which supply greatly exceeds demand and moreover a lot of firms are in a bad way economically. Risks must be avoided and it appears that taking on members of ethnic communities is regarded as a risk. Insofar as their

employment can indeed involve risks, for instance because they do not speak Dutch properly, while a proper command of the Dutch language is an essential requirement for doing the job efficiently, something can be done about this by training. This point is discussed in the following section. Insofar as 'fear of anything foreign' on the part of the employer is concerned this could be remedied by means of a so-called 'successful-cases strategy'. Youngsters, of whom it is more or less certain that they will function effectively (e.g. because of their favourable record at a training course), are selected by employment officers, who put in a good word for them with employers. This strategy is indeed being applied here and there. In cases of hard discrimination, however, other means will have to be sought. One way would be to improve penal law in this respect and to introduce quota schemes. In the Netherlands work is in progress on the former, while the latter is advocated in places, but so far no serious efforts have been made to realize such schemes[30].

The fact that discrimination by employers (and employment agencies) is indeed taking place has been demonstrated in an investigation by F. Bovenkerk et al., with respect to Surinamers and Spaniards[31]. It appears that the lower the level of the job, the greater the discrimination. What this means is that especially as far as the lower regions are concerned employers think in terms of 'increased risk' when taking on members of an ethnic community, but – unlike what was found in this investigation – it would seem that this applies more to Surinamers, Antilleans and Moluccans than to the Mediterranean workers. It is suspected that the discrimination of Moluccans has increased under the influence of the hijacking and hostage actions. But nothing is known about the exact significance of these factors and that of other possible causes[32].

3.3.1. The training of unemployed

Unemployed registered with the Regional Unemployment Exchange can be given an opportunity for further training or retraining, if such training would enhance their chances of finding a place in the labour process. Such training courses are financed by the government. People can even be more or less compelled to follow such a training course on pain of payment of their social unemployment benefit being stopped.

Seen in the light of the vast overall unemployment, these training measures constitute a very inadequate means of countering unemployment. Quite apart from the fact that the capacity of institutions arranging these courses is small, no great effect is to be expected from further training and

retraining anyway, because the main cause of unemployment does not lie in the qualitative discrepancy between supply and demand, but in the shortage of demand.

Only about 5 per cent of the total number of registered unemployed is put forward for training[33]. It is not known in how far people of non-Dutch origin are over or underrepresented in this figure. As regards content, a distinction is made in the different training measures between purely occupational training, training aimed more at acquiring general skills and a combination of the two. A distinction can also be made according to the extent to which such courses offer career prospects. This is the case if the trainee ends up at a higher qualification level than that with which he started the course. The Centres for Vocational Training of Adults are the best example of this. The minimum qualification for admission required here is the standard of knowledge of the fifth form of the elementary school, while the trainee ends up at the final standard of the elementary technical school (usually in the metal or building industry). Some rough estimates are available in respect of the actual number of participants of non-Dutch origin in such courses, with the exception of Moluccans. It is evident from these estimates that especially Surinamers and Antilleans take part in these courses (although it is not known how high this percentage of participants is) and hardly any people of Mediterranean origin. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that in the case of the Surinamers and Antilleans it is more often than not a matter of training presenting certain career prospects.

The fact that Surinamers and Antilleans are quite evidently recommended for training courses more often than people of Mediterranean origin may have different causes. The usually poor command of the Dutch language of Mediterranean youngsters can be an obstacle, since hardly any provisions have been made at the various training institutes for training people who do not speak Dutch. It could also be that the Netherlands government feels greater responsibility towards Surinamers, Antilleans and Moluccans (former colonies!) than for people from the Mediterranean countries, who after all were recruited precisely to perform unskilled (and usually also unpleasant) work. Another factor likely to play a part here is that Mediterranean youngsters themselves are quickly inclined to accept any kind of work. The relatively very short period of unemployment of Turkish and Moroccan young men may be an indication of this. In the policy conducted to find employment for young Surinamers and Antilleans the accent in Amsterdam appears to have shifted from direct placement in the labour process to recommendation for training[34]. This may well be the case

for the remainder of the Netherlands as well. There are no signs indicating that this is the case for people of Mediterranean origin anywhere in the Netherlands[35].
From the point of view of equal opportunities there is little to be said for this state of affairs. Mediterranean youngsters after all belong to the category of lowest skilled workers and often lack sufficient basic skills, such as a command of the Dutch language and elementary school knowledge, in order to be able to function in some way at least in Netherlands society. For this reason alone it might be a good thing to train these young people as well. But this problem cannot be regarded as a typical labour market problem and the solution should, therefore, not be sought exclusively in the instruments available to the Regional Employment Exchanges.

It would be true to say that training in elementary skills (Dutch language, elementary school knowledge and the like) of Mediterranean and possibly other young people insofar as their Dutch language proficiency is inadequate and they have not finished the elementary school education, should be advocated, irrespective of whether this would offer prospects of better work or any work at all. Drastic measures would have to be taken to achieve this and in the short term. It is recalled that between now and 1989 some 33,000 young people are expected to arrive in the Netherlands from Turkey and Morocco alone (see reference 1). On arrival in the Netherlands these young people are no longer of statutory school-going age.
Consequently, provisions will have to be made for them in the sphere of adult education and they will have to be encouraged to join such courses, if they are at least to be given a minimum of equipment to participate in Netherlands society.
Vocational training of unemployed young people is only to be advocated insofar as this would offer real prospects of work. A point to be considered here, however, is that the scarce number of trainee places should be divided in better proportion among the different groups than is the case now. In addition, the differentiation of members of ethnic communities in general and of people of Mediterranean origin in particular should be promoted in other respects as well[36]. A slight differentiation according to level can have a stigmatizing effect on a group, especially if this group is overrepresented at the lower levels.

REFERENCES

1 An indication of the number of Turkish and Moroccan young people still to arrive may be obtained on the strength of a prognosis for a period up to 1990 published in 1980. ('Population Prognosis Allochtons, Part I: Turks and Moroccans'. Social and Cultural Planning Agency, SCP-Cahier, No. 19, Rijswijk, 1980). According to this prognosis roughly a further 68,000 Turks and Moroccans in the age group of from 0 to 24 can be expected to arrive in the Netherlands (this figure roughly includes as many Turks as Moroccans). The age groups among these 68,000 will be roughly as follows: approx. 13,000 aged 0 to 5 years, approx. 13,000 aged 6 to 11 years, approx. 9,000 aged 12 to 15 years, approx. 33,000 aged 16 to 24 years. (Calculation performed on the basis of tables 8, 12 and 15 of 'Population Prognosis Allochthons in the Netherlands', op.cit.). This prognosis is based on the assumption that no further recruiting will take place.

2 Source: Central Bureau for Statistics.

3 'Population Prognosis Allochthons', op.cit.

4 The Social and Cultural Planning Agency also intends to make a prognosis in respect of Surinamers and Antilleans.

5 The number of Antillean pupils is small compared with that of Surinamese pupils. In estimates and statistics Surinamese and Antilleans are usually taken as belonging to one and the same category.

6 'Pupils of foreign nationalities in infant and elementary schools', Central Bureau for Statistics, Voorburg, 1979. The figures quoted relate to the situation as at 16-1-1979.

7 Estimate of the Ministry of Education and Science, based on censuses conducted by the school to record the situation as at 16-10-1979. The numbers of Surinamese, Antillean and Moluccan pupils cannot be determined exactly, since the majority of these pupils have Netherlands nationality and partly for this reason registration according to ethnic origin is problematical.

8 'Mededelingen', No. 7717, Central Bureau for Statistics, February 1980. The figures relate to the situation as at September/October 1978.

9 Estimate of the Ministry of Education and Science for the school year 1980-1981.

10 'Mededelingen', op.cit. This percentage also relates to non-Mediterranean nationalities.

11 Berg-Eldering, L. van den, A.C. Adriaansen and H.W. Grebel, 'Turkse en Marokkaanse kinderen op Nederlandse lagere scholen; een exploratieve studie' (Turkish and Moroccan children at Netherlands elementary schools; an exploratory study), Publ. 7, COMT, Leiden State University, 1980, p. 16.

12 'Culturele minderheden in het onderwijs. Concept-beleidsplan' (Cultural minorities in education. Draft Policy Plan), Ministry of Education and Science, Government Publishing Office, The Hague, 1980.

13 Vries, M.H. de, 'Waar komen zij terecht? De positie van jeugdige allochtonen in the onderwijs en op de arbeidsmarkt' (Where will they end up? The position of immigrant youngsters in education and on the employment market), The Hague, (Government Publishing Office), 1981.

14 Draft Policy Plan, op.cit.

15 The Ministry of Education and Science is at present engaged in recruiting teaching staff in Turkey and Morocco.

16 The relevant estimates vary! The Netherlands Centre for Foreigners estimates the number of Berber-speaking Moroccans at approx. 80 per cent and J.M.M. van Amersfoort puts this figure at approx. 50 per cent.

[17] The terminology originates from the *Draft Policy Plan*, op.cit.

[18] For a detailed description of these specific reception models the reader is referred to Berg-Eldering, L. van den, et al., op.cit., Chapters 6 and 7.

[19] Early in 1981 a start was made with the evaluation of specific reception models. The investigation is being carried out by the Institute for Development Psychology of Utrecht State University.

[20] See, inter alia, Bouwmeester, G., 'De internationale schakelklassen: een brug tot integratie van de buitenlandse leerlingen in het Nederlands voortgezet onderwijs?' (The international linkage classes: a bridge to integration of foreign pupils in Netherlands secondary education?), Doctoral Script Sociology, Amsterdam, 1979.

[21] For a further elaboration of the arguments for and against see Vries, M.H. de, op.cit., Part I, Chapter 4.

[22] At the present time an investigation is being conducted into the education problems of Moluccan children by LICOR of Leiden State University. It will probably be concluded at the end of 1981. An investigation into the problems of Surinamese children is at present being carried out by the Institute for Pedagogic and Andragogic Sciences of Utrecht State University.

[23] Annual Report Employment Market 1979. Ministry of Social Affairs, The Hague, 1980, p. 23.

[24] An investigation into the position on the employment market of Turkish and Moroccan young people is at present being carried out in six Netherlands cities by the Socio-Geographical Institute of the Amsterdam Municipal University. The report on this investigation may be expected by the middle of 1982.

[25] This information is based on the Social Monthly Statistics of the Central Bureau for Statistics, February 1974.

[26] This information has been derived from an investigation carried out in Amsterdam, which related to the situation in 1977. For the report on this investigation see Gooskens, I., J. Hoolt and M. Freeman, 'Surinamers en Antillianen in Amsterdam' (Surinamers and Antilleans in Amsterdam), Department of Social Affairs of the Municipality of Amsterdam, 1979.

[27] Gooskens, I. et al., op.cit., pp. 122 and 123.

[28] An investigation into the situation of Surinamers will shortly be completed. This investigation took place on the basis of a representative random census among Surinamers aged 15 to 65. Attention was also given to the employment position. The investigation was carried out by the Institute of Applied Sociology of the Nijmegen Roman Catholic University.

[29] The run relates to all ethnic groups mentioned, except to Moluccans. The data on Moluccans were obtained on the strength of a manual census performed at Regional Employment Exchanges. A survey is given of the situation as at the end of December 1979. The census was concentrated on the family name of the person registered to determine whether a Moluccan was concerned or not. Hence, the degree of accuracy in this census will probably not be very high.

[30] For statements on this subject see, inter alia, 'Meer greep op werkverdeling' (A better grip on distribution of work), in Algemeen Dagblad, 21st June, 1980, in which the Deputy Director General of Employment of the Ministry of Social Affairs expresses a positive view on quota schemes for the benefit of, inter alia, 'coloured people' (!), and also the recommendations of the draft report 'Minorities' of the Dutch Labour Party (May 1980).

[31] Bovenkerk, F. (Ed.), 'Omdat zij anders zijn. Patronen van Rasdiscriminatie in Nederland'

(Because they are different. Racial Discrimination Patterns in the Netherlands), Boom, Meppel/Amsterdam, 1978. The investigation of the employment market took place in Amsterdam. The racial discrimination of Surinamers as established in this investigation was more extensive than that of Spaniards, but the difference was not significant.

[32] See also Penninx, R., 'Naar een algemeen ethnisch minderhedenbeleid' (Towards a general ethnic minorities policy), in 'Ethnische Minderheden' (Ethnic Minorities), WRR, Government Publishing Office, The Hague, 1979, p. 33, and 'Werk voor Molukkers' (Work for Moluccans), recommendations on the position of young Moluccans, Inspraakorgaan Welzijn Molukkers, Utrecht, 1980.

[33] Estimate of the Ministry of Social Affairs.

[34] Gooskens, I., et al., op.cit., p. 106.

[35] This is illustrated by the fact that from 1st January, 1980 onwards the Centres for Occupational Orientation and Practice have been officially declared open to anyone, thus also to Mediterranean migrants, meeting the qualifications for admission. Previous to that they were exclusively open to young people of Surinamese and Antillean origin. As afr as is known, this situation has not yet resulted in Mediterranean people joining the course. On the other hand some Christian Turks, having refugee status, are taking part.

[36] A possibility that comes to mind in this respect is the furnishing of specific information on occupations and courses of study at schools and at Regional Employment Exchanges.

Consecration of the Moslem-cementary Westgaarde (Amsterdam)

RESEARCH ON ETHNIC MINORITIES AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO POLICY DEVELOPMENT

*by H.B. Entzinger**

It is commonly recognised that the density of social scientists in the Netherlands is among the highest in the world. Consequently few phenomena in Dutch society slip the attention of social researchers. Quite surprisingly the recent arrival of several hundreds of thousands of immigrants and their insertion into the host society is one field which has been neglected, at least until about five years ago. This is a remarkable contrast with the situation in other, especially Anglo-Saxon countries, which have a long-standing tradition of research on race relations and ethnic minorities, often of a very high quality.

IMPEDIMENTS TO RESEARCH

The relatively late take-off of research on immigrant minorities in the Netherlands may to some extent be explained by the fact that public opinion in this country has long held that the immigrants' presence was only of a temporary nature. It was thought that the vast majority of workers from Mediterranean countries, of Moluccans and of Surinamers and Antilleans would eventually return to their home countries, and that those who did settle permanently would soon become integrated or even assimilated. This view was supported by the surprisingly smooth integration process of Eurasian repatriates from Indonesia during the 1950s (a phenomenon on which only little research has been done; Ellemers and Vermeulen 1980).

Policy makers, social scientist and also the general public have not been sufficiently aware of the vast differences between these repatriates and more recent groups of immigrants (Ellemers 1979). Moreover, in periods of rapid economic expansion, like the fifties, it is easier to make place for

* This contribution is based on an article by the same author which appeared in 'New Community', Journal of the Commission for Racial Equality (London, England), Vol. IX, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 1981).

new-comers than when economic growth stagnates, as has been the case since the mid-seventies.
This may explain the lack of interest shown with respect to immigration and its consequences, not only in academic circles but also within the government, where there was a general feeling that no special policy was needed for immigrant minorities. And since social science research in the Netherlands is rather more policy-oriented than in many other countries, and also largely financed by the government, it will be clear that immigration research made a late and hesitant start in this country.

Methodological reasons also played a role. Until some years ago sociological research in the Netherlands was firmly based on the use of surveys and other formal interview techniques.
Hence, most research was quantitatively oriented, geared to the collection of numerical data. It was only gradually that sociologists realised that the use of these formal techniques might bias the validity and reliability of research data collected among immigrant minorities more strongly than among the local population. This is not only because of cultural barriers. In many of the migrants' countries of origin, for instance, it is considered improper or unwise to disagree with the (presumed) opinion of one's questioner. This is why giving a socially desirable answer rather than telling the truth is widely met in research among immigrant minorities which employs formal sociological methods. Many immigrants, moreover, especially those who have arrived recently, are unfamiliar with social research, its aims and its techniques. Sometimes the interviewer may even be the first member of the host society with whom the respondent can really talk about his or her personal problems, and hence the respondent may expect the interviewer to solve these problems. In other cases, however, the interviewer or the researcher may be seen as a 'spy' sent by the police or by the government, and he or she may therefore be faced with distrust or even hostility.

Although the use of formal instruments should by no means be rejected in all cases, the search for other methods had to be intensified. Participant observation, traditionally more common among anthropologists in non-western societies, is one of these, and is now becoming more common among students of race relations and ethnic minorities in industrial societies, also in the Netherlands. An advantage of this method is that a relatively long period of intense contact creates a certain familiarity between the researcher and his subject of inquiry, and this could make the

final results more reliable. In most cases it would be advantageous, though not necessary, if the researcher charged with the collection and the interpretation of data should himself or herself be a member of the ethnic community being studied. In other cases, however, this may hamper the researcher's possibilities for assuming an attitude of complete independence. In the Netherlands, contrary to the situation in some other European countries, there is a great lack of qualified social scientists among the immigrant communities, just as there is a lack of qualified people in general among these groups. This may be another reason why so little has become known about the immigrants for such a long time.

EARLY TRENDS IN RESEARCH

After the afore-going remarks, it will not be surprising that in the Netherlands the first steps towards obtaining a more systematic knowledge of immigrant minorities were taken by anthropologists. More than other social scientists they are familiar with non-western societies and with non-quantitative research methods. It was especially the Anthropological and Sociological Centre of the University of Amsterdam which has been acting as a pioneer in this field since the late sixties. The excellent studies by Frank Bovenkerk among Surinamese immigrants and return migrants (Bovenkerk 1974, 1976) and by Lotty van den Berg-Eldering among Moroccan families in the Netherlands (Van den Berg-Eldering 1978), both supervised by professor André Köbben, are among the best which stem from this school.

A second trend in research which appeared rather early, focused on various aspects of international labour migration. Thorough analyses were made of the migrants' reasons for coming to the Netherlands, especially for Mediterranean workers, and to a lesser degree of their position in the economy of the recipient society. Quite noteworthy in this category are several studies by the Institute of Social Geography of the University of Amsterdam (Van Amersfoort 1974, Van Amersfoort & Van der Wusten 1976), by Rinus Penninx and Leo van Velzen (1976), and, more recently, those by Hans Heijke (1979) and by Wasif Shadid (1979). During the years 1974-1978 the Institute for Social Science Research in Developing Countries (IMWOO) in The Hague was responsible for one of the largest research projects that has ever been carried out in this field. This project was called REMPLOD and many of the publications that came out of it were of international standing (e.g. Abandan-Unat a.o. 1976). REMPLOD

stands for 'Reintegration of Emigrant Manpower and Promotion of Local Opportunities for Development', which reflects the original research goal of the project. The shift towards preventing more emigration rather than promoting return migration, which gradually took place during the project, clearly reflected the growing recognition of labour migration as a structural rather than a conjunctural phenomenon, which broke through during the mid-seventies.

Finally there is a third and rather heterogeneous category mainly consisting of smaller research projects, most of which deal with social problems experienced by immigrants in the Netherlands, and most of which are rather strongly policy-oriented. This is not so surprising since it was usually the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Recreation and Social Work which subsidised these projects. The social welfare agencies for immigrants, largely funded by this Ministry, were the first to be confronted with the problems and needs of these people, and, apart from that, the Ministry has always shown a vivid interest in promoting social science research on which it could base its policy instruments. The projects in this category include research in 'guest-workers' hostels, research among Dutch women married to Mediterranean workers, research into the functioning of pools of language interpreters, an inventory of the need for mosques, as well as many others. Although some of these projects have generated highly relevant results, the overall impression is rather dissipated. This type of research could hardly contribute to a systematic accumulation of knowledge concerning the process of minority formation such as was becoming more and more manifest in the country.

THE TURN OF THE TIDE

Meanwhile immigration to the Netherlands continued. In fact, since the early 1970s the number of immigrants has risen more steeply in the Netherlands than in any other European country (OECD 1980). The arrival of large numbers of Surinamers shortly before Surinam became independent in 1975, and also thereafter, the acts of terrorism staged by certain Moluccans during the years 1975-1978, the ongoing family reunification and the sharp rise in births among people of Mediterranean origin have confronted the Dutch population as a whole with the effects of immigration. Not just the external appearance of streets and cities changed but there was also an increased appeal by members of immigrant minorities for a fairer share in the country's material goods (housing) and services

(education, jobs, social counselling). As everywhere else, and especially in times of economic stagnation, this led to mounting tensions between the local population and the immigrants. It is not surprising that the call for a better policy for immigrant minorities became stronger, but one of the major drawbacks was the lack of factual knowledge on which such a policy could be based.

This was also the message of quite a few publications by the growing number of academic specialists that appeared during the second half of the seventies. In 1978 Frank Bovenkerk published a book *'Omdat zij anders zijn'* (Because they are different), which was based on a study carried out by a group of researchers of the University of Utrecht (Bovenkerk (ed.) 1978). This study showed quite clearly that immigrant minorities have poor chances for participation in Dutch society and that they are discriminated against. The study had quite an impact on Dutch public opinion because it badly damaged the traditional reputation of tolerance in which the Dutch believed so strongly themselves. This study, together with the descriptive analysis of all larger immigrant (ethnic) minorities in the Netherlands which Rinus Penninx had made for the Scientific Council for Government Policy (Penninx 1979) certainly marked a turning point in political thinking.
Both studies illustrate how large may be the impact of high quality research work on policy development, provided the work attempts to give a – well timed – answer to problems felt by politicians and by the general public.

ACOM AND ITS PROGRAMME FOR RESEARCH

In the same year, 1978, the Minister of Cultural Affairs, Recreation and Social Work created an Advisory Commission on Minorities Research (ACOM). This Commission consists of nine independent academic experts and is chaired by professor André Köbben. The Commissions first task was to set up a long-term programme for research into the position of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. Apart from that, ACOMs tasks are to advise the government on individual research projects and to co-ordinate and stimulate minorities research in general.

In June 1979 the research programme, *Advies Onderzoek Minderheden* (Advice on Minorities Research) was presented to the government (ACOM 1979). It gave an inventory of the numerous white spots in knowledge concerning the position of immigrants, and it formulated about one

hundred topics for further research, arranged according to their priority. The Commission not only recommended that more research should be carried out by sociologists and anthropologists, but also advised jurists, economists, psychologists, educational researchers and specialists in other disciplines to take a larger interest in the matter. The themes for further research cover not less than thriteen different fields, such as legal status, housing, labour, education, health care, police, cultural aspects, the role of the government, return migration and a few more. A few basic types of research projects may be distilled from the long list of more or less concrete proposals which the Commission has set up.

First of all ACOM has noted a great need for research of an inventory type on the current position of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. Measures which aim at improving their participation could be more effective if they were based on good insight into the present state of affairs, e.g. on the labour market, in housing and in the school system, as well as regarding the legal position of foreign immigrants. There is a striking lack of statistical data on immigrants, which is mainly an effect of 'ethnic origin' not being registered as such by the local authorities and by other public and private institutions (Entzinger 1980). Another handicap for policy planners is that the outcomes of social science research do not always filter through to them sufficiently. ACOM has taken steps which are meant to improve this.

In the second place the Commission has underlined the importance of research into the manner in which the various social forces which lead to a low degree of participation of immigrant minorities in Dutch society reinforce each other. Quite obviously projects of this type should aim at the formulation of suggestions for the increase of social participation. They should lead, for instance, to concrete recommendations for education and schooling, for anti-discriminatory measures, for the functioning of welfare agencies, health care, and distribution mechanisms in housing. It is in this field that quite a lot may be learned from research outcomes and other experience in various Western European countries of immigration. The Dutch sometimes tend to think that the situation in the Netherlands, not only as regards immigration, is quite unique!

In the third place several research themes which the Commission has proposed, deal with the migrants' own cultural identity and aim at investigating the migrants' own experience in this field. It is a well-known fact that in quite a few cases migrants are confronted with very different,

sometimes even contradictory sets of values, norms and expectations. How does this influence their well-being, and to what extent is it possible to retain certain elements of the original culture for those who wish to do so? The Netherlands has traditionally been a pluralist society. The recent arrival, however, of so many people who combine a low socio-economic status with a very different cultural background, and the consequent change from a pluralist to a multi-ethnic society has created tensions which have formerly been unknown. These tensions are felt especially by the less privileged members of the original population. They become manifest at work, in the classroom, in the old urban districts as well as in many other settings, although so far they have hardly come to the surface in party politics. It would be quite important to know how the various groups involved view the situation and how they act while coping with these (potential) sources of conflict.

While the inventory and policy formulating stages of research move forward, it may be expected that the outlines of a minority policy will become more and more clear. As this process develops, the need for experiments, accompanied by research, and for research of an evaluating type, will make itself felt. If this really happens in the not too distant future – and prospects seem to be rather good – the systematic development of a minority policy will prove to be a good example of co-operation between researchers and policy makers.

The Minister of the Interior, who had taken over certain co-ordinating tasks from his colleague, the Minister of Cultural Affairs, Recreation and Social Work in the meantime, reacted favourably to the research programme which ACOM had proposed. Since 1980 an extra sum of two million guilders (UK £ 400.000 or US $ 800.000) for research on ethnic minorities has been reserved on the annual budget of the Ministry of the Interior, sufficient to provide work for about twenty researchers. This money is additional to the research funds already provided by the other Ministries involved, and is also supplemented by funds from other sources such as local authorities, universities and private institutions.
The proposed programme was also submitted for comment to various organisations of ethnic minorities. Generally speaking, their reactions were rather favourable, except that they proposed greater emphasis on research dealing with problems of cultural identity. In their view, the basic philosophy of the programme put too much stress on the development of instruments for smoothening the integration process, while they would

have preferred more projects which would support the development of a true multi-ethnic, pluralist society. One many question, however, whether decisions on such crucial matters should be made by the researchers themselves. Is not their major task to offer a systematic analysis of figures, facts and trends and to shed some light on possible consequences of alternative policies? Final decisions, however, should be made by the politicians. Here we touch upon the crucial question of the role of scientific research in government planning and policy development. This question will be further elaborated on in the final sections of this contribution.

RESEARCH ON GOVERNMENT POLICY

There are certainly some grounds for believing that research into the position of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands is rather governmental in its outlook. This partly stems from the fact that the national government finances nearly all major research projects in this field. In the Netherlands, contrary to the situation in comparable countries, a large part of social science research is directly funded from governmental sources. This means that research of a more fundamental type tends to be undervalued, especially outside the universities.

A clear risk of heavily government-sponsored research is that it may be too much directed at finding an answer to short-term, concrete policy problems the government faces *hic et nunc*, without being able to offer a real vision on long-term trends and developments. Or, as Köbben put it recently: 'The government in its role of research commissioner prefers projects that fulfill four conditions: (1) they should support government policy; (2) results should be quickly available; (3) the report should contain figures and tables ('hard data'); (4) the 'outline of the project should not be theoretical', as a government official once said, or – as he then added in a less diplomatic mood – 'it should not contain theoretical nonsense' ' (Köbben 1980).

Of course, Köbben continues, politicians cannot always wait for the scientists to come with their results. Too many researchers, at least in the Netherlands, tend to take their time. Good and thorough research, however, requires a certain period of reflection but also a considerable amount of hard work. There is a certain tension between the requirements of science and the demands of an impatient public, and nowadays the problem of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands definitely constitutes a good example of this. But given such circumstances, Köbben warns the govern-

ment not to have recourse to pseudo-research for the simple purpose of decorating ministerial White Papers. He then continues with a plea for the introduction of experiments combined with evaluative research. In any case, he says, active involvement of the researcher in the position of his subject of research, is a major prerequisite.

It is important not to underestimate the danger of sloppy research which may result from pressure of time as well from other pressures, such as the fear of missing a following assignment, but neither should it be exaggerated. Of course, there is a certain interdependency between (government) policy and research. But this should not lead to a situation where *policy oriented* research turns into a synonym for *policy affirmative* research. More than in many other countries the Dutch researcher is free to criticise the government, even if he or she works with government money, provided, of course, that criticism can be supported by research findings. The same holds true, as a matter of fact, for numerous highly vocal interest groups working with government money. It is sometimes said that the government of the Netherlands subsidises its own opposition.

GOOD QUALITY RESEARCH: ITS POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

A good social science researcher ought to assume a critical and independent attitude not only towards commissioners and subsidisers but also towards the subject of inquiry. The major task of the researcher is to present a picture of society which is as realistic as possible. This means that while selecting and analysing his or her data, and while formulating conclusions and recommendations based on these data, the researcher should avoid the wish to be father to the thought.

Many a researcher, perhaps especially in the fiels of immigrant minorities, *thinks* he finds what he had *hoped* to find. Distortion of research findings in order to please any one of the parties involved does occur, even among researchers with a reputation of high sincerity. Some years ago, two *bona fide* researchers published an article on delinquency among immigrant minorities (Van Amersfoort & Biervliet 1975). The message of their article was that – contrary to what is commonly thought – the vast majority of criminal offences were of a relatively minor character (small thefts etc.). However true this might be, a regrouping of the statistical data they had presented to prove this, revealed that for some categories delinquency was still disproportionally high, even when taking into account variables such as age structure and place of residence. It was certainly not their conscious aim to hide this, but the authors may have been somewhat too much

preoccupied with their ambition to help the immigrants lose their bad reputation.

Some researchers even go further: they are so much impressed by the fate of immigrant minorities that they spend much of their energy on finding a scape-goat. Quite understandably, such an approach is often welcomed by certain minority associations and other pressure groups. Although this may be a legitimate role of the latter, I think a good social science researcher should assume a more independent attitude. This is not meant as a plea against any form of identification with the minority groups or against what is sometimes called 'action research'. But especially in cases where issues are at stake which may easily provoke strong emotions – and that is certainly true of the position of immigrant minorities in the Netherlands – proper use of research methods and techniques and a sufficient amount of self-criticism as well as a certain scepticism vis-a-vis all parties involved seems to be everyone's interest. Neither is this meant as a plea for 'neutral' research, if such a thing exists. One may however require of a good researcher that any personal preference be expressed and motivated quite clearly in the report. Otherwise social science research may easily become counter-productive.

If research is carried out in line with these principles, it will be difficult to tell whether it plays into government's, the immigrants' or into anybody elses hands. The value of any social science research project should be judged from the quality of the outcomes. A proper application of research methods should be seen as a necessary but not as a sufficient condition for good results. Of course, a researcher is free to base his own recommendations on these results, provided facts and opinions are clearly distinguished from each other. Once the researchers' work has been completed, anybody interested should draw his or her consequences for *political action* from it, but, as I see it, the researcher has only a marginal responsibility here.

I am convinced that this type of social science research will offer a most valuable contribution to the improvement of chances for ethnic minorities in Dutch society.

LITERATURE

Only a limited number of books and articles on ethnic minorities in the Netherlands has been published in English or in another language easily accessible for a larger audience outside

Dutch-speaking countries. The following list of publications mentioned in the preceding contribution, contains the most relevant publications in English, plus a few others that are available in Dutch only.

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Turkish slaughterfeast in an abattoir (Amsterdam)

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IMMIGRANT MINORITIES IN THE NETHERLANDS: ETHNICITY AS A FACTOR FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND PRACTICE CONSIDERATION

by H. Campfens

INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE MIGRATION EXPERIENCE INTO THE NETHERLANDS0

In contrast to countries like Canada, the U.S. and Australia, Western European countries, including the Netherlands, have not pursued active policies of immigration during this century. As a matter of fact there was a period during the time of reconstruction following upon the Second World War when the Netherlands government encouraged emigration to relieve population pressures. Nevertheless, in spite of the official position on immigration, the Netherlands has experienced a great influx of migrant groups, which include the repatriates and Eurasians from the former Netherlands East-Indies (Indonesia); the Moluccans; the foreign workers and their families from the Mediterranean region; the Surinamers and Antilleans from the Caribbean region; and refugees. Combined they amount to an estimated 800,000 in a population of 14 million.

There are several causes that explain this extraordinary social phenomenon. Firstly, the process of decolonization was in many cases accompanied by extensive migration from the (ex-)colonies to the former mother country. Secondly, expansive economic development resulting in labour shortages in certain sectors of the labour market in the Western European industrialized countries during the '50s and '60s led to large scale migration from the less developed countries of Southern Europe and North Africa. And thirdly, political instability and civil wars in Third World countries have increased movements of economic and political refugees.

* The factual data presented in this article are drawn from a report by this author commissioned by the Dutch government: Campfens, H. *The Integration of Ethno-Cultural Minorities: A Pluralist Approach*: A Comparative Analysis of Policy and Programme in the Netherlands and Canada. The Hague: Government Publishing Office, 1979 (ISBN 90-1202765-9). This article is an adapted version of a paper presented at the Symposium titled 'Helping Networks and the Welfare State' at the University of Toronto, May 13-14, 1980 (Faculty of Social Work).

Refugee movements can be expected to increase in the next 20-30 years considering that, in spite of a gradual decline in the average annual rate in growth of world population, some 2 billion people will be added to the current level of 4 billion, as reported by the United Nations, with 90% of the increase taking place in the most resource-scarce and poverty stricken regions of the world. In addition, the Netherlands may meet with a further expansion in the size of ethnic minorities because of: a relatively high fertility rate among migrant families presently in the country; continuing family reunions; the probability of migration from countries of the European Communities (of which the Netherlands is a participating member), including possible entry of Third World migrant groups residing in these same countries; possible increase of migrants from the Netherlands Antilles, whose residents have the right to free entry; and other conceivable in-migration movements of foreign workers and refugees, dependent on Netherlands economic and international developments, and on government policy in this regard.

The outstanding features of the migration movement into the Netherlands are: 1. the intake of such large numbers of migrants into an already densely populated, small country with a severe shortage of adequate housing, and urban congestion; 2. the entry within a short period of three decades; and 3. the relative newness of a growing multiculturalism with the presence of ethnically different migrant groups, superimposed upon a society that was essentially homogeneous in culture.

Policy-wise, the central factors of the Dutch in-migration experience to be noted are: 1. the official non-acceptance of the 'permanency' in migrant settlement; 2. the official preoccupation with the 'legal status' of the migrant; and 3. a reluctance to develop a general policy that concerns itself with social, economic, political and cultural integration.

Research findings show varied experiences and explanations for the successful or unsuccessful integration of the major groups that entered the Netherlands during the last 30-35 years. The eventual absorption and successful assimilation of the first large group (i.e. the repatriates and Eurasians) was not so much the result of government policy but rather related to a number of pre-migration characteristics which facilitated the adjustment of Eurasians to Netherlands life. They possessed marketable skills as a result of their employment in the various sectors of the former colonial civil service system; they were adept in the Dutch language; in most cases they obtained a fair bit of education; they knew how to relate socially in a Dutch community; and as political refugees they had a great desire to remain in the Netherlands. Additionally, they arrived at a time of

unequalled economic growth. There was a noticeable absence among members of this migrant category: of a desire to retain a cultural orientation to their country of origin; of group formation; and of inter-group conflict with the host community.

The experience for the other major migrant groups has been quite different. They have met with serious problems in terms of: their disadvantaged socio-economic position in Netherlands society and their absorption into an emerging sub-proletarian class; a rise in social problems, such as drug addiction, crime, and various forms of discrimination; a growing isolation particularly among wives of foreign workers with an expected growth in mental health problems; inter-generational conflicts between migrant children and their parents, etc.; and a growing potential of inter-group conflict.

DILEMMA OF AN INTEGRATION POLICY

The rise of ethnicity as a social force in modern industrial societies and serious problems encountered in the integration of newcomers has called into question the traditional approaches and manner in which the State and its major institutions – such as the employment, housing, health, educational and social service sectors – respond to the diverse needs and problems of individuals and groups in a society that has become increasingly diverse in ethnic composition and cultural life styles. Two major and inter-related dilemmas come immediately to mind for policy makers and professional practitioners. The first relates to the degree to which members of ethno-cultural minorities can be permitted to retain their own way of life and identity without posing a threat to the unity and stability of society. The other side of this question is how people with diverse ethnic roots and origins can best be integrated into the larger society without emasculating their need and search for personal identity and ethnic group support in an environment that is becoming increasingly professionalized, bureaucratized and mass-consumption oriented. The second dilemma relates to the question of where the responsibility should lie in reducing the differences in socio-economic position of newcomers and members of ethno-cultural minorities vis-a-vis the mainstream of the population.

Answers to the first dilemma depend in part on public attitudes as well as government leadership in policies that pursue:

a) An 'Assimilationist' form of integration, in which people are encouraged or pressured to give up their ways of life;
b) 'Permissive integration', in which they are allowed to maintain their cultural identity with appropriate protective measures; or

c) 'Supportive integration', in which people are encouraged to hold onto their own ways of life, and supported in group and organizational development with official assistance.

As an illustration, Canada responded to the changing ethnic mosaic of its society with the introduction of a multi-cultural policy at the federal level in 1971, followed by the Province of Ontario in May 1977, recognizing thereby the existence of a multi-group society along ethnically differentiated lines, and accepting at least a 'permissive' form of cultural integration if not a fully 'supportive' one. Much of scholarly opinion concerned with the ethnic survival (Isajiw, 1977; Jaworski, 1977) and with alienating tendencies in highly complex societies (Kovacs and Cropley, 1972), has been supportive of such a policy. This policy as Palmer (1975) shows in his review of Canadian contemporary literature, emphasizes above all a shift from assimilationist to pluralist assumptions. But as Aun (1977) pointed out, political implications of such a policy remains still uncertain in the context of nation states.

The second dilemma concerns itself with efforts aimed at improving the socio-economic position or a reduction in the difference in status between members of the newcomer groups and the host society. Specifically, questions of relevance here are the extent to which society and its government expects the ethnic individual to adjust to his environment and improve his position by his own efforts as an individual, or though collective action. Secondly, if emphasis is placed on collective action, is this to be pursued through majority institutions serving the general population, i.e., political parties, unions, social services, community organizations, educational institutions, housing authorities, etc.; or, through indigenous voluntary ethnic organizations and groups, supported by official measures and subsidization? And, thirdly, if strategy is aimed at collective action through ethnic voluntary associations, are efforts to focus on socio-economic improvement of those members finding themselves in a disadvantaged position, or is more effective action achieved in emphasizing first their own cultural identity? The diagram below brings the above questions into schematic format, adopted from the Advisory Commission on Research on Cultural Minorities in the Netherlands (ACOM Report, 1979).

Diagram



Though Canada among western nations has moved farthest in addressing itself to the issue of cultural identity at the official policy level, and in recent years has also begun to assume some collective responsibility at the institutional and programmatic levels for the general welfare of the newcomer, it has still largely ignored or negated the potential and actual role of ethnic groups and networks in advancing their own well-being. Reasons for this lack can be attributed to a number of factors such as:

1. The debate about the implications of ethnic group identity and group formation for societal cohesion.
2. Conceptual confusion and the lack of a clear operational definition of ethnicity and ethnic group for policy and programme purposes.
3. The traditional thrust of the western welfare states and their helping professions, which have been guided by values of individualism and individual self-sufficiency.

This article will attempt to address each of these points and highlight a policy and programme that takes into account the ethnic group potential for the advancement of migrant well-being. Before entering into this discussion it would be helpful to consider first some of the prevalent theoretical perspectives on integration and ethnic relations, and state the assumptions on societal conditions which underlie and guide choices made in strategies of action relevant to integration. For this purpose I have relied in part on the work done by Schermerhorn (1970).

System Perspective

This particular perspective, which has dominated much of the immigration and integration experience in North America during this century, views the newcomer groups as sub-systems who are gradually fitted into the larger system (i.e. societal life) by a series of adaptive adjustments (programmes, projects, procedures and interactions), regulated by the norms and values of society's institutions that eventually become internalized by members of ethnic groups. A central notion of this perspective is the malfunctioning or 'momentary disequilibrium' of the larger system, as a result of a larger than usual number of ethnic individuals or groups found in a disadvantaged position, or as a result of developing prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory acts carried out by members of the majority, or as a result of discontinuities in the ethnic socialization process of minority youth with accompanying social problems. Presumably, this disequilibrium can be effected by corrective policy and programme measures aimed at removing societal or institutional obstacles to integration of the individual migrant and aimed at reducing his status difference through skill training, thereby returning the larger system to its former state of equilibrium. The underlying assumption is that of a harmonious process of integration free from conflict, in which the viability of the existing social structure is assumed and in which also the role of the ethno-cultural group – as an organized entity or functioning network – in the process of integration is left undefined. This perspective coincides with the assimilationist view of integration in which the focus of the service delivery system is upon the functioning of the individual ethnic and his/her relationship to the larger society.

This perspective appears also to have been implicit in the policy and programme developments emanating from the various Ministries of government in the Netherlands with subsequent undesirable consequences, particularly in relation to the settlement experience of those from the Caribbean region and the foreign workers. Characteristic of Netherlands developments in furthering the well-being of migrants has been the reliance of government on the private sector and the separate systems of heavily subsidized service centres for Surinamese, Antilleans and foreign workers, which have emerged in time from that sector. In this context little support has been given to group and organizational developments among ethnic members themselves, which might have been mobilized as a valuable resource to assist official and semi-official efforts

in meeting the usual problems encountered by newcomers in their settlement, acculturation, economic and social integration. In spite of official neglect in defining and supporting the role of indigenous ethnic associations in self-help activities, many recent arrivals seem to turn to existing natural helping networks made up of primary group members of kith and kin, who function in their own peculiar way, independent from official guidance, to aid these newcomers for better or worse to adapt to urban life in the Netherlands. Others, disenchanted with Netherlands life, become the victim of dubious recruitment efforts and practices of politically aligned indigenous organizations, which function in some cases as a direct extension of the ruling political regime in country of origin and act as a divisive element among migrant communities in the Netherlands. Although Netherlands government has given recognition to the growing cultural heterogeneity of Netherlands society in its various policy papers on foreign workers, Moluccans, Surinamers and Antilleans – and accepted in principle the right of migrants to express their cultural differences and maintain their own cultural identity – institutional and community practices have left much to be desired, with little evidence (barring a few exceptions) of a commitment to the development of a cultural and institutional pluralism. The implementation of government's socio-cultural policy expressed by the idea of 'integration with retention of own identity' has been an ongoing source of confusion in interpretation and conflict, between national authorities and functionaries of regional migrant service centres principally charged with meeting the socio-cultural needs of the various migrant groups, and between institutional officials and spokesmen of ethnic groups. The limited number of concrete measures taken, and resources made available to make retention of own identity within the context of integration into Netherlands society a reality, have created much scepticism among ethno-cultural groups about the seriousness of government intent. The greater emphasis placed recently in policy implementation on factors related to the socio-economic adaptation of migrants, has left many with the impression that they are implicitly being forced to conform to Netherlands norms, values and institutional practices, and expected to give up their own cultural orientation.

Official reliance upon migrant service centres for the implementation of government's socio-cultural policy throughout these years of migrant settlement has had the side effect of leaving out other important sectors of society, particularly those at the municipal and local levels, in assuming their part in meeting the specific goal of 'equal participation of migrant groups in Netherlands society' and in fostering the kind of structures

necessary for the functioning of a truly culturally based pluralistic society. Until 1976 there existed for instance no participatory channels for the Moluccans as a group to provide consultation in their own right at local levels for the formulation and implementation of a relevant welfare policy. As for the Surinamese and Antilleans who have few indigenous organizational structures at the local level, their interest promotion has to a large extent depended upon spokesmen who were also government paid functionaries of service centres for Surinamese and Antillean well-being. These ethnic spokesmen have criticized authorities at various levels of government for not giving them sufficient recognition as promotors of group interests, nor consulting them adequately in policy developments related to their group interests. Participatory structures for consultation at national and local levels are least developed for foreign workers whose interest articulation and promotion until now has mainly been assumed and inadequately carried out by the service centres for foreign workers. The very structure of these centres and the great variety of migrants with different national and ethnic backgrounds they serve, do neither lend these centres to speak effectively and with force on behalf of the migrant workers' diverse group interests in Netherlands society, nor for participating in an optimum sense in policy formulations touching on their diverse needs in education, health, housing, employment, social services, etc.

Conflict Perspective

From a contrasting theoretical perspective, the migrant population or ethnic minority is viewed as being in an embattled position, fighting for its life, its identity and self-esteem, subject to perpetual constraints that threaten its survival, its freedom, or its life chances in a precarious, uncertain world. The underlying assumption of this theory is that the ethnic minority is in a power relationship with the dominant group of society, that gives the latter the opportunity to dictate and impose its definition of integration, or use sanctions on those in subordinate positions with little fear of rebellion or successful retaliation. Secondly, it assumes that advances can only come about through ethnic group conflict or class-related action, not through a harmonious process as assumed in the 'system Perspective'. In short, conflict interactions between majority and minority groups and among different minority groups are perceived as inherent, natural and an inevitable feature of the process of change towards integration.

During my research visits to England in 1978 and 1979 I found this view

gaining particular support among spokesmen and leaders of Black and Asian groups, who had lost trust in the intentions of government, major political parties and policy makers, and in the ability of the current institutional framework to respond to their particular ethnic needs and bring about racial equality (see also Sivanandan, 1976; and Rex, 1978). The conflict power strategy is the Marxist answer to the assimilationists guided by the System Perspective, who dominated the field of ethnic studies, policy and community practice until the late sixties (Benton, 1955 and 1976, Patterson, 1963). The assimilationists used to argue that Black migrants, for instance, from the Caribbean region would eventually be absorbed into the indigenous working class, much like other ethnically different groups. Some Boroughs of London even had 'Immigrant Assimilation Officers' then. This view is regarded, today, as excessively optimistic by the Marxists, who argue that one must start by analyzing the economic and social position of migrants and not their group characteristics, since objectively migrants belong to the working class in which they in turn form a bottom stratum due to the subordinate status of their occupations. They expressly reject, therefore, ethnicity and racism as determining factors (Castles and Kosack, 1973), and see the pursuit of migrant well-being to be caught up with the labour movement along class lines with emphasis on the inequities of the economic-political system.
The question here is whether the 'group interests' of such visible minorities as the Black migrants from the Caribbean region and the foreign workers, who are presumed to make up largely the bottom stratum of the Netherlands working class, will be given any 'specific' attention within the labour movement, or whether they in turn will be subsumed to the 'majority interests' of Dutch labour. It would appear that protection of their individual and group interests in the face of rising discriminatory practices as noted from research (Bovenkerk, 1978), access to equal opportunities in this era of economic uncertainty and constraint, and concern with their ethnic related issues, will not necessarily be assured through singular reliance upon labour initiative.

Pluralistic Perspective

A third view takes a compromising middle position combining elements of the system and conflict perspectives, accepting the notions of interaction and competition among groups symbolized in the exercise of power. It takes 'cultural pluralism' rather than 'class' or 'system' as its point of departure, viewing racial and ethnic entities as distinct and valid sub-cul-

tures of society which interact to generate over a certain period of time a general culture (Schermerhorn, 1970; Glazer, 1975; Greeley, 1969; Levine, 1973; Rothman, 1977).

The important theoretical position underlying this perspective, is that an individual's basic entity consists of both individual and cultural elements. Any integration policy, therefore, must consider that identity derives not only from the essence of the migrant as individual, but also from the core of the migrant's own community culture. It must recognize, so the pluralists argue, that group identity provides the vulnerable, marginal migrant, a solid, protective and necessary 'social ground' in an otherwise bewildering and shifting world over which he has no control.

In this perspective, the focus of policy and programme would neither be singularly on the system and its momentary equilibrium, nor singularly on the so-called exploited minorities, but rather on the complex pattern of social and economic relations in a pluralist, multi-group society. It views the migrant not only in terms of his economic needs embroiled in market-labour forces but also in his social, cultural and self-esteem needs. It accepts that all interactions among human populations show both coerced and voluntary aspects. And so, ethnic individuals can be expected to engage intermittently in a process of accommodation and adjust to the existing institutional pattern of society at certain points in time, with co-operation from ethnic leaders, and at other times will be confronted with incompatible differences of objectives that can be resolved only in and through conflict to reach a new order of integration. It is in the latter case where new forms of group participation in decision-making will act to avoid emasculation of the needs and aspirations of ethnic individuals and their group interests and the resulting recourse to social or anti-social behaviour.

IMPLICATIONS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY AND GROUP FORMATION FOR SOCIETAL COHESION

The 'International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' specifically related to persons belonging to ethnic minorities (Article 27), calls for their right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. Furthermore, in November 1978, the General Conference of the UNESCO held in Paris, unanimously adopted a 'Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice' which included a reference to the 'right of individuals in groups to be different'. Specifically, Article 93 states that:

'Population groups of foreign origin . . . should benefit from appropriate measures designed to afford them security and respect for their dignity and cultural values; be facilitated in their adaptation to their host environment . . .'.

With these recent insertions of articles in international covenants and agreements, which have advanced not only individual but also group rights related to ethnicity, policy officials and practitioners alike need to rethink some of the assumptions upon which they have been functioning and making decisions (Breton, et al., 1979).

The negative view on ethnic group formations speculates that stimulation and support of ethnic identity has a segregative effect on society, in which members of such groups – who experience a clash in ethno-cultural needs with the rest of society – will a) either engage in disruptive action and thus undermine societal order and stability, as was apparent with the Moluccans in the Netherlands; or, b) dramatize their marginality and strengthen their isolation with little social participation of its members in community affairs and societal institutions, as has been the case among Canada's native Indians until recently. This view is particularly applicable to those groups which are economically disadvantaged and experience little or no upward social mobility. Both of these cases, though, need to be closely scrutinized and looked at in the light of their peculiar historical and political circumstances, because of their impact on policy in relation to other ethnic groups. The Moluccan experience in the Netherlands, for instance, resulting in militant action and recourse to violence, is believed to have strongly influenced subsequent ambivalent posturing in Netherlands social policies that might lead to or strengthen existing group formations among other ethnic groups, especially among the growing numbers of West Indian Blacks from former Netherlands Guyana (Surinam) and the Antillean Islands.

The Moluccan Experience in the Netherlands

The Netherlands took in 12,500 Moluccans in 1951. They are a heterogeneous group in culture and religion originating from Ambon and a variety of surrounding islands in the Indonesian archipelago. In the interim period they have grown to 32,000 including second and third generation members. The conditions under which these migrants from Indonesia entered The Netherlands make them a separate case from most other groups. First, as past members of the former Netherlands Colonial Army, and because of their military service, they claimed special status,

pension and other financial settlements. And secondly, many of them had no intention to stay, seeing their future in the political ideal of a free Republic of the South Moluccans (currently an integral part of the Indonesian unitary state). Differences in views on their status and political ideal have strained the relationship between the Netherlands Government and the Moluccans ever since, and complicated economic and social integration of the Moluccans into Netherlands society with occasional violent eruptions and kidnappings in the 1970's that have received wide international attention.

The official expectation that they would soon return to the newly constituted Indonesian State (with the co-operation of the Indonesian Government) led to a policy which, instead of encouraging integration into Netherlands society was directed at assisting them in maintaining their unity as a cultural group. Thus, the Moluccans came to be housed in separate residential quarters; they received collective care from the State, and were governed by a separate structure (i.e., the Commissariat for the Care of Ambonese) that kept them totally isolated from Netherlands societal and social life. When it became apparent that official assumptions about a speedy return were untenable, the Netherlands Government introduced a new policy in 1956 that withdrew 'total state care' with the expectation that henceforth the Moluccans assume responsibility for their own care. This meant entry into the labour market; followed in 1960 by other changes in housing, based on recommendations from a special Government Commission.

The expectation that the Moluccans would adapt to Netherlands community life – after opening up the labour market to them and rehousing them in specially built 'open' residential areas – proved to be too optimistic. Government misjuged the force of group solidarity and the development of 'closed communities' among the Moluccans, which remained even after they were resettled into housing estates across the country. Secondly, the Government misjuged the obstacles facing the second generation of Moluccans in school and on the labour market, because of lack of appropriate preparation. As such they had become a minority not only in the cultural but also in a socio-economic sense. Most of all, as now apparent, officials seemed to be largely unaware of the process of radicalization that had taken place during the sixties among large groups of Moluccan youths inspired by the political ideals of their elders and frustrated by their experiences in Netherlands schools, in the labour market and in Netherlands neighbourhoods. This led to radical

action during the seventies that affected the security and stability of the nation.

The Canadian Native Indians

They are the only 'ethnic' group in Canada, who have been recipients of specially instituted group-oriented policy and programmes, ensured by historically established treaty rights and special legislation, and administered by the Ministry of Northern and Indian Affairs. The native Indians are also the only 'ethnic' group who are eligible for 'core funding grants' – through the Federal Office of the Secretary of State (Native Citizens Directorate) and through provincial level offices – given to voluntary associations of native Indians with demonstrated support from their declared constituents. These grants are designed to enable native people to undertake initiatives in formulating policy and programmes to further their development, as well as meeting expenses for administrative and organizational purposes. Other groups who apply for government funding for organizational development can qualify only if they meet criteria in the general category of 'citizen' action, which excludes 'ethnic' group action.
Occasional attempts by the federal government in removing the special status enjoyed by native Indians in Canadian society have been staunchly-rejected by Indian leaders who perceive such status as a protective shield for their desire to retain their collective racial or ethnic identity. Evidently, government policy and programmes for the native Indians have been based more on their legal status and rights than on clear operational definitions related to the ethnic identity issue and need for group support. Generally, it can be said that the native Indian condition is one of 'social pathology' in which many of its members suffer of 'cultural deprivation', being apparently disposed to crime, poor family cohesion, inadequate educational motivation, poor work habits or attitudes towards work, drug abuse and alcoholism, apathy, etc. The causal factors may have been historical, past or current discrimination, or cultural downgrading of the minority individual by the larger public, or other such causes, which in turn may have developed into intra-psychic or intra-group malfunctioning. This is the argument expounded by advocates of the 'culture of poverty' theory (Current Anthropology, 1971).
The assumption underlying most social programmes, directed towards minorities and instituted by industrialized nations, is that the problem is an 'indian', 'Moluccan' or 'minority problem', leading to activities that direct themselves to changing attitudes and behaviour of such individuals. The

question, of course, is whether it can be regarded merely as a 'minority problem', or whether the source of the difficulty is also located in the larger society in the form of minority sub-ordination, racist or discriminatory activity, or plain inhumanity and insensitivity to the peculiar needs of the ethnic minority. If the latter is the case, it becomes very much a 'majority problem', requiring strategies of action aimed at sociostructural change.

The Pluralist Solution

The pluralist solution takes special issue with those who seek advances only through class- or systems-related action, which most often submerges sub-group needs, interests and other divisive elements. Both approaches are considered as seriously flawed because they tend to ignore differential group characteristics of these ethnic individuals. Consequently, such groups are often treated by other societal groups or organizations, as if they were a uniform, faceless mass of proletarians waiting to be recruited to join working-class unions, or individuals ready to be absorbed into the anonimity and passivity of the consuming masses, or into the existing social structure without regard for group differences.

The main task of the private sector, of professional practitioners and government initiatives – the cultural pluralists argue – is to take into account and nurture sub-cultural and ethnic affiliation, and build more on the group potential of such individuals for meeting of needs and problem-solving. In an age where the forces of technology and industry have frequently operated to protect and expand their own self interests, viable local communities who function supportively to such individuals appear to disintegrate gradually, or be destroyed outright. Western societies in their phase development from family-based agricultural economies to highly urbanized and industrial societies, find their social structure being rearranged from informal, localized patterns of social interactions to interest groupings in every sphere of society (Warren, 1972). In some spheres like the economic domain, such grouping have been integrated into decision-making structures that aim at resolving conflicts in interest as evidenced in the labour-management field. As part of the political process, interest groupings are increasingly functioning as pressure groups and hereby serve as adaptive instruments of political accommodation (Pross, 1975). In this context it would be essential that individual members of ethnic categories group together a) to identify, protect and lobby for their interests with various institutions and participate in the public policy-making process, and b) to serve as means or vehicles in meeting a variety of

particular ethnic-oriented needs. In this, governments can be instrumental through granting formulas, consultative services, partnership arrangements, fees for service approaches, etc. Formation of voluntary associations and coalitional activities between ethno-cultural groups also function as an effective counter-part to the ever possible threat of tyranny by the state. That threat is always present no matter how benevolent the state. Remove the self-help and voluntary association initiatives and you dismember society, creating excessive dependencies!

IMPLICATIONS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY AND GROUP FUNCTIONING FOR POLICY CONSIDERATION

Quite understandably there are some legitimate concerns and fears among policy-makers about ethnic group functions for societal cohesion. It is also becoming evident that there exists considerable confusion about what are distinct needs of members of ethnic minorities, i.e. what is 'ethnic-specific' in human needs that calls for special policies and programmes; and secondly, what is an operationally acceptable definition of 'ethnic group' that should be promoted by government for meeting various needs of the ethnic minority membership and for problem-solving, i.e. what are the 'positive functions' and roles of ethnic group formation in modern industrial society.

Ethnic Group Defined Operationally

Ethnicity is not, as British Social Scientist, Watson (1977) declares, an euphemism for 'race'. Physical appearance is just one of the many possible criteria that can serve as a basis for ethnic divisions. Isaacs (1975) for one argues that ethnicity is a reflection of 'primordeal loyalties'. This view has been severely criticized, since it assumes that people have unchanging attachments to a particular social category (whether their country of origin, culture or heritage), and carries a form of determinism found in earlier theories on race (see Montague, 1974). This notion is particularly contested by recent research on members of the second generation of migrant minorities, who find themselves between the cultural orientation of their parents and their host society. Findings show that developments among ethnic minorities tend towards a dynamic evolution of an own migrant culture with attributes that have absorbed elements of both their country of origin and their new adopted country (Watson, 1977). For this reason, Watson favours the approach to ethnicity in which alliances based on

ethnicity function like informal 'interest groups' and operating through a common culture or a sharing of customs. In this interpretation, ethnicity would only have meaning when two or more groups are interacting socially, or competing for control over scarce resources like jobs, housing, etc. Although the potential for conflict is always present, ethnic divisions vary considerably in intensity and hostility, depending in part on changing economic and political circumstances. For instance, ethnic intensity may be expected to increase significantly in a worsening economic situation, or when the civil status of certain migrant groups is being challenged as in the case of foreign workers in western Europe facing the prospect of deportation, or when certain groups seek ethnic minority status to qualify for 'affirmative action' or equal opportunity programmes as happened in the United States. Some manifestations of ethnicity actually militate against the formation of groups. Dench (1975), for instance, showed how an entire ethnic category stigmatized by the criminal activity of a few people opted for total assimilation, denying their cultural heritage, rather than unite as a group to fight this image.

Watson's views come close to that of Canadian sociologist Burnet (1976) who emphasizes that ethnic groups can be considered:

a) as forms of 'social life' rather than as survivals from the past;
b) as 'mobilizers of interest' rather than as bearers of cultures or traditions; and
c) as 'collectivities' with which people choose to identify culturally rather than as groups into which they are born and from which they sometimes struggle to escape.

Seen from this perspective, even sceptics like the radical egalitarian Canadian sociologist John Porter accepts that a strong case can be made for the role of ethnic group affiliation in solving problems of personal identity in the modern world of bureaucracy and technology; or stated differently, the value of ethnicity in developing a firm self-image from which to achieve in the larger society (Porter, 1975).

The following pages will provide some concrete and empirical illustrations of Burnet's three types of ethnic group functioning. Personal and informal ethnic networks will be considered as 'forms of social life'. Concentrations of members of a particular ethnic group in a residential area will be viewed as 'collectivities with which ethnic individuals choose to identify and seek support'. Indigenous ethnic voluntary associations will be discussed as mobilizers of interest and sources for problem-solving.

Many of the social programmes instituted in Western nations in relation to newcomers leave the impression that either these persons are totally dependent on initiatives of the host community to provide support systems to them, or are dependent on the formalized services introduced by various institutions, government or the professions. In other words, little attention is paid to the 'informal natural helping networks' which seem to be functioning among members of certain ethnic groups alongside the formal service structure. One of the most insightful and detailed research studies to illustrate the importance of personal and informal networks that are ethnically based is that done on the Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands by anthropologist van den Berg-Eldering (1978). She points out that Moroccans are very 'primary group' oriented, helping each other in times of need. They do not remain isolated for long, but form where possible communities in a social and often a physical sense. These helping communities form on the basis of relationships already existent back home through either: 1) family, 2) friendship, or 3) region of origin. Upon arrival the migrant will have had contact with any of these three relationship patterns and tend to move in as neighbours, resulting over time in concentrations of migrants in neighbourhoods. The same patterns seems to be followed in employment situations where 'good' Moroccan workers are approached by the employer for suggestions in taking on other Moroccan workers known to him, resulting in concentrations of ethnic group based workers. The housing distribution policy measure in the Netherlands (see 'Residential Milieu' below) has not prevented Moroccan families to seek each other out and maintain close ethnic relationships in the same neighbourhood, town, city or even with family and friends elsewhere in the country.

What do these informal networks consist of? For the Moroccans they involve daily contacts; visits between women while their husbands work; visiting and nursing the sick; babysitting; assisting during child birth and in child rearing; doing shopping for each other; working together in preparing food; and celebrating together birthdays, weddings, deaths, births, religious observances and ethnic or national feasts or holidays. Thus, migrants turn to each other in relation to family activities and occasions, religious activities, for meeting recreational needs, and giving support in relation to important events of the life-cycle, such as births, weddings and deaths, and providing financial and moral support in times of personal crisis. In relation to new arrivals these networks also assist them

to adapt to urban life through economic and moral support, easing the transition from their country of origin to the new environment.
In this sense, such networks function as highly self-sufficient and self-help groups, meeting thereby also indirectly group identity needs. Of course, group activity of this kind can also work negatively as witnessed in a developing phenomenon among Moroccan men who drink and gamble together. This is found to be frequently based on personal disappointments with their new life situation, seeing their initial expectations for advancement and a brighter future in their new country frustrated.
What we learn from such networks described above is, that they operate as informal counterparts to organized services, and in some areas carry the largest part of the so-called 'service load'. What is proposed here is that helping professions, carefully study such 'natural helping networks' that may be present in the neighbourhood, work place, high-rise apartment, meeting place, social circle, etc., and reach out to the natural helpers or central figures in these networks, to whom people turn in times of need for assistance in making arrangements, giving advice, and in providing direct help. Unfortunately, as Collins and Pancoast (1976) have pointed out, past experience shows that practitioners of the formal social services have a tendency to take charge of such networks or natural helpers by turning them into extensions of themselves. A fundamental difference exists in approach between professionally administered services that call for modification in service delivery, and one that is supportive of existing mutual aid or community self-help systems.

Residential Milieu, Ethnic Identity and Group Support

Analysis of settlement patterns of newcomers show that they tend to concentrate in certain cities and furthermore that members of the same ethnic group live in concentrated numbers and in close proximity to one another in certain neighbourhoods. Traditionally, newcomers in North America have tended to gravitate towards transitional neighbourhoods bordering on the central business districts of major cities where they could find cheap rental accommodation. With the re-development of the inner cities, and rehabilitation of older neighbourhoods, which have placed downtown housing out of reach to the average wage-earner, large numbers of newcomers in Toronto, London or Amsterdam are forced to settle now in other areas. The interesting observation is that, in spite of official attempts to the contrary, newcomers of the same ethnic origin can be found again in concentrated numbers living in close proximity in certain neighbourhoods

or in the same apartment blocks of new subdivisions. Official policy and practices with regard to housing, whether implicit or explicit, is to prevent and diminish the kind of residential concentrations of migrants that might turn into ghettos and serve as breeding areas for social problems like drug taking, prostitution and crime.

The Netherlands experience in housing the West Indian Blacks is an interesting illustration how the most well conceived government plans can fail when ignoring the search for ethnic identity and group support by newcomers, which among other factors explain residential concentrations of similar ethnic groups. The Netherlands government, during the 1974-75 mass influx of Surinamers, introduced the 5 per cent housing measure which meant that 5 per cent of all nationally subsidized new housing developments in municipalities across the country had to be reserved for these migrants. The policy came to be known as 'grouped deconcentration', aiming at a distribution of Surinamers across the country, but also making possible that kind of settlement which would not leave them in total isolation from each other, lost in a strange cultural environment. Not surprisingly, the plan failed. Reception centres were over-burdened with migrants for whom no housing could be found that would meet the settlement criteria outlined in the new housing policy. Many hasty decisions resulted which ignored the local employment situation in various municipalities, and the need of migrants to have the opportunity to associate with people of their own kind who faced similar difficulties. Secondly, these municipalities and local organizations were not adequately informed and prepared to deal with migrant groups who are different in needs, problems and life styles from the general population they had been accustomed to. Nor were migrants themselves properly informed of Netherlands community life. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the expectations for quick settlement and absorption into the local community did not materialize. Consequently, many – frustrated by their experiences – moved into the larger cities, where they aggregated into large concentrations, thereby creating the exact conditions which governmental policy on 'grouped deconcentration' sought to prevent.

Evidently, newcomers need the sense of security and belonging derived from primary group relationships with those who share the same ethnic identity (in national origin, or heritage, or as friends or relatives) and who live in close physical proximity. Living close together also protects them from having to face expected and actual forms of ethnic or racial discrimination in the open housing market and in neighbouring relations within white or other ethnic neighbourhoods (Bovenkerk, 1978). In ad-

dition, ethnic concentrations in neighbourhoods provide concrete forms of support similar to the ones described above in relation to 'personal and informal ethnic networks'.

Indigenous Ethnic Voluntary Associations

In contrast to the personal and informal ethnic networks and the residential milieu – which function as ethnic group support systems and provide direct help – indigenous voluntary associations tend to be more goal-oriented and formally organized in structure. These associations may function singularly or in combination as:

a) *Social Clubs or Groups*, which meet recreational, cultural or spiritual needs of their membership;

b) *Service Organizations*, which mobilize resources (funding, manpower, expertise) to provide ethnic related services; these services may include:

   I migrant reception services; such as information and referral, translation and interpretation, and orientation;
   II citizenship and acculturation services;
   III problem-solving services; such as legal aid, family counselling, alcohol rehabilitation and drug detoxification, group work and community outreach;
   IV adult education and skill training; these may include services related to training in pre-apprenticeship, vocational and social skills, and leadership;
   V multicultural activities; these will assist newcomers in appreciating the cultures of the host society, of other minority groups as well as their own.

c) organizations which carry a *social action* role, lobbying or advocating on behalf of the ethnic group's collective interests with government or specific institutions; or acting as a 'watch-dog' against discriminatory practices in employment, education, health or social services, advertising, news reporting, police practices, etc.

The question of relevance here is the relationship between the various sectors in meeting the needs and interests of ethnic individuals and groups – i.e. the public, private, and ethnic community sectors. How each society determines which activity falls appropriately within the realm of government or private sector is predicated by its philosophical and traditional

orientation towards addressing issues related to individual and community well-being. In a 'liberal' society like the U.S., with a long and extensive tradition of 'voluntary association' and community self-help, many of the activities mentioned above, including those related to the service area, are seen as appropriately falling in the domain of voluntary activity, both in initiative-taking and funding. In a more 'regulated' society like the Netherlands, government or government-assisted Community agencies have adopted these functions. A review of Netherlands practices shows that the national government, through the instrumentality of its grants programme, has assumed a central role in integration efforts, trying to shape the activities of private sector-initiated service centres for migrants into a more coherent programme of services related to the socio-cultural well-being of 'individual' migrants. Implicitly, it has followed a practice in which the ethnic leadership has largely been 'co-opted' into government-subsidized migrant services, hereby undermining ethnic group initiative in needs identification, interest articulation and group self help activity. Until this point in time there is no explicit policy that defines the role of ethnic associations in integration efforts as part of a growing cultural pluralism in Netherlands society. Instead, current policies guided by a 'system perspective' (refer to 'theoretical perspectives' above), continue to focus on the 'socio-economic' factors and 'individual emancipation' of the migrant in the institutional framework of Netherlands society.

Canada's experience with the role-relationship of government, private sector and indigenous ethnic groups in integration efforts, fall somewhere in between the United States and the Netherlands experience. Initial integration of newcomers into Canadian life is viewed as a shared responsibility, in which both Federal and Provincial government are involved, as well as local community agencies and ethnic organizations. A general assessment of the Canadian scene indicates that ethnic organizations particularly those of the larger ethnic communities such as the Italians and West Indians provide a considerable range of services for new arrivals. Some of these appear to duplicate those already provided by agencies serving the general population; however, others function in a complementary capacity. Research indicates that ethnic service organizations have a unique role to play, as people tend to feel more comfortable among those who share their values and aspirations, and also because they are generally more responsive and adaptive to the changing needs of their own respective communities than the established service organizations serving the general population.

In spite of Canada's official position on shared responsibility with regard to

integration of newcomers, and its multi-cultural policy, indigenous ethnic service organizations continue to be hampered by lack of credibility and political backing. Many of these organizations carry the lion's share in providing services to newcomers on 'shoe-string budgets'. What becomes clear is a continuing official ambivalence about delivery of ethnic-related services and pre-occupations with ethnic group isolation. This ambivalence seems to be true as much for the Netherlands and Britain (Cross, 1978, Smith, 1977) as for Canada.

FINAL REMARKS ON POLICY OPTIONS FOR MIGRANT INTEGRATION

In closing, my final remarks will attempt to outline some policy options, that will bring the theoretical perspectives on integration and the questions raised in this article into a concrete focus. Each of the options will, explicitly or implicitly, be concerned with two major problem dimensions of ethno-cultural minorities, i.e.: 1) individual and/or group emancipation; and 2) goals which stress cultural and/or socio-economic factors. The reader should be careful not to read these options as mutually exclusive, nor should they be seen as exhaustive of all actual or potential possibilities. It is their significance in the contemporary policy debate and for their empirical reality that they have been selected.

I *The Individualist Option* – This particular option can best be described as a non-policy in which a laissez-faire attitude is assumed of non-intervention by official circles. The migrant would be expected to find his own way in society with government reliance on community or private initiative, and little to no development of government-assisted migrant or ethnic-related services. In such circumstances the migrant would be dependent for meeting his needs on the institutional sectors of society serving the general population, and be subject to access factors and eligibility requirements. This position represents essentially the assimilationist view of integration. Developments at the community level may lead to group formation dependent on emerging leadership and circumstantial factors.

II *Reduction of Socio-economic Disadvantage* – Under this option policy would be aimed at reducing the status difference of the individual members of ethno-cultural minorities in their position on the employment and housing markets, in education, in their civil and political rights, etc.; and stress participation of the individual migrant in the existing institutional

framework through removal of structural obstacles and introduction of measures to assure real equality of opportunity. Such a policy can either ignore the ethnic or culture factor, implying the eventual loss of the migrant's ethno-cultural identity and language, and assume eventual total absorption in societal life; or it can take such factors into account, addressing the ethnic dimension as a 'temporary problem' to be overcome, through special policy and service accommodation during the initial settlement period of the migrant's adaptation process. Furthermore, such a model can be centrally and institutionally executed, or carried out through a local approach with the municipality carrying first-line responsibility for the integration and well-being of members of ethno-cultural minorities – in terms of employment, housing, education, social services, neighbour relations, etc.

III *Cultural Pluralist Option* – A multi-culturally based policy which recognizes the existence of specific group characteristics of the migrant in terms of his cultural identity needs and potential problem-solving capacities as outlined under the pluralist perspective and solution. The host community and its government can either supplement, build on, support, or in some situations even actively mobilize ethno-cultural group activity. It would be equally concerned with participation of the migrant as individual in the existing framework of societal institutions and his socio-economic needs, as with the migrant's group rights and development of his own ethnic identity. A variation of this approach includes official and community concern with inter-group relations and group access to political decision-making.

IV *The Inter-group Oriented Race Relations Option* – Policy and community action based on such a model concerns itself with countering discriminatory practices; the advancement of human rights; and the improvement of relations between majority and minority groups, and between ethnic groups themselves – which will allow for individual and group emancipation. As discriminatory practices may either be class or group based (conflict perspective), institutionally based (system perspective), and/or based on individual prejudices (inter-personal relations) – policies and measures, as well as community strategies would be selected accordingly from a combination of a) the judicial or semi-judicial approach with appointed statutory agencies functioning in a policing and enforcing role; b) educational and community relations activities to

promote understanding and acceptance of ethno-cultural group differences, and harmonious relations; and c) research into institutional and group-based discriminatory practices.

The British have relied principally on the local community approach towards integration with an emphasis on race relations (as outlined in option 4), implemented through the 'commission for Racial Equality' and local 'Community Relations Councils'. The Dutch, in contrast, have pursued a more centralist and programmatic approach with a focus on the socio-economic position of migrants, reflected in option 2. Canadian official approaches can best be described as eclectic, i.e. the immigration programme has focussed essentially on the settlement of 'individual' migrants; its multi-cultural policy and programme stresses the ethno-cultural 'group' dimensions, inherent in option 3; and its human rights legislation and anti-discrimination activities concern equality and relations among groups, inherent in option 4.

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VIEWS OF THE ETHNIC OPINION-LEADERS ON GOVERMENT POLICY

by R. Wiercx

In this article the floor is given to members of ethnic groups. Opinion-leaders of these groups in the Netherlands give their views on the place which the Netherlands community reserves for its 'new fellow-countrymen'. Naturally, the opinion-leaders place different accents, depending on the specific characteristics of their own group.

It is very tempting indeed to judge all the ethnic groups by the same standard. That just would not do, as it would amount to ignoring the great values which the specific cultural identity has for the own group. Even the Dutch themselves are after all not homogeneous.

They also have their conflicting socio-economic, cultural and political interests. How much more complex then is this conflict of interests within the roughly twenty ethnic groups that live in the Netherlands? We shall now see what six opinion-leaders have to say; last, but not least[1].

You will read – in numerical order – about Mediterranean workers, Surinamese Netherlanders, Moluccans, Antilleans, refugees and Roma (gypsies). The 28,000 Chinese are not discussed, nor are the 300,000 Dutch nationals who came to the Netherlands after the decolonization of Indonesia in 1949.

An essential characteristic of the term 'minority' is that it concerns a category of people, which is smaller in number than its counterpart, the 'majority'. The same is true for ethnic minorities. Anyone who is in regular contact with people from these minority groups knows that they often experience the term 'minority' as very humiliating. To them the term denotes, apart from the numerical aspect, that they are regarded by the dominant original population as mentally, culturally and socio-economically inferior. In order to avoid this negative association we prefer to use the term 'ethnic groups', in which only the ethnic origin and not the numerical aspect is regarded as a relevant variable. In this way we hope to emphasize the full and natural equality of all the members of these groups vis-à-vis the original majority.

A great handicap for the largest category among the ethnic groups is their low standard of organization. The 280,000 people of Mediterranean origin in the Netherlands are divided over nine nationalities: Cape Verdians, Moroccans, Tunisians, Turks, Greeks, Yugoslavs, Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese. Philippinos and Pakistani are not discussed here, because they were not – like the others – brought to the Netherlands via recruitment agreements which the Netherlands government and industry concluded in the sixties to make up the then prevailing shortage of unskilled workers.
It is significant in this respect that it was not until twenty years after the initial spontaneous arrival of Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese that there was some sign (in 1980) of incipient national bundling of organizations of foreign workers. It was especially some progressive Italian, Moroccan and Greek associations that played a part in this bundling. Through their efforts it became possible in the summer of 1980 to found the National Co-operative Body of Foreign Workers' Organizations, which was subsequently joined by numerous associations of different nationalities.

Despite this initial step towards a joining of forces the foreign workers continue to be a category difficult to represent among the ethnic minorities. This is due not just to their still relatively short stay in the Netherlands or to the feeling of uncertainty prevailing among these people as regards possible (compulsory) return migration in the coming years, but also to the very little support they receive from the Netherlands government for setting up organizations of their own. The government could easily give such support simply by granting a subsidy to each national or regional/local organization of, for example, Turks to enable them to rent their own accommodation and to organize activities intended to teach a Turkish group for instance how they can live in western society whilst still preserving their own culture. But in practice it is very difficult and complicated to obtain such a subsidy.
The driving force behind the above-mentioned National Co-operative Body of Foreign Workers' Organizations emanates from the Greek *Thanasis Apostolou* and the Moroccan *Mohammed Rabbae*.
They did not – like the majority of their fellow immigrants – come to the Netherlands as unskilled workers, but they attended university, first in their own country and later in the Netherlands. In this way they succeeded in finding their way in the – for foreigners – often very complex Nether-

lands society. Both are Directors of a regional welfare agency for foreign workers.

An office of this kind does two things for the Mediterranean people living in its region. By arranging consulting hours it helps to solve individual problems of foreigners, irrespective of their nationality, religion or political affiliation. In addition, it endeavours to organize groups of foreigners locally and per nationality and by taking appropriate action to improve their often inferior accommodation, education and work situation. The eighteen regional offices of this kind in the Netherlands are subsidized by the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work. Two of these offices are headed by a non-Dutch director and these are *Thanasis Apostolou* in the City of Utrecht and *Mohammed Rabbae* in the City of Breda, who were interviewed.

We asked *Thanasis Apostolou* for a reaction to all the papers and reports produced by the Netherlands government in recent years on the immigrant workers from the Mediterranean region.

Thanasis: 'I read from them that the government now admits that nothing much has been done for us foreigners in the past ten years. The arrears in our socio-economic situation is apparently now being made up quickly. Millions of guilders have suddenly become available to officials responsible for co-ordinating the minorities policy, sheafs of paper are being produced with fine objectives and fresh priorities in government policy. But it is all happening so suddenly that we just cannot understand all this goodwill, this understanding and this interest displayed by the government. We regard it with some reserve and distrust. Have we now all of a sudden become of significance? Or would the Dutch, and especially the government, be afraid that we would join forces and become rebellious, and would they want to keep us quiet?'

Thanasis explains his standpoint by drawing attention to what he sees as an ambiguous view set out in the government reports on the cultural heritage of the different ethnic groups: 'Our cultural values must never affect the fundamental values of the Netherlands culture', is what it says again and again. Thus, we ought to adapt to each other. To us, foreigners, this means that we lose, because our minority culture will allways be overshadowed by the dominant Netherlands values and norms.'

Mohammed Rabbae adds to what *Thanasis* has said: 'It is human nature that you would wish to communicate from the same emotional value and background as the person you are talking to. This is the reason why Moroccans abroad tend to flock together. Moroccans and Turks especially feel strange in the individualistically inclined Dutch society. After all they

come from a culture, in which the family, the neighbours, the neighbourhood and the region are regarded as important elements. Hospitality is something which the oriental keeps in high esteem. Although in the Netherlands we are often referred to as 'guest workers', we do not experience a great deal of the hospitality this would suggest.'

In Islamic countries the mosque occupies an important place in everyday life. The mosque is the centre of life: it is there that the social contacts take place. There are still few mosques in the Netherlands, although in recent years the Islam has become the second religion after Christianity. The Dutch government refuses to give the low-paid foreign workers financial assistance for buying and fitting out accommodation for mosques. For this reason the muslims must collect the necessary funds among themselves.

Mohammed Rabbae draws attention to a very negative result of this situation. 'The repressive regime of the Moroccan King Hassan grants financial assistance to the 'Amicales' organization, which is favourably disposed towards the regime. This money is used by the members of the organization to finance festivities, at which propaganda is made against progressive imams or against membership of Netherlands trade unions.

Since the very conservative Moroccan government provides funds for perception of the Moroccan cultural identity and the Dutch government gives little, my fellow immigrants continue to live in the margin of Netherlands society.'

Mohammed and *Thanasis* are convinced that only organizations of foreign workers, of their wives and children can guarantee that the government will hear their views. They feel that foreigners must find their own place in the Netherlands. For the present this will still have to take place per nationality and without being influenced by governments in the country of origin. The cultural identity of each group is in their view a good point on which to organize people, as long as one does not lose sight of the fact that often all kinds of reactionary and conservative ideas are wrongly justified on the ground of the identity of a culture: 'It says in the Koran that Allah wanted that there should be a difference between the poor and the rich.

A conservative imam can use this to consolidate the prevailing inequality of power among men. But a progressive imam reads the following text in the Koran: 'They shall consult with one another' and explains this as meaning: democracy is the basis of decision-making.'

As long as the own organizations and the cultural expressions of foreigners from the Mediterranean countries are not accepted at full value, Dutch society will continue to resemble most the conservative imam.

SURINAMESE NETHERLANDERS

Some 180.000 people from the former Netherlands colony Surinam in Latin-America live in the old mother country along the North Sea. There has always been some (temporary) migration to the metropolis from Surinam, then part of the Kingdom, but that concerned a small elite, who on account of the absence of proper educational facilities in their own country came to the Netherlands for study-reasons and often stayed there. But just before Surinam acquired its political independence in 1975 this emigration swelled enormously. Within a period of three years (1973-1975) large numbers of socio-economically weaker people travelled to the Netherlands by air, driven by a feeling of uncertainty about developments in their country of birth. Practically all these immigrants Netherlands citizen remained in 1975. Most of these Surinamese Netherlanders have thus been in the Netherlands for a short time and have very strong family ties with their Latin-American fatherland. But they also have ties with for instance India and the Indonesian island of Java (also at one time a Netherlands colony), whence around the turn of the century numerous contract workers were brought to the plantations of Surinam.

Just as in the case of the Mediterranean workers, great differences may be observed between the various ethnic groups, such as Creoles, Hindustani, Chinese and Javanese, all of whom are all of a sudden referred to as Surinamese in the Netherlands. The degree to which they are organized is higher than among the Mediterranean immigrants. There are organizations based on both political ideology and ethnical background, but hitherto the Surinamese welfare organizations have displayed the strongest development. Their spokesmen – and they can be of different ethnic Surinamese origin – have very much come to the fore as the guardians of the interests of the Surinamese Netherlanders.

The Director of the National Federation of Welfare Institutions for Surinamese is *Harold Roseval*. He is a sociologist by profession. In this capacity he has for many years been an opinion-leader on improvement of the often difficult socio-economic situation of his compatriots in the Netherlands. In talking to us he expresses considerable anxiety about the growing negative attitude towards Surinamese in everyday life. 'The Dutch discriminate against us on account of colour', he says, 'and that is why our urge for emancipation is acquiring a high rate of acceleration. We are compelled to stand up for ourselves better.'

'Our influence on the social process is partly dependent on the complaisance of the original population. Since our people are often in the

same weak socio-economic situation as many of the Dutch, the tensions resulting from this compulsory co-existence of the two groups should not be unloaded on to these socially weak Netherlands citizens. So far the government has failed to create a sufficient number of jobs for the socially weak Surinamers and Dutch alike.
Good and large houses are not yet available in a sufficiently large number either, and consequently the Dutch continue to regard us as competitors on the ill-supplied housing market.'
According to *Harold Roseval* the government has very nicely pointed out on paper that the Netherlands has in a matter of years turned into a multi-ethnic society, but this very same government refuses to draw the obvious conclusions from this. 'An effort is made to 'dutchify' the immigrants. They are afraid of isolation and ghetto-formation of immigrants. Their different life styles are characterized as strange and deviating.' He checks this argumentation against the opportunities the Surinamers get to participate in democratically deciding their own future: 'We as Surinamese organizations cannot exercise a proper say in the matter. We are no match for the well-paid and towering official structures, which decide at the ministries what is to be done on our behalf. Under these circumstances equality is a myth. It has also struck *Harold Roseval* that in recent years a lot of research has been devoted to the 'problems of ethnic minorities'. He takes the view that this interest is useful, in principle, but he also points out that it is a small number of researchers who decide what happens in this small scientific world.
This small group, he says, strongly identifies itself with each others opinions. Their recommendations to the central government are often quite different from what the immigrants, who are the subject of research, want. But since the immigrants do not belong to the select group of researchers, their views do not find expression in these recommendations. Hence, *Roseval* enters a plea for own institutions for scientific activities and expertise-formation of ethnic groups, as were successfully introduced in the United States of America. (Here he cites the paper by *Joyce A. Ladner*, 'The death of white society' (1975)).
Against the pressure of 'dutchification' and becoming a copy of his white fellow-man *Harold Roseval* puts forward *Franz Fanon*, who says that: 'the black man should no longer be confronted by the dilemma 'turn white or disappear', but he should be able to take cognizance of a possibility of existence. In other words, if society makes difficulties for him because of his colour, my objective will not be that of dissuading him from it by advising to 'keep his place'; on the contrary, my objective, once his

motivations have been brought into consciousness, will put him into a position to choose action (or passivity) with respect to the real source of the conflict – that is, towards the social structures' (*Franz Fanon*, 'Black skin white mask', (1952)).

'Netherlands society should also take action, namely by really accepting the Surinamers with their own languages, cultures and religions. As Surinamers we should be given the opportunity to act as a group. We must strengthen our own group and it is not until this has been done that co-existence on an equal footing with the majority will be possible', says *Roseval* with emphasis.

But meanwhile *Roseval* also expects action on the part of the central government, more especially to counteract growing racism and fascism among the Netherlands population. Effective anti-discrimination legislation will have to be introduced quickly, as otherwise, he feels, the human rights of the Surinamers in the Netherlands will be affected. 'To my mind the well-known Holland Festival is a criterion for the multi-cultural character of Netherlands society. Year in year out the programme is completely western, European. None of the minority cultures come on to the stage. Why are we not allowed to take part. After all we live in the Netherlands just like anybody else. Isn't it just as much our festival?', concludes *Harold Roseval*.

MOLUCCANS

The 35,000 Moluccan inhabitants of the Netherlands constitute one of the smaller ethnic groups. Small, but heard of throughout the world on account of their violent actions involving two hijacked trains and some occupations of official buildings, causing a small number of Moluccans and Netherlanders to lose their lives in the seventies. In ethnic circles it is often pointed out that the actions on the part of the (youthful) Moluccans awakened the Netherlanders to the problems of the minority groups. And this reasoning is indeed sound chronologically: after the violent actions beginning in the seventies the government made funds available for organizations promoting the welfare of Moluccans. But they did not receive official recognition of their political objective: an independent Republic of the South Moluccas.

The largest organization of Moluccans is the *Badan Persatuan* (South-Moluccan Unity Movement) and its significance is illustrated by the fact that the Vice-Chairman of this *Badan Persatuan, Rits Mual*, is also the Chairman of the Consultative Body for the Wellfare of Moluccans, which

A boarding-house for foreign labourers (Amsterdam)

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– on request and voluntarily – makes recommendations to the Minister of Culture, Recreation and Social Wotk on matters concerning the Moluccans.

In addition, *Rits Mual* teaches sociology and community development at the Social Academy in Culemborg. He is a graduate sociologist. Being a true representative of his people, we asked him what the ideal policy on behalf of the Moluccans would have to look like.

Rits Mual: 'To start with, it is about time people should realize that we did not come here of our own free will. At the time many of our people served in the Royal Netherlands Indies Army and in 1950 we were ordered to come to the Netherlands, then dismissed from military service and put out of the way in camps. When it became clear that we could not go back on account of political developments in the Republic of Indonesia, which in the meantime had occupied the Moluccan islands, the only way open to us was to stay on in the Netherlands.' He continues: 'We should very much like to develop ourselves in the Netherlands in accordance with out own ideas. We have lost our country, our political ideals are being thwarted and the development of our identity has been sacrified to an unsuccessful integration policy. To my mind the government places too great an emphasis on the socio-economic arrears of ethnic groups. I find that rather one-sided. I should prefer to place this emphasis on cultural development, because in my view this is still a white area on the map of government policy on behalf of minorities.'

Rits Mual gives an example of the cultural values of Moluccans: 'When we came here thirty years ago, we brought along an extensive mutual aid system. Moluccans help each other on the strength of all kinds of relations (pela, kampong, family ties). To give an example, at the present time there is not a single Moluccan who has a burial insurance policy. If someone dies, the people of the village where he or she comes from see to payment of the funeral expenses. We have a smooth-working adoption system within the Moluccan family circle and also automatic care of those in need.

Don't misunderstand me, I do not want to keep everything the way it was, but I consider it unacceptable that the government completely ignores the elements of value present in *our* community.'

Rits Mual is pleased to see that the fairly well-organized Moluccans themselves are very active in education and employment projects, in giving assistance and in housing committees. This activity is not surprising, considering the long time these people have been in the Netherlands, but it certainly gives rise to amazement seeing that for a long time they were fairly isolated in camps and later in their own residential neighbourhoods,

as a result of which they would probably not be so much inclined to take part in Netherlands society. Or would it be true to say that this isolation was precisely a sound basis for participation in Netherlands society after all?

'Living in own residential neighbourhoods creates the conditions for an intensive community life. Our three-generation families do not fit so easily in the Netherlands one-family houses. All the same I feel that our people, especially the young people, should have a choice between a residential neighbourhood with Moluccan people and a Netherlands neighbourhood elsewhere. But then again we see that the Dutch don't know what to do with us. If we live in our own neighbourhood, they talk about undesirable ghetto-formation and that frightens them, and if we come to live among them, they start to discriminate against us. In this way we continue to live in compulsory isolation.'

The Moluccans are fairly uniquely represented in a Consultative Body, of which – as mentioned before – *Mual* is the Chairman. Not all the important Moluccan organizations are represented in this Consultative Body, but the majority of them are. Mual sometimes hears the reproach that his Consultative Body is not representative.

Rits Mual gives a direct answer to this: 'That's not a reproach, it's a weapon to attack the effective protection of our interests. In the past thirty years there have been moments that the Moluccan community was in itself greatly divided. That was used against us. But at other times, when we had achieved almost complete unity, we continued to hear that the Consultative Body was not representative. I find this representativity discussion hypocritical, because the government itself invariably ignores the existing neighbourhood organizations in our neighbourhoods. The Dutch government prefers to leave the welfare work to self-appointed institutions, a legal construct completely strange to the Moluccans. We Moluccans have our own typically Moluccan forms of organization and, I feel, the government should make allowance for this.'

What is this 'typically Moluccan'?

Mual: 'It is made up of our specific forms of organization, our customs, attitudes and reactions, as well as our identity. Our culture, if you wish. When we Moluccans talk about culture, we expressly do not speak of art or folklore. It concerns our Moluccan way of life. And that way of life is different from the culture of the Dutch. Look here, Dutch people are inclined to talk rather condescendingly about their own culture. To them it is no more than a clog-dance, it has become folklore, because pop-culture

and coca-cola culture has overshadowed everything else. Netherlands culture has become so superficial and empty.'
Among the Moluccans, also among the young people, who only know the islands where their parents were born from pictures and stories, there has been a striking revaluation of the Moluccan language, customs, art and folklore.
'It's not a homesick feeling for the past, but rather a search for what binds us together and we can be proud of', concludes *Rits Mual*, 'our culture is very much alive, also in the Netherlands.'

ANTILLEANS

What the 28,000 Antilleans in the Netherlands have in common with the Surinamers and the Moluccans is that their future was decided by the era of colonialism. The Netherlands Indies and Surinam have meanwhile become politically independent republics, the Netherlands Antilles in the Caribbean politically still form part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Netherlanders have been confronted with Antillean immigration since 1954. Just as in the case of the Surinamers, a large number of the immigrants who arrived at that time were students. But there were also seamen among them. In the sixties, when people from the Mediterranean countries were being recruited as unskilled workers, Netherlands companies also went to find labour on the Windward and Leeward Islands in the Caribbean. Up to 1972 workers and nurses came to the Netherlands.
Since that time a growing number of Antilleans have come on their own initiative, driven by feelings of uneasiness about the bad socio-economic conditions in their island region. We talked to one of them, *Anco Ringeling*, about the position of these people. *Anco Ringeling* is the co-ordinator of an Antillean Welfare Agency, Kibra Hacha, and until recently he was the Chairman of the National Committee of Antillean Welfare Institutions. He furthermore studies sociology.
'In recent years the number of immigrants without a diploma and without any work experience has greatly increased. As a result of this the Antilleans are also more and more becoming a problem group for Netherlands society, which is struggling with growing unemployment. As far as the Netherlands is concerned the well-trained Antilleans have a favourable quality. The centuries of colonialism have caused them to be strongly oriented to the Netherlands and western ways of life. Their insight into and their capacity for adjustment to the Netherlands are considerable and thus offer very few problems. But the Antilleans with a low standard of edu-

cation often hardly speak any Dutch, but are more fluent in English or Papiamento. They are having a difficult time, because the Netherlands is very strange to them. You can see this from the percentage of unemployed among them, which is well over twice as much as the Dutch average.'

In order that something can be done about this *Anco Ringeling* would very much like to see the Dutch government conduct an active policy. 'Affirmative action, as practised in the United States of America, is a good solution to the problem. Government establishments would be compelled to employ a certain quota of people from ethnic groups. This can also be arranged in private industry, of course, provided the government pays a subsidy per worker from the ethnic groups, who is taken on in this way.'

According to *Anco Ringeling* the government would in this way also counteract discrimination against coloured people on the employment market. For the present there is not much chance of an 'affirmative action' policy being introduced. How do the Antilleans hope to exercise influence on government policy?

Anco Ringeling draws attention to the political developments in the Antillean island region. 'Since 1979 we have had a new government, a progressive coalition of two parties. This government fortunately sees it as its duty to establish closer ties with the islanders in the Netherlands than did the previous government. In collaboration with the Antillean Welfare Agencies the island government is considering return-migration projects. We should like to see that Shell, which operates a large refinery on the island of Curaçao, would take on as new personnel unemployed Antilleans who have been on the unemployment registers in the Netherlands for a long time.

There are after all also well-trained Antilleans in the Netherlands who are unemployed and would be only too willing to go back, if they could get work 'back home'.'

Anco Ringeling also points out that the Antilleans who want to (or must) stay in Europe should build up an organization structure of their own. The basis for such a structure is already present in the form of the Antillean welfare organizations.

'Without any false pride we can certainly say that the welfare agencies are at present the only fairly well-organized bodies of Antilleans in the Netherlands. There are also a lot of sports clubs and volunteer organizations, but they don't count in the contacts with the central government, because they still lack the expertise when such subjects as employment, housing and education come up for discussion.'

Since the summer of 1981 the Antillean welfare foundations have been organized at national level.
Anco Ringeling feels that it was high time for this organizational structure to be set up.
'Since only a few months we can seriously take part in the discussions on policy matters. Before that time we knew nothing and received much less information than, for example, the National Federation of Welfare Institutions for Surinamers or the Consultative Body for the Welfare of Moluccans. All the same I do think that Netherlands society still does not give us enough room. And if it won't give us this room, we shall have to fight for it', concludes *Anco Ringeling*.

REFUGEES

Whereas since the Second World War the Netherlands had only been required to admit refugees seeking asylum from Eastern Europe, this situation changed in 1969. It was from Portugal that for the first time 'left-wing' conscientious objectors and deserters started to arrive in large numbers. At the time they came up against a blank wall of misunderstanding on the part of the Netherlands authorities: accepting refugees from another NATO country seemed impossible. Hitherto those seeking asylum had come from such communist countries as Hungary (1956) and Czecho-Slovakia (1968).
This disturbance of the traditional pattern brought organizations working on behalf of refugees on humanitarian and political grounds closer together. An effort was made to achieve a proper reception of groups of refugees ('contingents' in the jargon). It started with the Indian Ugandese, who were banished from their country in 1971 by the then dictator Idi Amin. And it continued with the Chileans (from 1973 onwards), Uruguayans and Argentinians up to and including the Vietnamese boat people.
In recent years the number of refugees invited by the Dutch government in collaboration with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has exceeded that of the individual refugees seeking asylum (especially Christian Turks, Eritreans and Kurds). At present 8,500 refugees eligible for being granted asylum legally reside in the Netherlands.
The co-operation between a large number of organizations for the reception of refugees became steadily closer according as larger contingents of people eligible for asylum were invited by the government. Ultimately, a single, large, private organization was formed in 1979 for the

Roma (Bergen op Zoom)

initial reception and guidance of refugees, namely the Association for Work among Refugees in the Netherlands, which is almost fully subsidized by the Government.

A remarkable point about this organization is that it has opted for the legal construct of an Association. This means that individual members – concerned with the work among refugees and with the refugees themselves – decide how things are done. The underlying idea of this construct is that active groups in the community must constitute the vehicle for admission and reception of the refugees. These active groups consist for the greater part of volunteers and of some professionals. The Association endeavours to arrange for a proper initial reception with the assistance of these volunteers and professionals. By this is understood an initial meeting with Netherlands society, language courses, assistance in finding housing accommodation, obtaining a social security benefit (or work) and human contact. The general idea is that after two years the refugee should be able to look after himself in his newly adopted country. The Association takes the view that the refugee may not become dependent on Netherlands assistance. Once they have acquired the refugee status, a source of income and accommodation, and have followed a language course, they must be able to stand on their own two feet.

The Association considers it a good thing that organizations of refugees exist, even though they will often be of a specific political colour. The refugee must be absolutely free to choose the (own) organization of which he wants to become a member.

The ideal of having an Association of volunteers has so far not been so very successful. The Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work would not appear to be particularly happy with the legal construct of an Association, in which citizens can decide fairly independently on how public funds will be spent. Hence, in the eyes of the Association the civil servants are inclined to carry out as much work as possible themselves instead of leaving it to the (volunteers and professionals of the) Association for Work among Refugees in the Netherlands.

The Ministry takes the view that there is too little control over the volunteer work among the refugees. This was the reason why in the spring of 1981 the Association decided to withdraw from the reception of the contingents of Vietnamese boat people and to concentrate solely on the work on behalf of individual refugees seeking asylum and those entitled to being granted asylum.

The Association is arranging its own funds for this.

The reception of the large groups of invited refugees is now entirely in the

hands of the central government, which endeavours to arrange for the exiles to be given housing accommodation somewhere in the country as quickly as possible and to offer them a social security benefit, a language course and contacts with Netherlands volunteers via – unskilled – local municipal channels.

ROMA (GYPSIES)

As so many other countries in the world the Netherlands also has its Gypsies. In their own language – Romanes – they refer to themselves as Roma, a name we would use here as a matter of respect. Since 1450 they have wandered through Europe, but their history is one of repression, discrimination, persecution and sometimes even of genocide. The Netherlands also had its share in this: in 1750 the country was 'freed of Roma' by christians, who justified their massacres with a reference to the so-called heathendom of the Roma. And early in the twentieth century the christian Prime Minister Abraham Kuyper wrote about the Roma: 'They are and remain parasites. . .'.

The Roma who once more came to live in the Netherlands after 1750 suffered heavily from the genocide practised by the German Nazis in the Second World War.

The Roma who wander through Europe nowadays mostly originate from Yugoslavia. Owing to the modernization of that country they were compelled to assimilate. Towards the end of the sixties, however, they suddenly moved in large numbers to Western Europe, to the rich countries, which they had come to know from the stories told by Yugoslav immigrant workers coming home on holiday.

All the West-European countries, with the exception of Sweden, displayed a very hostile reaction to the Roma. At the frontier posts they were often sent back and forth. To rid itself of these difficulties the Netherlands government admitted 500 foreign Roma in 1977 and then closed its frontiers to this people. This resulted in family ties being cruelly severed: Roma live in 'kumpanias', i.e. large families, of which the members regularly visit and help each other. Relatives who were not in the Netherlands on the predetermined date were no longer allowed to enter the country.

The Roma who were admitted spent a very difficult first winter in their caravans on a unhygienic camping site. Later they were dispersed over nine municipalities, who after all wanted to admit them as residents (the Netherlands numbers 792 municipalities!). In these municipalities they

were temporarily housed in what are termed exchange dwellings and later given normal rented housing among the Dutch.

The Roma are being dispersed throughout the country with the intention of promoting fast integration with the Netherlands population. The type of community in which the Roma live, the 'kumpania', is thus disregarded. This is contrary to the Netherlands government's fine ideas on 'recognition of the cultural identity'. The very frequent communication which the members of the 'kumpania' maintain amongst themselves must now take place by letter or by telephone. Hence, the Roma are continuing their efforts to bring their relatives – legally or illegally – to the Netherlands.

There is something strange about housing and dispersing the foreign Roma. Is it likely that people who have always travelled and wandered around and who found their livelihood in trading would now all of a sudden wish to live in neat little middle-class houses? The question is how long this would last. If you were to ask the Roma to-day whether this is what they really want, you would get an affirmative answer.

This answer is quite understandable to anyone aware of their former experiences, a life without any rights whatsoever and in great poverty. Hitherto the Roma culture has wrongly been depicted as very romantic: nomads roaming through the countryside with a plaintive violin, the picture from the operetta 'Der Zigeunerbaron'. Reality is different. There is no longer any freedom for them to wander from one West-European state to another. The traditional occupations (tinkers, horse and car dealers) are being made almost impossible by regulations or have become completely out-of-date.

The freedom of the Roma in Western Europe has become the freedom to go to ruin. It is not surprising that they (temporarily?) make use of the opportunity to live in a brick house on a social security benefit, even if that means they must do without the 'kumpania'.

NOTES

[1] In July 1980 the Board of Editors of 'Welzijnsmaandblad' (Welfare Monthly) asked representatives of organizations of ethnic groups to put their views on the 'minorities policy' of the Netherlands government to paper. In September the articles were published in a theme issue of the monthly, a publication of Stichting TMW/Samson B.V., Vol. 34, No. 9, pp. 278-324. The editor of this theme issue summarizes the most important statements in this article.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS IN THIS ISSUE

Hubert Campfens migrated from the Netherlands to Canada in 1953. In 1971 he obtained a doctorate from the University of Toronto, Faculty of Social Work. He has taught at several Universities in Canada and else where; currently he is associate professor at the Faculty of Social Work, Wilfrid Laurier University at Waterloo, Ont.

Han Entzinger (1947) studied sociology at the University of Leiden. He worked at the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Recreation and Social Work and at the International Labour Office in Geneva. Since 1978 he has been secretary to the Advisory Commission on Minorities Research (ACOM).

Rinus Penninx (1948) studied sociology of non-western societies at the Universities of Nijmegen and Leiden. He has carried out research in the Netherlands as well as in Turkey, on many aspects of international labour migration. Since 1978 he has been working at the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Recreation and Social Work.

Carlo van Praag (1939) studied social geography at the University of Amsterdam. He worked at that same university and at the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Recreation and Social Work. Since 1974 he has been working at the Social and Cultural Planning Office as a specialist in housing and in immigration.

Marlene de Vries (1947) studied sociology at the University of Amsterdam. She has worked for a welfare agency for foreign workers and she has done research on 'the second generation'. At the moment she participates in a research project of the University of Amsterdam on the labour market position of Turkish and Moroccan youngsters.

Rogier Wiercx (1947) is journalist and editor of 'Welzijnsweekblad/Welzijnsmaandblad' (Welfare Weekly/Welfare Monthly), Haarlem. From 1969 to 1972 he was a member of a group expressing solidarity with immigrant workers and from 1977 to 1980 he was chief editor of the monthly 'Motief', dealing with ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. In 1980/81 he worked on the board of editors of the bimonthly journal 'Discrimination' of the Association against Racial Discrimination.

THE NETHERLANDS ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
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